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ABSTRACT 
 
South Africa has a sophisticated and developed retirement fund industry and an extensive 
social security system. While the objective of the latter is wider, both are concerned with 
financial security: particularly in the face of risks of death, disability and old age. It is 
widely recognised that there are many gaps in coverage. The chapters in this thesis 
address these gaps and administrative and benefit structures that could be developed to 
provide a truly comprehensive social security system. In particular, the thesis discusses 
the retirement and old age recommendations of the Taylor Committee, on which the 
author served. The vision is of universal coverage for the current state benefits 
augmented by mandatory employer based group schemes that offer disability, retirement 
and orphans' pensions. Means tests, the Road Accident Fund and workers' compensation 
arrangements would be abolished.  
The chapters of the thesis are each self-contained, having all been published in – or 
submitted to – journals, books or conferences. In each, an attempt has been made to 
review a broader literature than is normally used to discover the impact of some element 
of the benefit structure, governance or investment policies of retirement schemes on their 
members. In this context, it is considered to be particularly appropriate to test policies 
and governance against the standard of justice.  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
1 OBJECTIVE 
The chapters of this thesis have been written to evaluate the policy proposals in 
Chapter 9 of Taylor et al (2002) (the Taylor recommendations). Chapter 9, Old Age and 
Retirement, was based on the report of the Retirement Sub-committee1, which was 
written by the author of this thesis. That report needed expansion in a number of areas, 
and the recommendations needed to be justified systematically; conditions which this 
thesis remedies. It discusses what I see to be the more important questions in the context 
of an extensive review of the relevant literature. 
To be fair to other members of the Committee, it should be recorded that there was not 
time to discuss many of the recommendations of the Retirement Fund Sub-committee. It 
should also be recorded that I submitted a letter to the Minister of Social Development 
dissenting from a number of the Committee's main recommendations. This thesis 
therefore reflects my views and not necessarily those of other members of the 
Committee. 
The individual chapters of this thesis therefore discuss, in some cases explicitly and in 
others tangentially, those of the Taylor recommendations that I saw as needing additional 
research, investigation and possibly explanation. As I have wanted to expose and debate 
the ideas more widely and to contribute to the development of policy, the chapters have 
been written to stand alone, and have already been published, discussed at conferences or 
included in research paper series. 
The concerns of this thesis also interact with other issues covered by the Taylor report: 
unemployment benefits, protection of children, disability, the Road Accident Fund and 
worker's compensation arrangements. In each of these areas, it was evident that middle-
class South Africans obtain their financial security (or at least receive more money) from 
                                                    
1
 Although an acceptable version can now be found at: 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/CountryPovertyPapers/SouthAfrica/taylor/report7.pdf#search=%22Taylor%20%22R
oad%20Accident%20Fund%22%20abolish%22 
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insurance companies and retirement funds than from the state, but the authors of the 
other chapters of the Taylor report focused almost entirely on state provision. Their 
discussion, and on occasion recommendations, is often consistent with the 
recommendations of chapter 9. Those reading both the report and this thesis will 
however see that they are based on different visions of how a comprehensive social 
security system should serve all South Africans.  
2 MY VISION 
While the following chapters set out to investigate some of the Taylor recommendations, 
the thesis effectively outlines a vision of a rather different South African social security 
system insofar as it affects death, disability and retirement benefits. Little is said about 
changes to poverty relief, job creation and medical insurance, each of which is arguably 
more important. Fundamental issues not addressed here are the advantages and 
disadvantages of pay-as-you-go systems and funded private arrangements. Asher (1997) 
makes the case for the latter in terms of accountability, the efficiency of investment 
markets, and greater economic democracy. The social, economic and educational benefits 
of economic democracy are spelt in more detail in Asher (1992). 
The vision consists of two parts that can be briefly described. 
First is a universal pension for orphans, the disabled and the aged funded from general 
tax revenue. This would mean adding an orphans' pension to the current system, and 
abolishing the means test, which I characterize in chapter 3 as an administrative atrocity.  
The second part would be employment based funds very much like current retirement 
funds, except that membership would be compulsory and they would be required to offer 
a set of minimum pensions: for orphans, the disabled and the aged. Membership would 
not be required of workers informally employed or earning below the tax threshold. The 
funds would all be controlled by elected trustees subject to the fiduciary duties of 
common law and a government regulator. These benefits would replace those currently 
offered by the Road Accident Fund and workers' compensation arrangements, which 
could therefore be abolished.  
Such a system would be uniquely South African. The universal state pension and benefits 
would resemble the New Zealand system, but that country has not much of a contributory 
scheme. The defined contribution private system would have much in common with 
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countries that have followed the Chilean model, but would not be imposed on informal 
workers and would offer a more comprehensive suite of benefits. It would provide an 
acceptable level of support to the poor, and create a high probability that wealthier 
families could retain their lifestyle in the event of early death, disability and in 
retirement. There would be protection for the weak and controls on the power of the 
strong. 
3 JUSTICE 
The Taylor recommendations are evaluated against the standard of justice, which 
provides the imperatives of the title to this thesis. Justice is the standard against which 
we measure the exercise of power by individuals, and agreements and laws that exercise 
power over our lives. It is therefore the standard by which we measure government 
intervention, and is particularly concerned with protecting the powerless against the 
powerful. In lesser measure, it is also the standard against which we measure the actions 
of trustees when they exercise discretions given them in terms of their power over the 
operation of retirement funds.  
There is an ancient consensus that justice can be defined as giving to each his due2. What 
is due to people subjected to the power of others? If anything, it must be related to their 
essential dignity: to their ubuntu (humanness), flowing, for some, from our resemblance 
to the Creator. This dignity seems to provide sufficient basis for the recognition of 
objectives or what are sometimes called basic or first-generation human rights: to life, 
equality, liberty, the provision of basic needs, and recognition of just deserts. The 
approach taken in this thesis is to recognise the absolute value of these objectives, in the 
sense that they always have value and that governments are under obligation to attempt 
to satisfy them as much as practical. Efficiency is added to the list of objectives in to 
capture the practicalities. 
This approach can be distinguished from the “rights-based approach” to social objectives 
that are occasionally referred to in the Taylor report, which ambitiously attempts to 
ground minimum social security benefits in law and with the judicial arm of government. 
The justice-based approach applied here is also concerned with processes and social 
                                                    
2
 See Aquinas (1275) Part II – II Question 58 
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impacts, less definite in its operation, and looks to both government and private sector 
for action. Looked at another way, justice can be seen as the application of the golden 
rule to the relationship between rulers and the ruled.  
Justice is, as Lucas (1980) says, the glue that creates social solidarity, the fraternite of 
the French revolution or the flowering of ubuntu: umuntu ngubuntu ngabantu – a person 
is only a person because of others. Its foundation in human dignity gives the lie to claims 
that such solidarity requires those with authority in a community to be immune from 
criticism. On the contrary, their position of power means that they are subject to an even 
higher standard of behaviour. 
4 IS THE TOPIC RELEVANT TO ACTUARIES? 
Benefit design is not one of the statutory functions required of actuaries, and it may be 
asked whether it is an issue of direct relevance to actuaries. An answer can be derived 
from at least three perspectives: from the needs of society, the roles played by actuaries 
in the retirement fund industry and the self-interest of members of the profession. 
 The need for the profession (as underlined by their statutory roles) arises from the 
difficulty faced by the general public in evaluating financial soundness of insurance 
companies and retirement funds without specialised training and detailed knowledge. 
There is a need for people with the skills and integrity to monitor the soundness of those 
institutions that are likely to pay benefits many years after contributions have been made.  
The remoteness of the benefits from the contributions creates another need for 
specialised knowledge. It is difficult for healthy people to envisage and understand the 
financial needs of the disabled, for parents to know the financial implications to their 
children of the death of one or both of them, or for young people to project their needs in 
retirement. Such knowledge cannot emerge spontaneously. It requires a systematic 
evaluation of the financial needs of the beneficiaries. The arguments for professional 
discipline in this arena are similar to the arguments for prudence in the management of 
financial institutions: they both require some deferment of gratification, which can be an 
unpopular message that may require that those people and organizations that promise 
premature pleasures should be restrained. There is therefore a need for professional 
involvement in this sphere.  
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Given the need, it is not surprising that actuaries, in practice, devote much of their time 
to the design of retirement fund benefits. Actuaries working with retirement funds are 
frequently styled, or employed by, “employee benefit consultants”. It is true that the 
actuarial focus is more on the pricing of the benefit than on the design per se, but that is 
largely because benefit design cannot be often changed and is therefore not often the 
subject of much thought. When changes are considered, it is inconceivable that actuaries 
would not have to be consulted and have to consider the contingencies upon which the 
benefits are paid. While it is argued that they should often know more about these 
contingencies, their training and experience frequently make them better informed than 
others involved in these decisions.  
This second perspective might appear to be conclusive, were there not a dislocation 
between the work of so many actuaries and alternative views of the nature of actuarial 
science. This dislocation is expressed in the difference between the definition of the role 
of the profession given above, and another commonly used to describe the work of 
actuaries. The Institute of Actuaries defines actuaries as "providing expert and relevant 
solutions to financial problems, especially those involving uncertain future events3". This 
definition is so broad that it appears to extend the work of actuaries into a number of 
investment and commercial areas in which they have no particular experience, and where 
they would compete with other professionals. As the profession already has a defined 
social purpose, which includes but is not necessarily limited to its statutory powers, it is 
suggested that it is not helpful to see actuaries as a group of people with a particular skill 
looking for anything to do that relates in some way to their training. The profession’s 
statutory powers are limited to the security and pricing of benefits rather than their 
design but just as actuaries have had to consider the cost of this security, they must surely 
be concerned that the benefits are worth securing in the first place. It can also be noted 
that the profession antedates its statutory powers and that members have always been 
involved in benefit design. 
Day (2000) perhaps provides a clue as to why a profession might attempt to avoid a 
practical definition of their responsibility. He shows that claims to a relatively undirected 
                                                    
3
 The Institute of Actuaries Education Committee: “Consultative Document on the proposed new syllabuses 
prepared by the Education Strategy Working Party”, 1991 
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expertise are not limited to the actuarial profession, and are often tied to claims that the 
professional discipline is scientific:  
“Professions have habitually taken an uncritical stance toward their foundations, and they 
have often uncritically adopted the rhetoric of dominant social, cultural, and political 
forces in order to construct and preserve their social power. Upon the rhetoric of 
"science" and "progress," professions have often harnessed their sleds, sometimes fairly 
careless of their destination.” 
Thomson (2004) has persuasively argued that actuarial work involves the application of a 
scientific discipline, but even if it were not so, the problems to be addressed by this thesis 
are real, amenable to empirical observation, modeling and application in the work of 
actuaries. It is however suggested that while actuaries have always had a significant, and 
often dominant, input into the design of life insurance and retirement fund benefits, they 
do not always appear to have had the benefit of a full understanding of the real needs of 
the policyholders and beneficiaries of these funds, nor a coherent framework from which 
to develop new benefits or improve existing ones. This thesis is also an attempt to 
address this issue.  
It can be argued that actuaries should consider the question in their own self-interest; it is 
a question of marketing. Some marketing theorists insist that the business of an 
institution is to provide for the real needs of its clients, and not just to sell more of the 
products it happens to be producing. In the classic exposition of this view, Levitt (1975) 
shows the danger of failing to appreciate this distinction. He suggests, for instance, that 
the American railway companies lost their dominant position in the American economy 
of the nineteenth century by failing to see they were in the transport business rather than 
being providers of railways. 
The business of a profession can be considered similarly. Long-term survival will depend 
on developing services that address people's real needs - rather than producing and 
servicing products that are inadequate or may become so. Phrased more positively, 
considering people's needs is the only way to generate new ideas of how to meet them.  
Rich (1991) quotes the draft mission statement then being prepared by the Actuarial 
Society of South Africa: "to make a significant contribution towards enabling South 
Africans to enhance both their individual and institutional financial security using their 
expertise in the disciplines of ..." The paragraph was dropped as referring to the mission 
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of actuaries rather than that of the professional body, but it would seem to provide a more 
fruitful definition of the mission of actuaries.  
The actuarial mission can then be outlined as follows: 
• People need financial security: their future incomes are both uncertain and 
limited, while the value of their property is also exposed to various risks.  
• The insurance and retirement industry exists to provide for this need. 
• It is the responsibility of actuaries to provide the necessary professional skills to 
ensure that these industries are run soundly with this aim in mind. 
As Trowbridge (1989) puts it: "Actuaries are those with a deep understanding of 
financial security systems, their reasons for being, their complexity, their mathematics, 
and the way they work." Such an understanding would seem pointless if it were not 
utilised to provide people with the financial security they really need. It is therefore 
suggested that the question is therefore not merely actuarial, but perhaps critical to the 
profession playing its full role in society. The consideration of people's needs, as for 
instance found in using the financial lifecycle to answer financial security questions, is 
finding increased exposure in the actuarial literature. Cooper (2002), Cantor and Sefton 
(2002) and Milevsky (2004a) provide examples. 
5 INSURANCE COMPANIES AND RETIREMENT FUNDS 
The thesis is limited to considering retirement funds rather than insurance companies in 
spite of their similarities and frequent overlaps. The major difference between the 
benefits provided by life insurers to individuals and group retirement funds is that the 
individual benefits offered by the former have to be sold to individuals, and are primarily 
subject to considerations related to the distribution channel and are not necessarily 
related to needs. Retirement schemes are different in that compulsory membership 
greatly simplifies the question of distribution and they are managed by trustees. Benefit 
design is far more likely to be governed by what is apparently good for the members 
rather than designs that are superficially attractive.  
Milevsky (2004b), for instance, recounts an attempt to persuade a Canadian company to 
sell a deferred annuity with no benefit on prior death. The management were persuaded 
of the benefits to potential policyholders, but ultimately rejected the idea because of 
administrative difficulties, and the possible public embarrassment that might arise from 
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the lack of a death benefit. (Insurers can be criticised for paying nothing to heirs on the 
death of an annuitant in spite of the terms of the contract. The often blatant self-interest 
of the criticism does not necessarily ameliorate the perceived damage to reputation.)  
Another illustration is the annuity portfolios of the two largest South African insurance 
companies: a large proportion if not most group contracts are with-profit versions that 
address inflation and longevity risks. The overwhelming majority of individual contracts 
are however either fixed annuities that offer no protection against inflation risk or “living 
annuities” that offer no protection against longevity risks4. The companies have made 
minimal effort to sell the more appropriate benefits to individuals apparently because of 
the difficulties in persuading their sales forces to make the effort to suggest that retirees 
should sacrifice immediate yield for inflation protection, and make adequate provision 
for longevity risk.  
One cannot therefore discuss insurance policy design without an in-depth consideration 
of distribution issues, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
6 LITERATURE AND OTHER SOURCES 
Reviewing the relevant academic literature must be the first step of any serious research, 
but it is suggested that its proliferation over the past few decades means that a literature 
review is now different.  
6.1 The area to cover 
Until perhaps 15 years ago, reviewing all the literature on any single topic was a 
manageable activity for a diligent researcher. There were a limited number of academic 
journals and a few reputable publishers. Printed citations indices, searches of adjoining 
library shelves and common room discussions with those from different disciplines could 
guide one to important ideas in related areas.  
In the last decade, this has become more difficult if not impossible. There are frequently 
too many papers to read – even on the most esoteric subjects. In addition to the formally 
published research, there are vast numbers of working papers and articles published by 
                                                    
4
 As is evident from the annual reports of the Registrar of Long Term Insurance, available from the FSB. 
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academic departments, research organizations and policy think-tanks. The internet makes 
them available almost immediately. The literature review for chapter 7 of this thesis 
illustrates. An internet search for “mean reversion” and “investment” for section 3 
produced almost 100 000 references. Limiting the search to Google Scholar reduced it to 
5 000 - still impossibly vast to inform a few pages of discussion. Even writing ten years 
ago, Campbell et al (1997) mentioned the impossibility of covering all the papers that 
have investigated the efficiency of markets, the subject of the second section of this 
chapter.  
In addition to the likelihood that useful research will be missed, the proliferation of 
voices makes it more difficult to sift what is important and reliable from the relatively 
trivial and speculative. While the number of citations and downloads gives a guide to 
relevance, it is less useful in measuring reliability. 
For insight and reliability, one would want to see the extent to which ideas have been 
subject to review and debate. As to technical competence there is often little to cause 
concern: academic journals are peer reviewed - many to an extremely high standard. The 
review process is not however entirely uniform as, for instance, illustrated by Ferson et 
al (2003), who find instances of spurious statistical relationships.  
Often more problematic is the interpretation of the statistics. Chapter 6 of this thesis, on 
the relative investment performance of the Community Growth Fund, makes almost no 
reference to a fairly considerable literature on the performance of ethical investment. 
This is because the published papers invariably fail to consider that the relative 
performance is a function of both demand and profitability5. As explained in the chapter, 
poorer performance may well be explained by higher demand for the shares at the 
beginning of the period of measurement and have nothing to do with profitability.  
It would also seem that even the best journals have become less open to critical debate 
over time6, so making it more difficult to understand the areas of controversy, let alone 
                                                    
5
 True of the first 5 references out of over 600 on a Google Scholar search: “investment performance” and 
ethical. 
6
 As: Coelho P R P, De Worken-Eley F & Mcclure J E (2005) Decline in Critical Commentary, 1963-2004 
econjournalwatch.org/main/intermedia.php?filename=CoelhoetalEconomicsInPracticeAugust2005.pdf 
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come to a balanced opinion. A particular problem arises when those in the same field 
appear to ignore each other. The question of the efficiency of markets again provides an 
illustration. Market inefficiencies arising from the cost of information, and those that 
arise from transaction costs and institutional structures, are discussed in Stiglitz (2002) 
and Merton and Bodie (2005) respectively. Joseph Stiglitz and Robert Merton are 
winners of the Nobel Prize for economics, but these papers summarise their own 
contributions to the literature about ways to understand market imperfections without 
cross-references. 
For actuaries, there is a further problem that, with minor exceptions, the professional 
actuarial journals are not indexed in the academic literature. An advantage for papers 
published in the British Actuarial Journal, which may not be sufficiently appreciated, is 
that the discussion of the papers at sessional meetings is also published.  
There are some shortcuts, such as referring to more recent papers, which will usually 
summarise at least one string of previous research. This method creates the risk that their 
importance is overemphasised, but it has often been taken in the chapters in this thesis. 
6.2 Understanding 
If one cannot cover all the ground, the aim must be to attempt to produce a broad outline 
with a sample of the more prominent features. The object of research is understanding, 
and not mere information. This means searching out insights, comparing and contrasting 
alternative views and approaches, and attempting to synthesise a framework for thinking 
about the subject. 
How this might be done is itself controversial. Pemberton (1999) and Huber and Verall 
(1999) emphasise the need for both theory and empirical testing in developing actuarial 
or economic models, and the need for judgment in their application. They (and 
apparently most philosophers of science) therefore reject the empiricist view that only 
falsifiable theories can be considered valid.  
They do, however, appear to accept the other positivist view that true knowledge ought to 
be dispassionate, if not disinterested. While superficially attractive, this view is 
unrealistic: a deep understanding is not likely to come to those for whom the subject has 
no interest – of a material or other kind. Polanyi (1962) “demonstrates that the scientist's 
personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its validation, is an 
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indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, ‘knowing’ is an art, of 
which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate 
sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part.”7 Strong feelings 
about a subject may well be a necessary basis from which to launch the pursuit of 
understanding, although they become counterproductive if they blind us to credible 
alternatives or inconsistencies in our own views. While it is preferable to reduce the heat 
in argument, participation in debate with those with whom we disagree is a critical 
element of learning. 
6.3 The approach of this thesis 
The process of literature review therefore needs to be both critical and efficient. My 
input into the Taylor recommendations was based on twenty years of experience in the 
retirement fund industry, and over a decade of exposure to formal academic literature. 
Much of this involvement and reading were motivated by indignation at what was 
regarded as unjust or inadequate. In searching the literature, I have looked principally for 
justification and criticism of prevailing theory and practice; and for support or otherwise 
for my own views where they differ from the consensus. In such searches – as is 
consistent with Simon's theory of bounded rationality – the search was stopped once I 
was satisfied that I had either found an appropriate justification for the consensus and 
could therefore accept it, or found support for a credible alternative. There are no doubt 
many important ideas and research results that were not unearthed, some of which may 
well have a bearing on the arguments.  
In searching for discussion of alternative ideas, the literature search has necessarily 
ranged considerably further than the standard actuarial and economic literature. 
Important related fields are sociology, gerontology, the less formal literature of financial 
advice and publications on social security. The latter is produced by governments and 
international agencies reflected in government commissions, the publications of the 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). This strand however is also politically fractured: the Bank and IMF 
are more interested in the development of private-sector schemes while the ILO is more 
interested in extending the coverage of benefits.  
                                                    
7
 This pithy summary of the book's theme is taken from the review at Amazon.com. 
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Whether the thesis does adequately evaluate the supporting and contradictory evidence is 
for the reader to judge. It should be pointed out that the publication or discussion of the 
chapters as independent pieces means that each have their own bibliography. 
7 THE THESIS 
The common thread in the thesis is how different aspects of the retirement system can be 
adapted to better meet people’s needs in a just manner. The different aspects include the: 
• interaction between the state and private institutional arrangements discussed 
particularly in chapters 2 and 3,  
• governance of the private arrangements covered in chapter 4,  
• benefit structure of private funds in chapter 5; 
• investment issues that affect the size of benefits in chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the Taylor recommendations for the abolition of the means test 
for the state old-age pension, and various specific changes to the income tax system. The 
second chapter (Pensions in Africa) describes the South African retirement fund system 
and some alternative systems in the context of Africa, with its small and poorly resourced 
economies. It focuses particularly on the needs of people working informally, suggesting 
that their retirement needs should be provided by a non-contributory scheme funded by 
general taxation as is currently the case. While South Africa is richer than other countries 
on the continent, the same conclusion is reached: governments ought not to attempt to 
deliver a complete earnings-related retirement system but: “the energies of the state 
would be better directed towards providing a low level of universal cover and the 
protection of members in voluntary private sector arrangements.” The conclusion is 
evaluated in terms of the model of justice discussed above that is also used extensively in 
chapter 3, and finds its echoes in each of the succeeding chapters. The second chapter 
also raises the question of the governance of retirement schemes, an issue taken up again 
in chapter 4. The third chapter (Means Tests) makes the argument for the abolition of the 
means test not only in South Africa, but also in Australia and the UK. It is suggested that 
means tests create an unnecessary and onerous burden on lower income workers in the 
formal sector. 
Chapter 4 (Conflicted Superstructures) discusses the question of governance. The 
Committee recommended that all funds be controlled by trustee boards of lay members, 
50% elected by members, and that the Financial Services Board report annually on its 
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efforts to manage conflicts of interest. The chapter describes the Australian 
superannuation industry, but the governance issues have South African parallels, which 
are drawn out in a postscript. The main driver of expenses is the distribution system, 
which also creates a number of fiduciary conflicts. The fiduciary responsibilities of 
retirement fund trustees are evidently an issue of justice, as those that exercise power 
should not enrich themselves at the expense of those for whom they have responsibility. 
Ensuring that trustees conform to their responsibilities is the proper role of the state, 
whether exercised through the courts or the regulators.  
The Committee also recommended that the power pension funds had over the companies 
in which they invested be increased by changes to company law, but this is not explored 
further as it was debated and recommended in Asher (1998). 
Chapter 5 (Integrating Insurance Benefits) discusses the Taylor recommendations 
covering compulsory contributions, preservation and the related issue of annuitization. 
The report recommended that compulsion be limited to those over 40, that preservation 
requirements be waived only if the members have exhausted their unemployment 
benefits, and that at least two thirds of the benefit be taken as an inflation-protected 
annuity. Other benefit recommendations were that funds should be compelled to offer a 
compulsory disability benefit of 50% of the member’s income and orphans’ benefits of 
20% each, and that there be greater disclosure of the cross-subsidies inherent in a defined 
benefit (DB) design. The Committee was divided over whether the life and disability 
cover would make the Road Accident Fund and workers' compensation benefits 
redundant, but recommended that the question be investigated.  
In chapter 5, the extensive economic and social literature on the financial life-cycle is 
used to expand and clarify a variety of ideas raised in Asher (2000, 2003a and 2003b). 
This chapter also considers the questions whether formal sector employees should be 
compelled to contribute to retirement funds, and whether there should be a compulsory 
suite of benefits. The conclusion is that while there appear to be good reasons for funds 
to provide death, disability and annuity benefits, compulsory contributions seem to have 
the effect of creating earlier rather than more satisfying retirements, which provide 
arguments against high levels of contribution.  
Compulsion itself can however be justified. One consequence of the distributional 
economies of group schemes, and their advantages of integrating insurance benefits, is 
that they are common goods. As the benefits of common goods cannot be secured 
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without compelling potential free riders to join the group, this provides good arguments 
for compulsory membership of group retirement schemes. It also provides further 
arguments against choice of fund and in some respect investment choice, which Asher 
(1999) argues, provides more stresses than advantages to members. 
The next three chapters consider investment issues. The first of these, chapter 6 (Ethical 
investment) examines the history of the Community Growth Fund (CGF), set up by trade 
unions to invest retirement fund moneys. It discusses the theory and some of the practice 
of using social criteria to choose investments and shows the effects on the performance 
of the fund. The CGF provides an illustration of ethical innovation that would be 
extremely unlikely in a government run retirement scheme. 
While I was Chairman of the CGF Management Company for 10 years, I did not support 
the Taylor Committee’s investment recommendations that funds invest a proportion of 
their assets in a defined socially desirable investment universe. Compulsion was not 
recommended by the Retirement Sub-committee; and I would continue to stand by the 
points made in Asher and Adler8: prescribed assets create hidden and undesirable 
subsidies. It was however not a point on which I felt sufficiently strongly to include in 
my dissenting letter.  
Chapter 7 (Herding and benchmarking) surveys the current state of investment theory and 
how it can be best transmitted to retirement fund trustees and members who might 
otherwise suffer. Recent research suggests that ill-advised investors can lose money not 
only by inadequate diversification and excessive trading but also by being panicked into 
buying overpriced or selling under-priced assets. It is suggested that regulators or 
industry bodies should be active in identifying poorly performing investment managers, 
and should publish a consensus portfolio to act as a benchmark to reinforce the need for 
fundamental analysis and appropriate diversification. In the discussion of this chapter9, it 
was suggested that it would be better for government to set the benchmark portfolio and 
restrict members to this allocation. This alternative suggestion however ignores the need 
to match asset allocation to the particular needs of the members, but also the evidence of 
                                                    
8
 Asher, A. & Adler T (October, 1991) “Should Prescribed Assets be Reintroduced?” Trustee Digest, 
circulated to union elected trustees.  
9
 At the 14th Australian Colloquium of Superannuation Researchers, July 2006 
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Srinivas et al (2000) that such restrictions universally reduce returns, apparently by 
inhibiting market functioning. This chapter thus provides a justification for the Taylor 
recommendation that the Financial Services Board (FSB) develop performance 
benchmarks to guide trustees particularly in their choice of international assets.  
The last chapter (Chapter 8: Smoothed returns) outlines why retirement schemes should 
smooth investment returns, and how they can do so in a manner that is fair to all 
members and consistent with modern financial theory. It argues explicitly that 
governments should not guarantee the retirement benefits of contributory schemes, but 
that the beneficiaries should participate in general prosperity through appropriate 
investment instruments – which mean that retirement arrangements ought to be funded. 
Merely setting the level and minimum age of a universal flat scheme creates enough 
political problems. The current European turmoil over excessive, cross-subsidized 
defined benefit schemes mirrors earlier problems in Latin America and illustrates the 
point. Chapter 8 does not address any of the recommendations of the Taylor Committee, 
but is important in that it shows that members do not necessarily suffer if governments 
do not underwrite pay-as-you-go systems or otherwise provide investment guarantees. 
Not mentioned in the final version of the chapter is the point that government guarantees 
of earnings-related pensions involve a subsidy to wealthier members of society that 
seems difficult to justify. 
The thesis concludes with a final chapter that provides a discussion on vocation and 
wisdom, with a more personal apologia, and considers how further research and reform 
might proceed. 
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CHAPTER 2 - PENSIONS IN AFRICA 
 
First published as Chapter 41 “Pensions in Africa” in the Oxford Handbook of Pensions 
and Retirement Income (2006), ed: G L Clark, A Munnell, M Orzsag, Oxford University 
Press (816-836) 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In providing an outline of pension arrangements in Africa, this chapter is particularly 
concerned with justice. Justice is the traditional criterion for evaluating the performance 
of governing structures, and this book is intended to describe the theoretical frameworks 
used to understand the structure and performance of retirement systems. For our 
purposes, justice can be evaluated by determining whether the policy concerned strives, 
in a procedurally just manner, to reconcile five sometimes conflicting objectives: 
equality, liberty, efficiency, provision for people’s basic needs, and recognition of their 
deserts. The main issues raised in this chapter are those where policy appears to fail in 
achieving these objectives. 
Perhaps the thorniest African issues are those of compulsion and governance. 
Compulsory contributions are an affront to liberty, but are justified on the ground that 
they provide for basic needs that people would otherwise not provide for themselves, and 
on the ground of desert, in that people should pay for benefits that the state would 
otherwise have to provide. Compulsion is also more efficient in that voluntary 
contributions invariably attract significant marketing costs. In the informal sector 
however, compulsion is enormously expensive and creates further inequality by acting as 
an additional tax on the financial and administrative resources of the poor.  
On the issue of governance, many would agree with Barbone and Sanchez (1999) that it 
is the ‘first order of business’ for retirement reform in sub-Sahara particularly. The 
inefficiency and corruption of many government structures are clearly unjust. A specific 
issue in pension arrangements is actuarial fairness that requires the accruing value of 
future benefits to be closely related to contributions – real or notional. This is a question 
of desert, and departures ought to be justified as a contribution to greater equality, or as 
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the provision of basic needs. In Africa, this is a particular problem with civil service 
schemes. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides some background on the 
economies of Africa, a short discussion on the causes of poverty and a description of the 
informal sector. This is followed by a relatively detailed description of the South African 
pension system. Apart from the author’s familiarity with South Africa, its subsistence 
and informal sectors have much in common with the rest of Africa, while both its public 
and private sectors provide a number of models for potential development. Its 
policymakers and entrepreneurs have a growing influence on other African countries, 
particularly in southern Africa. Section four extends the description to other African 
countries. A final section also raises some research questions. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 African economies 
Africa makes up almost a quarter of the world’s land surface, one eighth of its people but 
only 4% of its economy even on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis10. For purposes of 
this chapter, we can divide it into three. South Africa has a diversified modern economy 
and accounts for some quarter of total economic output, with the balance divided more or 
less equally between the five Mediterranean countries (including Morocco) and the rest 
of the continent. In terms of per capita income, on a purchasing power parity basis, South 
Africa is a medium low income country standing at something under $10,000; the North 
African countries stand at half of this, while the other Sub-Saharan countries average one 
tenth.  
All African economies are relatively small and concentrated – often dependent on a 
single commodity. The implication is that all are volatile, and subject to periodic bouts of 
currency fluctuations and high inflation, except where there are tight foreign exchange 
controls. This provides one explanation for extensive government intervention in the 
economy, with its consequential restrictions on private activity and risk of corruption. 
Economic instability is also invariably linked to political volatility. 
                                                    
10
 The statistics in this section are taken from the Nationmaster.com website. 
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These economic and political risks undermine the security that might be offered by a 
pension system. It is often not possible to find local investments to provide sufficient 
diversification. Those that are available will not provide security in times of political and 
economic uncertainty.  
2.2 Poverty 
Of the various explanations for poverty, Sachs et al (2001) offer little hope in that they 
suggest that geography is a major cause. The tropics, which include most of the world’s 
poverty and very few prosperous nations, are debilitating environments. In addition, 
Africa is served by a relatively few harbours and navigable rivers, significantly 
increasing the cost of transport and trade.  
Other analyses relate to institutions and culture, which are not immutable. In 
economically fragile societies with poorly understood informal institutions, apparently 
sensible reforms can be counterproductive. Institutional obstacles to development have 
been highlighted recently by De Soto (2000), in particular that most property cannot be 
sold, so tying people to their existing land rights and preventing land from being used as 
capital. He also describes the multiple bureaucratic obstacles to business development in 
all poorer countries, which often goes hand in hand with corruption. On these points, it 
can be noted that unmarketable land rights do function as retirement assets and 
alternatives will need to be found if they can be sold. As already noted, the imposition of 
formal social security contributions contributes to the bureaucratic burden on enterprise.  
Of those who focus on cultural and political issues, Landes (1998) mentions openness to 
science and trade, trust within society, open government and the value placed on hard 
work. These are also issues covered by Powelson (1994), who emphasises the benefits of 
a diffusion of power in society, both as a counter to corruption and a source of personal 
responsibility and motivation. South African experience described later shows that 
private retirement funds with democratically elected trustees can contribute to such 
diffusion.  
Somovia (2003), Director General of the International Labour Office (ILO), surveys the 
immediate causes of poverty: malnutrition and illiteracy, lack of access to markets and 
capital, and corruption. He calls for the transfer of resources to the poor, debt relief and 
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the extension of a developed legal and institutional framework. The need for a system of 
social security to break the life-cycle of poverty is a major goal of the ILO.  
2.3 The informal sector  
Somavia looks at various elements of the informal economy, which accounts for the 
overwhelming proportion of employment in Africa, and its interaction with poverty. The 
informal economy can be defined as that beyond state control: untaxed, unregulated and 
not using formal legal or accounting systems. It includes subsistence farmers, micro-scale 
traders and manufacturers, and many domestic workers. 
The disadvantages of the informal economy are obvious. Efficiency is low as the division 
of labour is much more difficult and economies of scale impossible. Access to credit and 
insurance is limited by the absence of records and formal dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The latter is also associated with violence. Literacy is of less value, and is therefore 
encouraged less in the young, which also means that skills are less likely to be passed on. 
The smaller tax base limits the ability of governments to develop infrastructure and 
provide social services.  
The informal sector, by definition, precludes formal pension arrangements. Outside 
formal organizations, wage related contributions cannot be collected; money cannot be 
securely invested, and structured payouts cannot be managed. While formal systems have 
clear advantages over informal arrangements, it is not clear that the ILO and other 
agencies understand the significant demands they place on participants. If the demands 
cannot be met, the costs and the disruption of attempting to create formal systems may 
outweigh the advantages. 
There are also unstable smaller employers on the fringe of the informal sector. 
Yakoboski et al (2001) report the results of their US research which suggests that these 
employers, and their employees, are reluctant to contribute to formal pension 
arrangements because of their uncertain future, and the expense of contributing on behalf 
of lower income individuals. It may be better to use persuasion rather than compulsion to 
bring them in to formal pension schemes. 
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3 SOUTH AFRICA  
3.1 The first pillar 
The first pillar consists of a flat pension, subsidies to old age homes and other support to 
the needy living alone or with their families. The state’s resources are inadequate from 
many perspectives, but it would seem that the positive social impact does justify the 
costs. 
The main benefit is a monthly old age pension paid out of general revenue, subject to a 
means test, to men above the age of 65 and women over 60. Recipients must be South 
African citizens resident in South Africa. The amount, R740 (R3 is approximately U$1 
using PPP) monthly for the 2005 fiscal year, although low by OECD standards, is a 
generous 45% of GDP per capita. 
3.1.1 Administration 
The Mothers and Fathers Report (2001) contains the following comments that give a 
flavour of the African setting. 
The predominant method of pension receipt, namely queuing on particular days at a 
specified pay-point, and the problems associated with this over-shadowed all other 
problems faced by the elderly... Security at pay-points is a great concern of pensioners, 
particularly when they have to return home after dark… The length of time spent in the 
queue, lack of shelter, seating, insufficient and filthy toilets and lack of water at pay 
points are problems across the country. Even where there are halls, pensioners are not 
necessarily allowed into them. … 
People continue to arrive very early and to sleep at pay points. No preference is given to 
the very frail who have to wait in line along with everyone else. …Many pensioners 
experience rough and insulting treatment by staff at pay-points. …  
Money lenders are active at pay points, take IDs (identity documents) … and harass 
pensioners. Hawkers and liquor vendors also cause problems… A large number of burial 
societies, largely unregistered, try to recruit pensioners.  
… Security officers accept bribes to let people jump the queues. There are also 
allegations that pensioners are short-changed by officials….  
Chapter 2: Pensions in Africa 
 24 
… Pensioners in hospital have to make their way to pay-points on pension day or face 
the prospect of losing their pension. Some have died in the queue. 
Perhaps the most difficult administration issue arises from the bureaucratic need for rules 
to determine whether the pensioners are still alive. It seems that such rules often become 
unreasonable. The South African courts (prompted by non-government organization 
funded lawyers) are sufficiently reliable to provide some protection, and have recently 
found certain pension administration to be unjustifiable. One practice that has been 
outlawed is stopping payment unilaterally in an attempt to counter fraud, and refusing to 
make back payments in an attempt to save money. 
3.1.2 Means tests 
An income test phases out the pension at a rate of 50% of other income11. Married 
couples with a combined income over R3,384 do not qualify for any state pension. Those 
with assets (excluding their homes) of more than R266,000 also do not qualify12.  
Lund (1993) reports that the mechanism is widely misunderstood and inconsistently 
applied. This should not be surprising. The difficulties of auditing income are immense. 
Apart from those who are obviously cheating, one just has to think of determining 
income from casual jobs and the renting of rooms, and of irregular interest, pensions and 
transfer payments, let alone translating income in kind from subsistence farming13. The 
means test is not, and probably cannot be, enforced. Unenforceable policy is bad policy. 
If this were not enough, it is also inefficient. The distribution of income and the failure to 
implement the test mean that the pension is paid to almost 85% of old age pensioners. 
The Smith Committee (1995) estimated that the costs of abolishing the test would be 
some R1.5 bn of which two thirds could be recovered through the tax system. This is 
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 The formula for the means tests are set out in the South African Government Gazette 18771 of 
31/3/1998 
12
 The asset test has not been phased in since changes published in the Government Gazette 22852 of 
23/11/2001. 
13
 The author has some experience attempting to quantify earnings for tort claims. On one occasion he was 
able to gather evidence that the in-kind income was ten times higher than that initially claimed. 
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entirely dwarfed by tax concessions to retirement funds that are justified by the putative 
savings created by the means tests. The test also offends vertical equity in that the 
maximum rate of tax levied on high incomes is currently set at 42% while poorer 
pensioners lose 50% of the state old age pension for every rand of private income. 
Willmore (2001) expresses surprise that it has not been abolished. International agencies 
suggesting the introduction of means tests may well do more harm than good. 
3.1.3 Non-citizens 
Rules to determine the benefits to be enjoyed by immigrants require some balance 
between equality, need, desert and affordability. This is of particular concern in South 
Africa where the state old age pension is significantly larger than anything offered by its 
immediate neighbours. As in many similar situations, the rules governing the acquisition 
of citizenship can be contested at times.  
3.1.4 Social impact 
The Smith Committee (1995) records that the amount payable to whites was some eight 
times that payable to blacks in the mid-sixties, but subsequent reforms led to final 
equalization in 1993. Even before equalization, social pensions provided an important 
source of income particularly in poor rural areas. Ardington and Lund’s (1994) study in 
Kwazulu Natal found that the pension income made up more than half the income of a 
third of rural households. Not only does the pension relieve poverty among the elderly, it 
turns old people into economic assets rather than liabilities to their families, and it 
seemed unlikely to create incentives that might distort the labour market or fertility 
behaviour. Case (2001) confirmed that families with the pension, if it was shared within 
the family, enjoyed measurably better nutrition and health.  
Bertrand et al (2003) introduce an element of scepticism with their findings that labour 
market participation of working age adults in extended families is lower in families with 
the pension, which decline from an already low 24% and to 21%. The effect was largely 
explained by the participation rates of older men. From one perspective, this is a matter 
for concern as the pension appears to make subsistence more palatable and reduce the 
incentives to move into the formal sector. On the other hand, facilitating dignified early 
retirement to a rural area can be defended as providing openings for younger workers. 
The negative labour market incentives do however need to be made clear as they 
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undermine the arguments currently made in South Africa by supporters of a basic 
monthly income grant for all. 
3.1.5 Institutions for the aged 
As in the developed world, long term care is becoming an increasing problem. It is 
widely accepted that it is desirable for people to remain outside formal institutions for as 
long as possible, but increasing numbers will inevitably require admittance. Many who 
require admittance are unlikely to be able to afford the R4 000 monthly cost14. The costs 
in OECD countries of frail care are much higher. Rappaport (2001) reports them as being 
as much as $6 000 monthly in the USA. South African costs are lower mainly because 
the wages of caregivers are lower.  
Involvement by government or private charities in these homes is inevitable. Old age 
homes for whites were previously given generous subsidies by the Department of Social 
Development, but these have been significantly reduced in the last decade, so 
undermining the viability of many organisations. Subsidies can be justified to support 
particularly needy individuals, but whites are disproportionately represented amongst 
those in frail care not least because of their longer life expectancy and smaller families. 
Subsidies that largely benefit whites are difficult to justify politically so soon after the 
removal of apartheid.  
The Mothers and Fathers Report also gives a graphic description of these institutions: 
… some homes are dirty and pervaded by a strong smell of urine. The quality and 
quantity of food is often below standard …In some homes residents don't have their own 
clothing, laundry is not marked and face-cloths and toothbrushes are shared. … Many 
residents seem to spend their days seated in rows around a room or along a veranda - 
waiting for the next meal.  
 …Staff are generally low-paid and untrained and few qualified nurses are employed to 
care for elderly residents. …  
The high level of theft in homes could be described as endemic and nobody seems to take 
responsibility for addressing it. Some homes have been targeted by criminal elements….  
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 Personal communication from Peter Asher, board of The Association for the Aged, Durban. 
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3.1.6 Other social services 
The alternative, ‘care in the community’ may however be little better, as the report 
continues: 
(this) has become increasingly difficult for many old people due to the absence of 
community services in most areas, inadequate housing and unaffordable service charges. 
…Many elderly persons are being abused by their children and grand-children. … 
Elderly people living alone are dying from malnutrition and neglect… Official agencies 
do not make home visits to elderly people. … A meals on wheels service is run by one 
national organization but it reaches fewer than 10,000 elderly persons …Specialist 
geriatric clinics and nurses have been totally phased out. Clinic staff tends to say home 
care is ‘not our business’. Equipment banks and lending depots for wheel-chairs and 
other aids are not supported by clinics and hospitals and tend to run out of stock. … 
3.2 The South African private sector 
The private sector consists of employer or occupationally based schemes and voluntary 
products largely sold by commercial life insurers which provide for top ups, the needs of 
the self-employed and perhaps some of those informally employed. The Financial 
Services Board (FSB) (2003) shows that group retirement funds for which they were able 
to provide statistics have almost 9 million members (but over 1 million are retired and 
there are a number of duplications). Contributions amounted to R60 billion. To these 
occupational scheme contributions, another R8 billion in contributions to annuity 
products with life insurers can be added. A large proportion of the R27 billion of regular 
premium life assurance is also written as endowment policies intended to mature at 
retirement. Total assets amount to over R900 billion, and appears to account for some 
half (or more) of the country's total assets. 
3.2.1 Coverage in the organized formal sector 
The term ‘organized formal sector’ is used here to describe businesses registered for tax 
purposes. These businesses usually belong to one or other labour or employer 
federations, while self-employed people are likely to be organized in professional 
associations. While noting that the statistics are invariably unreliable, the South African 
Institute of Race Relations Survey (2000, 356) reports estimates that this sector 
accounted for some 75% of remunerated employment in 1996.  
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Those employed in this sector are invariably covered by private pension arrangements, 
whether as part of their employment contract or voluntarily. The actual extent of 
retirement fund coverage is debatable. Some surveys - such as AMPS15 - suggest that 
only 50% of employed people are contributing to a retirement fund. This does however 
not reconcile with the level of contributions to retirement funds reported to the Financial 
Services Board, which amount to almost 20% of personal remuneration. The 9 million 
active members reported would be more than the number of formal jobs. The latter 
figures tend to corroborate the Smith Committee estimates that some 80% of formally 
employed workers are covered by retirement funds. The AMPS survey recipients may 
have misunderstood the questions asked. Evidence from around the world, such as from 
Ferris (2000) and Glass (2001) is that the average person finds the design of retirement 
arrangements too complicated to understand.  
3.2.2 Explaining the high coverage 
The South African second pillar is more efficient and has a greater coverage than that of 
Chile in spite not being compulsory. The unusually wide coverage of the organized 
formal sector can be explained by a number of factors. Not least of these is the absence 
of an earnings related state scheme. Of the other factors, and the one perhaps with most 
lessons outside South Africa, is the focus on group schemes. These have significant 
advantages over arrangements where individuals have more choice. Relatively generous 
tax concessions are only available to group schemes where employees have no choice but 
to join. Such compulsion is an infringement of freedom, but the benefits appear to 
outweigh this loss.  
Foremost of the benefits, and now widely recognised, are cheaper administration and 
minimal marketing costs. Almost all the information required for administration can be 
obtained from the employer’s personnel records. The contributions are collected in one 
monthly amount from the employer. Large superannuation funds are also able to 
negotiate lower investment management fees. The costs of selling group schemes are 
proportionately much lower than selling to individuals. Keeping charges low can make a 
difference of 20% or more to final pension payouts. Compulsory group schemes also 
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 The All Media and Product Survey conducted by the South African Advertising Research Foundation – 
private communication. 
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routinely offer life, disability and health cover without medical questions. Those in poor 
health, who might not be offered cover at all under an individual contract, are thus able 
to obtain significant cover at ordinary rates. This generates further cost savings. 
The contribution that group schemes can make to industrial democracy is not often 
considered. Members can participate in the election and monitoring of trustees, who in 
turn are able to vote the shares owned by the fund. This is not possible with individual 
retirement contracts. The South African focus on group schemes arises partly from the 
early start, with the Pension Funds Act (1956) providing focused regulation. There is a 
widespread perception amongst employers that offering retirement benefits helps retain 
staff, while trade unions have seen the intrinsic benefits and the opportunities to use the 
funds as a focus for organization. This has facilitated a number of industry wide 
determinations, in terms of the Labour Relations Act, requiring employers to contribute 
to an industry fund or set up a company specific fund. The marketing effort of life 
insurance companies has often been directed at the employers because of the life 
companies’ influence as major shareholders. This, in turn, has arisen because of their 
management of retirement fund moneys. 
3.2.3 The informal sector 
The income over which contributions to retirement or insurance funds become 
economical is debatable. Participants in the South African industry suggest that monthly 
administrative costs are unlikely to be kept at below R30, while distribution costs 
(marketing in the private sector and enforcement in the public sector) may double this. 
The costs for someone earning even R1 500 monthly (twice the monthly pension) and 
contributing 15% of their income for retirement would be at least 3% of income (and 
15% of contributions).  
Requiring people who earn much below these levels to contribute to retirement savings is 
equivalent to an additional tax. The South African experience makes this clear. 
Legislative reforms in the nearly nineties freed micro-lenders from the constraints of the 
Usury Act and led to an explosion of loans at interest rates that vary from 20% p.a. to 
80% p.a. or more. The statistics suggest that most employed South Africans have such 
loans. While the morality of such rates is debatable, they reflect the shortage of funds in 
the low income and informal sector. At the same time, retirement funds earn net returns 
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of some 10% p.a. Requiring poor people to borrow at 50% and invest at 10% is clearly 
exploitative.  
Most people employed in this sector rely on the government disability and old age grants 
for insurance and retirement cover. The current level of these grants is sufficiently high 
relative to the earnings of the majority of recipients for them not to need further savings. 
Funding these benefits through consumption taxes is much more efficient and contributes 
more to equality than collecting contributions. James (1999) also makes many of these 
points, suggesting that they may be applicable outside South Africa. She also points out 
that universal pensions provide support for women who have not been active labour 
market participants and who gain nothing from contribution based systems. 
Compulsory contributions appear to me to be only in the interest of people employed in 
the formal financial sector, and here I would include policy makers and government 
regulators. Their narrow focus on the formal sector and their self interest appear to 
combine to blind them to the cruelty of compulsory requirements.  
3.2.4 Benefit coverage 
In spite of these high levels of coverage, which have been all but universal for the white 
population for forty years, over a third of the white population still draws the means 
tested old age pension, with women being disproportionately represented. Two 
interrelated reasons can be identified. The first is the lack of preservation of benefits on 
changing employers. The second is that elderly widows suffer because their husbands 
have spent their withdrawal and lump sum retirement benefits. This is an international 
problem - as described in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991) in a US study. It is an injustice 
that deserves urgent consideration in the reform of family law.  
3.2.5 Types of fund 
The earliest South African funds were DC in that they were funded by endowment 
policies. They were replaced by DB funds during the sixties because of the greater 
predictability of the benefit in DB funds. A swing back to DC provident funds (that 
provided lump sums and not pensions) began in the early eighties largely in response to 
pressure from black trade unions. Black South Africans were first allowed to join trade 
unions in 1979, and in the early eighties organised a series of strikes over plans by the 
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government to limit pre-retirement withdrawals. As in many countries, trade unions 
continue to be involved in fund administration. 
Kerrigan (1991) describes the unions’ objectives: fairer withdrawal benefits, lump sums 
on retirement, greater influence on investment policy and the power to elect trustees. The 
DC funds did away with the complicated cross subsidies of DB, and the lump sums 
offered greater ease in avoiding the means test that at that stage reduced the state pension 
by 100% of other income.  
Employers encouraged the shift to DC benefits. Firstly, they were reluctant to permit 
newly elected trustees to make decisions that could lead to investment losses. Secondly, 
they were not averse to reducing the investment risks inherent in DB design, and towards 
the end of the eighties, they saw that AIDS threatened a significant increase in the cost of 
insurance benefits. The swing gained momentum when the high returns on equity 
investment were seen to lead to better benefits for members.  
3.3 Regulation 
The standard regulatory structure is based on the Pension Funds Act, which sets up the 
Registrar of Pensions. The Financial Services Board Act (1990) sets up the FSB, whose 
chief executive officer assumes the functions of the Registrar. Funds regulated by the 
FSB are subject to proper governance procedures. They must have a set of rules, a board 
of management of which 50% are elected by the members16, report regularly to members 
and produce audited accounts and actuarial valuations (if they are self-administered). The 
board of management or trustees owe their primary fiduciary duties, which derive from 
the Common Law, to members. 
A South African innovation is the Pension Funds Adjudicator set up to ‘dispose of 
complaints …in a procedurally fair, economical and expeditious manner’17. The intention 
was to empower members who could not use expensive legal procedures to establish 
their rights. The first adjudicator was flooded with complaints, not least because of his 
personal energy and ability to address critical issues in legally creative ways if necessary. 
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 Section 7A of the Pension Funds Act (1956), in force since 15 December 1998. 
17
 Section 30D. 
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Some of the complaints were resolved by mediation, but hundreds have required written 
rulings18. In shifting the balance of power towards members, it seems that the innovation 
has been resoundingly successful. While few will agree with all his determinations, the 
office and the approach deserve consideration and perhaps imitation in other countries.  
The Pension Funds Act has always provided protection to DB members to ensure that the 
funds are fully funded. Withdrawal benefits were however considerably less than the 
actuarial reserve so penalising early leavers, and inflation was often allowed to erode the 
real value of pensions significantly. Members transferring to DC funds also suffered 
losses. Employers taking contribution holidays benefited from the surpluses thus 
generated. In a relatively high inflationary environment, these flaws in benefit design 
accelerated the move to DC. Unprecedented legislation in 2001 requires funds to use 
their surpluses (where they exist) to go back to 1980 and compensate pensioners and 
those who have withdrawn.  
3.4 Government employees’ schemes 
South African government sector employees are generally covered by DB schemes. 
There is one for central government employees, others for local government, and various 
para-statal organizations. Unusually, these are actuarially valued and fully funded, 
although the assets of the DB funds are largely held in government stock.  
During the eighties, however, the funds were removed from actuarial oversight and 
quickly reduced to some half their previous funding levels. The reasons partly arose from 
the inflationary erosion of fixed interest assets, but also from excessive benefits, 
particularly the notorious ‘buyback’ provisions that gave enormous discounts to senior 
members of the funds. Wassenaar’s (1989) exposé which led to the re-imposition of 
proper controls reports that this bounty was limited to about 45 000 more senior public 
servants. He estimated the cost at R5 billion in 1986 terms, but the total deficits required 
perhaps ten times that number in additional contributions (and tax concessions) before 
they were extinguished in the mid-nineties. Another abuse of the system was to 
artificially inflate final salaries by promotions just before retirement - as the rules based 
the pension on the last day’s salary.  
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 Some 162 are recorded in 2001 on the website: http://www.fsb.co.za/pfa/deter2001.htm 
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4 OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
Many of the South African issues have parallels in other African countries. Detailed 
information on the benefits available is however not as readily available. One source is 
‘Trends in Social Security’ published by the International Social Security Association 
(ISSA) and available on their website to members. It gives some indication of the nature 
of retirement arrangements in different countries by reporting on planned changes. 
Barbone and Sanchez (1999) give some helpful tables. 
4.1 Civil service schemes 
Separate DB schemes for the civil service are the norm internationally. They are 
frequently overly generous: the problem is not limited to developing countries such as 
South Africa and Brazil, with the Actuary (2004, 14) reporting unfunded liabilities in the 
UK of over half that country’s GNP. Benefits for military are often particularly 
favourable with very young retirement ages. In poor African countries, the pensions of 
government employees do not have to be particularly generous to absorb a large 
proportion of the state’s resources. ISSA data reports retirement ages for civil servants 
that are being raised to 60 in some countries, and that the contributions required for the 
Egyptian scheme amount to some 30% of remuneration. Both suggest generous scheme 
benefits. 
This is not to object to DB arrangements per se, but accruing benefits should be clearly 
defined and bear a reasonable relationship to current income. Actuarial management is 
necessary for this, but insufficient to prevent abuse. Reform is particularly difficult as 
those in the government departments responsible for drafting legislation are frequently 
the main beneficiaries. They are well placed to defeat the intentions of any reforms – not 
least by last minute surreptitious insertions.  
4.2 National schemes 
Most African countries have set up national schemes for all those of working age, that, as 
discussed, necessarily exclude those employed in the informal sector. In some cases, this 
is recognised in the regulations of the scheme. In other cases the informal sector is 
legally included, in which case the law is often an empty letter or another source of 
confusion and corruption. Coverage is higher in North Africa where it is reported to 
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exceed 80% of the workforce in Tunisia and Egypt, but Barbone and Sanchez show most 
countries have coverage of less that 10%. This may, of course, represent a high 
proportion of the formal sector outside of government employment.  
4.2.1 Provident funds 
A number of ex-British colonies, as elsewhere in the world, introduced national 
provident funds around the time of independence. These initially provided lump sums at 
retirement and some ancillary insurance benefits in return for contributions from private 
sector employees. Lump sums rather than pensions are particularly attractive to members 
who do not have access to the banking system in retirement. This is the case for much of 
Africa, where pensioners in rural areas can be charged exorbitant fees by local 
shopkeepers to cash cheques - if they arrive in an unreliable post. Lump sums can be 
used to upgrade housing and purchase cattle, traditionally the source of wealth in Sub-
Sahara.  
A number of African provident funds failed because of inadequate investment returns 
that reduced payouts to trivial amounts in some cases. Governments make it difficult to 
make international investments, and there are not enough local opportunities. The funds 
thus proved vulnerable to all the problems listed in section 2.1 above: political 
interference, economic volatility and inflation. Mounbaga (1995) illustrates from 
Cameroon. Some of the African funds are now being converted into national pension 
schemes. Nigeria is an exception having just chosen to follow the Chilean model. The 
different influences of the ILO and the World Bank have presumably contributed to this 
difference of approach. 
4.2.2 Earnings related schemes 
The ex-French colonies introduced national earnings-related pension schemes for private 
sector employees. These protect the members from direct investment losses, folding the 
problem into general government finances, which are thereby placed under further 
pressure. 
One apparent exception, which is described by Chaabane (2002) and receives favourable 
mention by van Ginneken (2003), is that of Tunisia. Imaginative and energetic action 
appears to have been successful in extending coverage to the self-employed and informal 
sector. Chaabane does not however report on the efficiency of the approach taken and the 
Chapter 2: Pensions in Africa 
 35 
exercise is too recent, and the government too authoritarian, to be confident of ongoing 
success. Chourouk (2003), in a rather confusing paper, suggests that the Tunisian and 
other North African schemes are facing financial difficulties.  
4.2.3 Non-contributory schemes 
Willmore (2001) describes the four countries he says have universal systems. Three 
(Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia) are in Africa and have been influenced by the South 
African experience. He reports that the schemes are popular in New Zealand and 
Mauritius where they have been established for some time, without being too expensive 
(4% and 2% of GDP respectively). In spite of the administrative difficulties mentioned in 
3.1.1 above and acknowledged by Willmore, universal pension schemes are probably the 
most cost effective way of getting money to poor and rural areas. 
4.3 Other arrangements 
4.3.1 Large private sector employers 
The employees of multi-national companies are invariably covered by pension funds as 
part of the companies’ world wide human resources policies. These funds do not always 
offer the same protection to locals as to ex-patriates. In some cases, there is 
discrimination in eligibility for membership; in others different practices on withdrawal.  
In Anglophone countries with a less extensive first pillar, particularly Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, larger local companies also have corporate schemes. As in South Africa, both 
employers and employees appear to have encouraged the move to DC arrangements – in 
spite of investment restrictions on international investments. Members have not however 
benefited from all the legislation of the type mentioned in section 3.3 above. 
Anecdotal evidence is that the mortality experience of group schemes does not reflect the 
increases expected from AIDS deaths because local employees return to their rural 
homes to die, and so do not claim their entitlements. The author’s experience of South 
African funds makes this credible: large numbers of retirement fund beneficiaries do not 
claim. Illiteracy plays a role, as does the cultural reluctance of men to let their wives 
know of potential life cover benefits.  
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4.3.2 Voluntary arrangements 
Van Ginneken (2003), from the ILO, suggests the development of voluntary special 
schemes to give the self employed access to pension benefits. He envisages community 
based non-profit organizations such as some of those involved in micro-financing either 
offering pensions or acting as agents for large formal institutions. Burial and rotating 
credit societies provide other examples that clearly flourish in Africa. He suggests that 
they should be subsidized in order to remain attractive to all members - because they are 
not actuarially fair.  
There are a number of models that have historically provided something of this type of 
benefit. ‘Industrial’ life insurance involves the weekly collection of premiums and pays 
out lump sums. At its peak in the UK, more than half the households contributed. It also 
had some success in South Africa. It has however been phased out largely because it is 
impossible to give decent value for money. The costs of collection invariably make up 
more than 30% of the premiums.  
Friendly societies provide an alternative, community based, and therefore cheaper, model 
that goes back to the European middle ages, and has proved itself in a number of social 
and economic environments. The British version pays disability benefits predominantly, 
which – if there is no retirement age – is precisely what is required for poorer 
communities where voluntary retirement is a luxury.  
Subsidies to voluntary schemes are likely to be abused, and are regressive in that only the 
wealthier members of society are likely to be able to save. James (1999) warns 
specifically against them. The first step rather is to remove obstacles to the formation of 
voluntary arrangements in the form of inappropriate regulations. Subsequent work is to 
provide financial and technical advice, and appropriate consumer protections. The need 
for the latter may not always be evident. Informal arrangements are effectively beyond 
the reach of formal law and can be unreliable. The detailed interviews with a number of 
burial society members, reported in Thomson and Posel (2002), illustrate the great 
difficulty of building trust and enforcing agreements in informal arrangements.  
4.3.3 The extended family 
Kaseke (1999) writes of the extended African family and its role in the provision of 
financial and social support to the aged and other needy members. The large families that 
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have characterised the rapid population growth of the last century – and which thereby 
can be called ‘traditional’ – do provide a level of financial security through the sharing of 
risk. Certainly, his view that many children provide security in old age appears to be held 
widely. The sharing also appears to go beyond the extended family to village 
communities.  
Pensioners too old to work do receive support from their families, but Peil (1992) shows 
that many do not seem to have contact with adult children. Somavia (2003) reports that 
more than 40% of Africans over 64 are still obliged to work. AIDS has greatly 
aggravated this problem, which is often made worse by the need to care for orphaned 
grandchildren. If it can be afforded, even a small old age grant seems desirable.  
4.4 Investments 
Nineteen African countries have local stock exchanges19, although most are small. Plans 
to rationalise some of them will not only improve liquidity and efficiency, but also 
provide potentially more diversity for retirement fund investments. Real diversification 
will require investment in economies removed geographically, as both economic and 
political risks can be concentrated regionally. Except in South Africa, the capitalization 
of these is too small to absorb more than a fraction of funded pension liabilities.  
Insulation from political risk would mean that the retirement funds themselves would 
have to be outside the control of their national government. Anything less would be of 
limited value, but it is not entirely clear whether governments can be persuaded to lose 
control of such a large pool of assets. 
4.5 Governance 
In suggesting reforms that will aid governance, Barbone and Sanchez (1999) advocate 
simplification of institutions, reducing the role of government and formalising the 
management of the national schemes. This should go along with a reduction in regressive 
subsidies particularly, and with increased competition. Simplification clearly contributes 
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to efficiency, but illiteracy should not be confused with the inability to cope with 
complexity.  
Few would disagree on the need to address the accompanying and more difficult issue of 
corruption, which might well serve as a heading for this section. Addressing corruption 
will be easier in simpler systems where accountability is easier to enforce and power is 
diffused from government to private but accountable institutions. Diop (2003) lauds 
reforms in Senegal, which have created a more autonomous management of the social 
security system, and appear to offer greater stability as well as improvements in service. 
The way in which South African unions have both used pensions as an organising force 
and contributed to pension fund democracy provides an interesting model of power 
diffusion 
Given their resources and temptations, it is doubtful whether the public sector in most 
sub-Saharan countries has the capacity to administer even simple national retirement 
funds. If it is accepted that the overwhelming majority of the population in the informal 
sector would be better off without compulsory schemes, then there is a strong argument 
for their abolition. The energies of the state would be better directed towards providing a 
low level of universal cover and the protection of members in voluntary private sector 
arrangements. The South African experience shows that these can cover a high 
proportion of the formal sector. 
5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Research questions 
We know surprisingly little about the actual and potential effects of pensions and social 
security benefits on the lives of people, especially those living in the third world. What 
are the costs of levying contributions on informal sector workers? Are means tests more 
effective than suggested here in targeting the poor and ameliorating their deprivation? 
How do families react to unexpected losses of income and of pension benefits? In order 
to answer these questions, I believe one has to have panel data as suggested in Asher 
(2001). Cross sectional studies record the memories and impressions of those 
interviewed, which are often unreliable.  
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Research also has a role in exposing and addressing corrupt practices. Careful analyses 
of institutional structures and the interests that they serve is a necessary first step to 
reform. Three South African examples can be provided. Wassenaar’s (1989) book 
provided much of the impetus for the subsequent withdrawal of the over-generous state 
benefits. The recording and publicity given to administrative corruption over many years 
has clearly brought some measure of relief to state pensioners. The success of the 
pensions fund adjudicator has depended partly on adequate research, and on the 
development of the legal protections available. 
The role of retirement funds in the development of local capital markets also requires 
some exploration. This relates to the management of the investments of national schemes 
and to exchange control and other pressures placed on private funds to invest locally. 
Africa would not appear to provide many role models but experience elsewhere may 
prove helpful. 
5.2 Policy lessons 
Justice means, inter alia, defending the powerless against the powerful. In Africa, the 
poor and powerless are to be found mainly in the informal sector. Pension arrangements 
for them need careful consideration; a number of commentators have come to the 
conclusion that a universal non-contributory pension is the solution.  
African civil services are particularly powerful, and need to be constrained. Actuarial 
management of their own pension schemes may help to reduce their ability to extract 
excessive benefits from this source. Limiting their involvement in national schemes and 
encouraging second pillar group arrangements may help develop countervailing powers.  
The interests of women also need consideration. Non-contributory schemes provide more 
equitably for those who have not worked in the formal sector. Family law reform is 
particularly necessary to protect married women whose husbands consume more than a 
fair share of lump sum benefits. 
Finally it should be said that addressing these issues from outside the continent is fraught 
with dangers. Injustices provoke indignation, and foreigners might do best to support the 
indignant who have been wronged by providing the fruits of research and technical if not 
material support. As the New International Version has it: ‘speak up for those who 
cannot speak for themselves’... Particular examples worth considering are the efforts of 
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the trade unions, the Pensions Fund Adjudicator and the private support for Court actions 
in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 3 - MEANS TESTS: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
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THOSE OF MODEST MEANS 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Integration between flat state pensions, which make up the first pillar of a pension 
system, and other sources of retirement income is achieved in many countries20 by means 
tests that reduce the first-pillar pension. It is currently the subject of some debate in the 
UK and South Africa, and was also subject to detailed investigation in Australia during 
the mid-nineties.  
This paper is written to evaluate the recommendations of the Taylor Committee of 
Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System for South Africa: means tests 
should be abolished and the taxation of retirees and retirement funds increased in order 
to compensate. It attempts to focus on these two interrelated issues. 
The conclusion is that in South Africa, Australia and the UK means tests cannot be 
justified in their current form. The standard justification for means tests is that they make 
state pensions more affordable by targeting them towards those in greatest need. Means 
tests can however be seen as a tax on other income (and assets) in which case they are 
unrelated to questions of expenditure and affordability. A more careful evaluation of 
means tests against the different criteria of social justice suggests that the major 
problems are those of an unwarranted interference in the lives of pensioners and the 
efficiency of administration and incentives. It is not so much about the money but the 
mechanisms of the means test. 
                                                    
20
 Willmore (2001) reports that only 4 countries have universal non-means-tested schemes: New Zealand, 
Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia. Hancock et al (2005) say that 18 out of 30 OECD countries include a 
means tested component in their state systems. The rest offer a minimum pension from an otherwise earnings-
related mandatory pension system.  
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1.1 Structure 
Part 2 is the main part of the paper. In it, the policy issues governing means tests and the 
taxation of pension systems are systematically evaluated against a range of criteria 
required by justice. The criteria used are need, equality, efficiency (covering 
administration and incentive impacts), liberty (including freedom from unnecessary 
administrative interventions) and just deserts. As is appropriate when considering 
political questions, the third part considers the institutional environment and the interests 
of the most important participants in the institutional structure – private and public. The 
paper then goes on to suggest possible reasons for the absence of debate and the 
perpetuation of means tests, and makes recommendations as to how the policy issues can 
be more systematically addressed.  
1.2 Scope 
The first-pillar pension under consideration is that paid from general revenue to those 
over some relatively arbitrary retirement age. The needs of those below this age are not 
considered. I am concerned here with arrangements in South Africa, Australia and the 
United Kingdom (UK), being most familiar with their systems. The arrangements of 
interest are the state pension and means tests, how they are determined and administered, 
and to a lesser extent the tax treatment of contributions, investment income and benefits 
paid by pension or superannuation arrangements.  
The paper includes no detailed analysis of the variety of different allowances and 
variations, although there is some discussion of the principles of grandfathering 
arrangements. There is also no specific costing of any proposals, as such specifics relate 
only to a particular year’s government budget, and irrelevant to the debate about general 
principles.  
Means tests and pension and superannuation fund taxation are not always considered 
together. From a policy perspective, however, it is difficult to consider one without the 
other. The question is discussed from different perspectives at other points in this paper. 
At this point it is suggested that there must be a prima facie case that the fungibility of 
money applies to taxation and the clawback of social security benefits required by tests 
of income. 
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2 JUSTICE 
This section first looks at the relevance of justice to this topic, and then applies the five 
criteria mentioned above to the question of means testing and taxation. The criteria used 
find common justification in our recognition of the dignity of every person, which has a 
symmetry with our own self-respect. While they are debated, the criteria are not novel 
and would have to be mentioned in any serious application of moral philosophy to 
financial or social questions, as they are in chapters 7, 9, 10 and 11 of Hausman and 
McPherson (1996) for instance. Their application to the question at hand, however, does 
not appear to have been done systematically. 
Similar analyses of the related subject of social security and the taxation of investment 
income have been performed. Diamond (1977) evaluates the US social security system 
explicitly in terms of redistribution, market failure, paternalism and efficiency. McNulty 
(2000) examines taxation issues using the criteria of fairness, economic allocative 
efficiency, welfare, and simplicity, with fairness incorporating notions of equality, 
reward and retribution. Fairness is also used in this paper to describe this particular 
subset of the justice criteria. 
Discussions on the relevance of justice frequently bring forward the arguments that the 
concept is personal and that it is irrelevant to the way people behave. Neither is entirely 
true.  
2.1 Personal 
People certainly place a different personal value on the different elements of justice. 
Europeans appear to place a much greater value on equality and a lower value on liberty 
than North Americans (Alesina et al, 2004). Union members usually place more 
emphasis on equality than managers - and less on desert. MacIntyre's (1988) different 
intellectual traditions of rationality and justice provide different rationalizations for this 
variety, but it would be a mistake to see the variety as proving that our views of justice 
are entirely personal with no wider application. Without the idea of justice, government 
could be based only on the whims of the powerful. There is widespread agreement on the 
procedures required to attain it, and much on its constitution. There is near universal 
agreement of what constitutes gross injustices: exploitation, corruption, etc.  
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Tyler and Smith (1995), in a review of the social science literature on justice, show that 
people are often more concerned with just procedures than just outcomes. The argument 
being made here is that that each of the criteria has an absolute value in the process: 
ceteris paribus it is never wrong to value people’s needs, create greater equality, 
efficiency and liberty or give people their just deserts. The subjective personal 
differences arise from the compromises that practicalities force on us. In another 
paradigm, justice gives to each person a set of minimum human rights. Our indignation is 
justified if the criteria or the rights are not considered in the process. To think otherwise 
is confused, deviant or malicious. The critical issue is the process rather than result: one 
might justifiably consider a criterion or right and decide to override it in particular 
circumstances. 
2.2 Relevance 
The view that justice is irrelevant to people’s behaviour can only be sustained by a 
cynicism that not only holds that people exclusively pursue their own self-interest but 
that they are not prepared to compromise for the common good.  
While this view may have some traction in the economics literature as justified for 
instance in Stigler (1982), it finds minimal acceptance in any other discipline. In politics 
and philosophy justice provides the rules that allow for the production of the common 
goods of security and the other benefits of good government. As Lucas (1980) puts it: 
"Justice is the bond of society ... the condition under which I and every man can identify 
with society, feel at one with it, and accept its rulings as my own." Even the most self-
interested must take note of it if they are not to be excluded from society.  
From the other social sciences, Tyler and Smith (1995) confirm that: 
“People's actual behavior is also strongly linked to views about justice and 
injustice. A wide variety of studies link justice judgments to positive behaviors 
such as willingness to accept third-party decisions; willingness to help the group; 
and willingness to empower group authorities. Conversely, other studies link the 
lack of justice to sabotage, theft, and on a collective level, to the willingness to 
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rebel or protest. In other words, how people feel and behave in social settings is 
strongly shaped by judgments about justice and injustice.”21 
2.3 Liberty 
This is perhaps the easiest criterion to deal with. In general, people do not like to be told 
what to do. Intervention of government in the lives of people is undesirable per se. 
Where it is necessary, it should be minimized by number, extent and impact:  
• One intervention is better than two. 
• Intervention in one life is better than intervention in two. 
• An intervention that takes one hour or costs one dollar is better than one that takes 
or costs two. 
The implications in this context follow: 
• A single system to allocate money to individuals and to recoup from others is 
preferable.  
• It should have as few rules as possible. 
• It should require the least possible effort from those involved. 
With means tests, the work of the tax authorities in making income assessments is 
duplicated by the welfare authorities. The tests are applied at much lower levels of 
income than those considered for tax purposes and also apply to assets ignored for tax 
purposes. 
It can be noted that apparently respectable discussions of social security issues, such as 
Feldstein (1985), assume that a large proportion of the population are myopic and can be 
justifiably compelled to act in a particular way. In the case of pensions, they can be 
forced to contribute, or be subject to the indignity of detailed investigation of their 
means. This line of thinking appears to fall short of justice in that it would require a 
careful analysis before deciding people were myopic. Even if they were found to be so, 
procedural justice would require there to be a careful balancing of the advantages of 
intervention against the loss of liberty. 
                                                    
21
 Page 1 with references to other studies removed. 
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Hancock et al (2005) suggest that the British pension-credit may provide a test of extent 
of the indignities created by an intrusive evaluation of means. The UK pension credit is a 
means-tested top-up of the non-means-tested basic state pension. The take up rates are 
relatively low: the explanation appears to be that the costs of claiming – in terms of effort 
or social stigma – outweigh the benefits. A means-tested pension is devalued by the cost 
of obtaining it. 
2.4 Needs 
Meant by needs is the wherewithal for a minimum acceptable standard of living. If the 
retirement age is set so high that those above the age are not readily able to work for a 
living, need provides a ready justification for the payment of a pension to those without 
another source of support. It does not however provide a justification for means tests. 
2.4.1 The minimum standard 
Open to debate is what constitutes a minimum acceptable standard of living. It must 
clearly include a place to stay, enough for basic water, food and clothing and basic health 
care. This paper is not intended to debate what constitutes an adequate level as it is 
clearly highly context specific. Minimum pensions, in the countries discussed here, also 
appear to be somewhat higher - for most recipients - than that required for bare necessity. 
This is contentious, but the evidence is that even the relatively small South African 
pension raises whole families out of poverty - as, for instance, suggested by Case (2001).  
Contention about this issue arises from a common argument that state pensions are 
required to deliver pensioners from poverty. A recent UK government publication22, for 
instance, boasts that millions of pensioners have been lifted out of “absolute poverty” 
which is defined in a footnote as 60% of the national median disposable income. This is 
however a measure of relative not absolute poverty: it relates to equality rather than need. 
The argument from need suggests necessity and urgency. A view that the large 
proportion of the population of Australia or the UK living on their respective state 
pensions are in real economic need does not seem tenable.  
                                                    
22
 Principles for reform: the national pensions debate published by the Department of Pensions and Works 
(dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2005/pensions_debate/)  
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In South Africa, 40% of children are reported as being clinically malnourished. Justice 
would apply the same standard of need to all members of society – not just pensioners. In 
the face of the needs of the families that do not include a pensioner, the argument from 
need - to increase the minimum income of pensioners – appears impossible to sustain. 
2.4.2 Perceived needs 
To check this conclusion, one can ask whether poorer people actually consider their 
retirement income to be sufficient. In an international survey23, AXA finds that 
significant numbers of retirees do regard their income as insufficient. This varies from 
30% in Canada to 60% in Japan, with Australia at 36% and the UK at 40%. The US 
percentage is 31%, which varies from 15% for individuals with incomes in the top third 
of their survey to 64% for the low income third. This latter breakdown is unfortunately 
not available for other countries. One conclusion that may be drawn is that the absolute 
level of income is not the only issue that leads to dissatisfaction .This again suggests that 
equality and not need is more likely to be important when setting the level of a state 
pension.  
In their evaluation of public attitudes to pension policy in Australia, Evans and Kelley 
(2005) report weak evidence that older people believe that pensions should be lower than 
younger people think the level should be. This again suggests that need is perhaps not an 
issue. 
2.4.3 Targeting 
There are grounds for believing that there is no practical way of targeting benefits 
precisely at those that need them. The nature of the needs is complex and fluctuating; the 
measurement is inevitably somewhat simplistic, limited to a particular time and prone to 
error. Where attempts have been made at triangulation (measuring needs using different 
methods including surveys of the views of the poor and their neighbours), significantly 
different answers are obtained24. If it is true that pensions are invariably large enough to 
                                                    
23
 AXA (2006) AXA Equitable Retirement Scope: Retirement — a new life after work? Report 
axaonline.com/axa/pressroom/2006/2006_01_24_Retirement_Survey_International.pdf 
24Two working papers from the Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto illustrate this point. 
(www.q-squared.ca/papers.html )  (See overleaf) 
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meet all essentials, there is then a strong argument for a pragmatic approach to measuring 
income and needs. Getting into too much detail represents a spurious level of care, and is 
an unwarranted interference in the lives of the poor. Income – as defined by the tax 
collecting agencies - is probably an adequate measure of lifestyle for most purposes. 
2.4.4 Allowances 
Cases of exceptional needs can be addressed by specifically targeted social security 
allowances: housing and care particularly. In South Africa, the departments of health, 
housing and education all provide means-tested benefits. Local governments and state 
owned enterprises provide other allowances or price reductions to those with special 
needs, of whom pensioners figure prominently. Their design and implementation 
however requires considerably more effort than has been allocated. 
These allowances appear to offer little in the way of a systematic approach to the 
provision of needs, but are often a further offence against liberty with their intrusive 
questions and their artificial incentives to distort spending patterns. Cheaper prices for 
some items in a consumption basket often come with a higher cost in others. Rural areas 
are a case in point with cheaper housing and perhaps food but much higher costs of 
transport and health care25. How can a local government tell that subsidies for urban 
housing are targeted at the neediest? There is a vast array of different needs and 
expenses, and the enormous difficulty in calibrating benefits to meet them undermines 
the rationale for having specific allowances.  
Social security departments do not normally appear to make any systematic evaluation of 
the standards of living of different groups of recipients. Travers (1995) makes this point 
in the Australian context. Perhaps as a result of a recommendation in the Taylor 
Committee report, the South African Department of Social Development has recently 
                                                                                                                                              
Appleton S & D Booth (2005) Combining Participatory and Survey-based Approaches to Poverty 
Monitoring and Analysis  
Barahona, C & S Levy (2005) The Best of Both Worlds: Producing National Statistics using 
Participatory Methods. 
25
 The detailed Financial Diaries survey of the expenditure habits of 150 poor families in South Africa found 
rural families spend 2.5% of their incomes on medical care, as against the 1% spent by wealthier urban 
families. See www.financialdiaries.com/files/Financial%20Diaries%20Medical%20Focus%20Note.pdf 
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commissioned a Human Science Research Council’s survey of social grant beneficiaries: 
two waves of a panel survey were performed in 2005. This is to be welcomed and 
perhaps imitated. If the welfare departments cannot measure needs, however, it would 
not seem that other arms of government are likely to be able to do so.  
These other means tests are not the particular concern of this paper as they impinge on 
the needy other than the aged. To the extent that they are important to pensioners, two 
points can be made. The first is that any analysis of needs should be holistic and take all 
means and expenditure into account. This may be appropriate in managing long term care 
for the aged and possibly in offering subsidized housing. 
The other point, deriving as much from the principle of efficiency as from need, is that 
some of the basic needs or rights can profitably be offered in kind. This is normally the 
case for medical care, which is effectively free in all three countries for those prepared to 
queue at public hospitals. Many South African municipalities have introduced a “life-
line” tariff for utilities that provide a minimum supply of water and electricity free to 
every household. These are to be preferred to means-tested subsidies.  
There are other types of self-targeting benefits that may not be appropriate. Hancock et al 
(2005) were quoted earlier in suggesting that means tests introduce various costs and 
create a social stigma that helps target pensions at those that need it most. There is some 
attraction in this type of self-targeting, but it should be noted that the neediest people 
may be excluded from benefits. It is far from clear that social stigma will select the 
neediest; it will certainly select the shameless, but the impoverished prim may prefer to 
starve.  
2.5 Equality 
If pensions are greater than the amounts required by urgent need, equality provides 
justification for their current size. It is however difficult to find a justification for means 
tests arising from this criterion. One possible exception is raised in subsection 2.6.2. 
2.5.1 The principle 
Equality refers in this case to equality of welfare, interpreted broadly, of income and of 
status. For Christian, socialist and economist RH Tawney: “What is repulsive…is that 
some classes should be excluded from the heritage of civilization which others enjoy, and 
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that the fact of human fellowship, which is ultimate and profound, should be obscured by 
economic contrasts, which are trivial and superficial.” 26 
Equality can be variously justified as desirable for its own sake, as maximizing society’s 
total utility from the widely observed fact that marginal utility tends to decline with 
income, for its impact on improved health (Wilkinson, 2005), for its contribution to the 
development of mutual trust and social capital so discouraging crime (Uslaner, 2002), or 
because it leads to greater happiness (Layard, 2005), although Alesina et al (2004) 
suggest that this does not apply universally. Tyler and Smith (1995) refer to extensive 
documentation of how feelings of relative rather than absolute deprivation underlie much 
social unrest: it is the inequality that seems to provide the spark. 
In order to clarify a point for the intended audience of this paper, it should be emphasized 
that the argument here is that – if there were no other considerations – everyone should, 
morally, have an identical amount of money to spend. This is clearly a fundamental 
assumption of those who would incline to the political left. It is also, just as clearly, not 
recognized by some on the political right. The consequence of the model of justice used 
here is that failing to recognize equality as a principle is wrong. (Having considered the 
desirability of equality, one might however make a just decision that does not promote 
equality.)  
As this may appear a rather bold claim, some further discussion may be warranted. The 
argument for equality of spending power is analogous to that of equal votes. They both 
depend on the essential equality of persons (of adult age and perhaps excluding a limited 
number of others for reasons of their personal competence or as punishment.) As an 
example of its application which may be easier to accept, one might consider the shares 
given to each adult in the privatization of some state-owned firms in Eastern Europe. The 
principle may be more acceptable if it is couched in such terms: if there is largesse to 
distribute, it can be fair to distribute it equally. 
Equality should incorporate both horizontal equity, which means like people are treated 
in the same way, and vertical equity, which means that differences in treatment are 
proportional to the differences between the people concerned. In terms of taxation, 
                                                    
26
 Hausman and McPherson (1996, 138) quoting Tawney (1931, 139) Equality New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Co. 
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horizontal equity requires those of equal income to pay equal amounts of tax. Vertical 
equity requires that the rate of tax applied to people of different income increases 
smoothly with their income and requires increasing marginal rates of tax.  
2.5.2 The measures 
A case can be made for a system of benefits and taxation that is more cognizant of 
purchasing power, but for the sake of practicality, this section only considers net income 
available for spending. Equality would be fully served if income tax and social security 
benefits left everyone with the same spending power.  
Mehran (1976) considers some of the single measures of equality that provide some 
measure of the dispersion from complete equality, the best known being the Gini co-
efficient. Single figure indices however often hide as much as they reveal, and there are 
considerations not captured by any one of them.  
Rawls (1971) suggests that – rather than equality – people would choose a maximin 
principle – that maximized the income of the poorest - if they did not know where they 
would fit in the income distribution. While this may be extreme, the income of the 
poorest people may be considered of special importance. This is related to the object of 
equality of status to the extent that it is related to income inequality. If this is so, 
significant gaps between the incomes of neighbouring classes might also be considered 
as undesirable.  
Another question is the period over which to measure equality. In practice, this reduces 
to whether people should be permitted to defer their income when they are being taxed at 
higher marginal rates to years when the marginal rates are lower. As the tax year is 
essentially arbitrary, it seems acceptable for people to be able to make such a deferral so 
long as the income deferred is eventually taxed (even if the person has died). Emerson 
(2005, 4) says it has been argued that tax deferral is unfair, presumably because it largely 
benefits the wealthy. In fact, it identifies and benefits wealthy people who will have a 
lower marginal tax rate in retirement, and so can be seen to discriminate more accurately 
between degrees of wealth. 
2.5.3 The taxation of income 
Perhaps the most hotly contested of taxation debates is whether tax should be imposed on 
income or consumption, or more particularly whether it is fair and efficient to tax 
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investment income. McNulty (2000) provides a detailed evaluation of the debate, finding 
no obvious grounds to prefer one over the other. Changing from one to the other does 
however create significant transitional issues and is clearly not desirable. The current 
system in most countries of a balance between income and consumption taxes seems 
worth retaining.  
In this context, it seems clear that the taxation of investment income contributes to 
equality. Positive real investment income (after adjusting for inflation) undoubtedly gives 
the beneficiary greater spending power. It is therefore reasonable that it should be taxed. 
There is a view that this represents double taxation, but this – as McNulty (2000) and 
others have shown - is nonsense. If I earn 100 and pay tax of 20 I have been taxed. If I 
earn 100 the next year and pay tax of 20 again, I have been taxed twice but this is not 
double taxation in the sense of being unfair – it is new income. If I invest 80 of my 
earnings and earn a real return of 5, taxing the 5 is not double tax, but a tax of new 
income. (Taxing income annually does mean that the rate of tax that applies to the 
investment income earned over a number of years is higher than that earned over one 
year.27 This is another consequence of the arbitrary annual taxation of income, and is not 
necessarily unfair, although might be characterised as double taxation.) 
This misunderstanding takes a different form in the context of pension taxation, in that it 
is argued that double taxation occurs when both investment income and benefits are 
taxed. There is, in this case, double taxation, but it is not unfair as the taxation of benefits 
is matched by the exemption of contributions as shown by Brown (1993).  
Those with investment income are, by virtue of their assets, wealthier than those with 
similar earned incomes. Both vertical and horizontal equality would thus allow for a 
higher rate of marginal tax on investment income. The argument is sometimes made that 
taxing the investment income of retirement funds is unfair to the poor. This is straining at 
a gnat and swallowing a camel. The two important points not made are that the poor face 
higher rates of clawback from means tests, and that most of the investment income of 
retirement funds is being earned on behalf of the wealthy. The poor with retirement 
savings are, probably, better off than those without, so using a higher rate of tax than 
their direct marginal rate is not an offence against horizontal equality.  
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 (1+(1-t)i)n < 1+(1-t){(1+i)n -1} for n>1, tax at rate t 
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2.5.4 The implications 
From the perspective of equality of spending power, it is clear that tax and state pensions 
(and thus the means tests that determine them) should be considered together. They are 
the two complementary parts of any system of creating equality: amounts taken from the 
wealthy and given to the poor.  
It also becomes clear that means tests that apply a clawback of benefits at a higher rate at 
lower incomes than rates of tax at higher incomes are an offence against vertical equity. 
In South Africa, the means test on private income reduces the pension by 50% against 
marginal rates that currently vary from 17% to 40%. In Australia, the rate of clawback is 
40% against tax rates that vary from 16% to 48.5%, but the taxation of superannuation 
contributions can increase the loss to as much as 49% of the proceeds. The UK basic rate 
of clawback is 40%, which is the same as the highest marginal rate of tax.28  
2.6 Redistribution 
Arguments for means tests, as for instance in Hancock et al (2005) and the Australian 
debate discussed in 3.1.2 below, refer invariably to the affordability of the state pension. 
This is however a limited perspective, seeing the issue as that of allocating the 
government’s welfare budget and failing to see means tests as revenue raising items. The 
welfare budget should also be seen as part of government’s role in the redistribution of 
income. To characterize this as a question of how much the rich can afford to give to the 
poor is a caricature. Questions of redistribution involve the division of a common pie; 
some of the slices may appear too big or too small but talk of affordability is 
meaningless. 
The major issues are illustrated by figure 1. The straight unmarked line shows net income 
equal to earned income – if there were no taxes and benefits. The dashed line shows – 
more or less - the effects of the South African means tests on net income after adding in 
the state pension and deducting the clawback and tax. The other marked line shows the 
impact of abolishing the means tests and only applying higher tax rates. What is made 
clear is that means tests would target the poorest if it were possible to identify them 
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 Information on these can be found at websites of the relevant government departments: sassa.gov.za, 
centrelink.gov.au; thepensionservice.gov.uk. The first is however not yet fully operational.  
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accurately, but that there are significant penalties applying to those just above the lowest 
income band.  
The graph shows the reality in South Africa that, at some income levels, the marginal 
rate of clawback exceeds 100%. The higher marginal rates arise from the use of means 
tests to clawback some of the allowances mentioned in subsection 2.4.4. These include 
allowances for housing, rates and taxes, school fees (which are relevant in multi-
generational homes where pensioners support grandchildren) and health care. In 
Australia, higher marginal rates apply at the point where the pensioner loses rights to a 
pension, which also mean loss of access to the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme and 
various subsidies on transport, rates and most importantly, residential aged care. At some 
incomes, the marginal rate therefore also exceeds 100%. Hancock et al (2005) report that 
it only reaches 91% in the UK.  
 Figure 1  
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Before moving on to the other criteria, it is useful to consider the balance of high and low 
incomes in the countries being considered. The UK and South African budgets29 show 
social security payments at some two thirds of personal tax (including social security 
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 finance.gov.za/ and budget2005.treasury.gov.uk/page_09.html 
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contributions in the UK). In Australia, official figures30 show personal tax is more or less 
balanced by social security spending. Abolishing the means tests would represent 
additional expenditure of some 5% of the respective national budgets. Some half would 
be recouped from simplifying the tax system by removing tax concessions to the elderly. 
The rest would have to be funded by an increase in tax or a reduction in the level of 
benefit. How taxation expenditures on retirement provision can be reduced for this 
purpose is discussed in section 3.1.3 below. 
The arguments from equality therefore seem clear. The state pensions do contribute to 
equality, but greater equality would arise if the combined rates of clawback and tax 
increased with income. In terms of figure 1, this paper is intended to address only the 
kink (or dip) in the line created by the means test, and to suggest that it is unnecessary 
and unfair. The degree of redistribution between pensioners changes the slope of the line, 
the degree of redistribution between generations its intercept. A range of different lines 
would be compatible with justice, but only a smooth curve, with a declining slope, 
satisfies the requirements of equality. 
2.6.1 Lifetime considerations 
Spread over a lifetime and looked at from the impact on average rates of tax, the means 
tests on pensions are not particularly significant. Given that contributions to retirement 
funding represent a relatively small part of any individual’s wages, the effects of 
inequalities in the clawback and taxation of retirement benefits is considerably diluted. A 
50% clawback of retirement benefits that have a present value of 10% of salary over the 
lifetime increases the marginal – and average – rate of tax on income by 5%. As a large 
proportion of the benefits can be taken as tax-favoured lump sums, the actual impact is 
reduced to perhaps half in current South African circumstances31. This means that it is 
probably less than 20% of the income and expenditure tax paid by South Africans 
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 budget.gov.au/2005-06/bp1/html/index.htm  
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 The present value of the state old age pension is more or less equal to the tax free lump sum. If a new 
pensioner’s savings were three times the tax free lump sum then the means test would apply to two thirds of 
their retirement savings. This is where the affect of the means test is at its maximum, so the average must be 
less.  
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earning an average income. While significant at any one time, this is less than some of 
the changes that can be observed in average tax rates in the past.32  
2.6.2 Comparison with unemployment and disability benefits 
There is another argument from equality that needs consideration.  
Pensions could conceivably be seen as unemployment or disability benefits based on a 
presumption that people over the retirement age are unable to work. Certainly, state 
pensions, unemployment and disability benefits are often set at more or less the same 
level. If one were just to consider the recipients’ material needs, it would be fair to treat 
the beneficiaries equally and apply similar means tests. 
There are however wider economic and social reasons to encourage people of working 
age to return to the workforce, as well as considerations related to their own welfare. 
Disabled people need rehabilitation for their own sake. Some return to the workforce is 
usually a possibility, and is generally recognised as a cure in its own right. 
Unemployment is similar: both from their own perspective and that of the national 
economy, people are better off if some way can be found for them to return to work. The 
tests that apply to unemployment and disability might better be called capacity tests 
rather than means tests. They should also include additional requirements to seek the 
necessary medical attention, or to be actively searching for a job. 
These considerations barely apply to the retired. In many cases, they might well prefer to 
continue to work, but the personal, social, economic and budget imperatives are not as 
pressing. Even if the costs of re-entering the workforce do not rise with age, there is a 
shorter period over which to recover the human capital invested and it becomes 
increasingly uneconomic to attempt to do so. If the retirement age is set high enough, it is 
a reasonable presumption that the pensioners cannot economically return to the 
workforce. 
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 For 30 years of Australian rates see http://www.bendzulla.com/ref8.html. South African changes will be 
found to be of the same order. The last 10 years have however been relatively stable and can be found at: 
http://www.sars.gov.za/it/Income%20Tax%20Tables/Income%20Tax%20-%20Tax%20Rates-Duties-
Levies%20-%202004.pdf 
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This suggests that abolishing the means test has an increasingly strong case for those at 
more advanced ages. It is interesting that Travers (1995) reports that, for a period during 
the seventies, the means test was abolished in Australia for those over 70.  
For younger retirement ages, it becomes likely that retirement, unemployment and 
disability benefits are confounded. Means tests on their own will discourage people from 
returning to the workforce, but this brings us to the incentives discussed in the next 
section. 
2.7 Efficiency 
Efficiency is taken to include lower costs of administration and the provision of 
productive incentives. Efficiency is not normally explicitly considered as an issue of 
justice, but it must often be considered in order to make a balanced evaluation of policy 
options. It is argued here that it should function as a criterion of justice. The question to 
ask is whether it would be unjust to fail to meet one of the other criteria because of cost 
considerations? If not, then efficiency would appear to act as one of the components of 
justice.  
In some of the social security literature33, efficiency refers to the proportion of social 
security payments that are paid to those under some poverty level of income. As 
concluded in section 2.6, this artificially characterizes the question as a budgeting one or 
as an artificial caricature: how the state (on behalf of wealthy taxpayers) can best afford 
to target a needy group?  
This section considers deadweight losses that arise from means tests. It concludes that 
the criterion of efficiency produces strong arguments against means tests. The first two 
sub-sections discuss administrative difficulties and costs; the next four discuss incentives 
to save.  
2.7.1 Administration 
Means tests in the three countries being discussed are controlled by government 
departments responsible for social security and not those responsible for finance, which 
control the collection of taxes. 
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The challenges of auditing assets and income for means tests are difficult to overstate. 
Apart from catching those that cheat, one should review records of income from casual 
jobs and the renting of rooms, interest on formal and informal loans, pensions and 
transfer payments, and – particularly in South Africa - estimate income in kind from 
subsistence farming. This is impossible given the budgets of these agencies. The UK 
website mentioned in footnote 28 has a calculator that asks 48 questions in order to 
provide a first estimate of the means-tested benefits available. Centrelink is the agency 
responsible for implementing the tests in Australia. Its website lists seven different kinds 
of income and six different types of assets that have to be considered twice a year. In 
many instances, there is no way in which the answers can be independently confirmed, 
while the level of complexity makes the assessment difficult even for diligent applicants 
and competent administrators with goodwill and plenty of time.  
The difficulties are illustrated by a recent audit of Centrelink – reported in Pender 
(2004). The audit found the agency made some 250,000 errors a month, with an 
“actionable” error in 52% of the cases investigated, and that almost all folders contained 
administrative errors. Another audit of Centrelink by the Australian National Audit 
Office34 reviewed the files for proof of identity and found only 24% completely correct, 
although most of the errors were of a minor administrative nature. This is not to suggest 
that Centrelink is any worse than other agencies. It is to suggest that the proper 
administration of means tests is not possible. There is far too much to do. 
Any attempt to quantify the additional costs of means tests is necessarily suspect given 
that they are almost certainly not performed properly. The National Association of 
Pension Funds (2005; 35) however quotes costs reported to the Parliamentary Select 
Committee of £54 annually for the UK means-tested pensions credit against £5.40 for the 
non-means-tested basic pension. The Select Committee found that the Pensions Service 
(the UK social security agency) was to be commended for its accessibility, but expressed 
concerns with accuracy rates purported to be at 90%. 
Abolishing means tests would make administration possible. Three quarters of the 
questions in the UK calculator would be irrelevant (assuming that many of the social 
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 See particularly table 2.1 in the report, which can be found at: 
anao.gov.au/WebSite.nsf/Publications/4A256AE90015F69BCA256B22000BE66B 
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security allowances would be reduced to take the universality of the pension into 
account) and much the same would apply in other countries. All the difficult questions 
relating to assets and private income would be abolished. Pensioners could then be 
subject to the same tax rules as other people. 
There would – of course - be the additional administrative work of paying pension 
benefits to more people. This would however not appear to be a major burden as almost 
all the wealthier people concerned would have bank accounts and the exercise would be 
largely automated. For those paying more tax than the pension, it could be avoided 
altogether if there were the necessary electronic linkages. 
2.7.2 Unenforceable law is unjust 
Laws that cannot be enforced are unjust laws as they are likely to fail each of the criteria 
at some point. The administrative difficulties referred to in the previous paragraphs 
indicate that means tests cannot be enforced uniformly. Anecdotes from South Africa and 
Australia suggest that cheating is widespread. This would be reason alone to attempt to 
find an alternative to means tests. 
2.7.3 Work incentives and redistribution 
Redistribution of income requires higher tax rates on higher incomes, and creates a risk 
that this will act as a disincentive for higher earners. It does however reduce taxes on 
lower income earners which is likely to have compensating effects. We are here 
concerned with changing the incidence of tax and clawbacks on retirement income, 
which is likely to have an attenuated impact on motivation during the working years.  
The studies reported by Tuomala (1990) suggest that "most labour supply studies of men 
seem to indicate backward-sloping supply curves." Higher income taxes can lead to men 
taking less leisure because they need to work harder for the same standard of living 
(described as an income effect), but leisure is relatively cheaper because of the loss of the 
lower net wage, which may mean that more leisure is taken (described as a substitution 
effect). It appears that the income effect is often more powerful for men. Studies of 
women on the other hand suggest normal supply curves: lower tax rates increase work 
effort.  
This suggests that it would be very difficult to make the case that small increases in the 
marginal tax rate of the wealthiest are likely to have a significant impact on their 
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incentive to work hard. The other suggestion relevant to South Africa is whether higher 
tax rates would create an incentive for the wealthy to emigrate. There appears to have 
been no local research into either of these incentive questions, and the ambivalence of 
other research suggests that they are unlikely to be of great importance. They are 
therefore not considered further. 
There is the additional question of whether people understand the size of the incentives 
anyway. Hills35 reports that in the UK “only 17% of basic rate taxpayers and only 28% of 
higher rate taxpayers can identify their own rate of tax relief.” 
2.7.4 Deferral incentives and life time smoothing 
It is frequently argued that tax incentives are required to get people to save enough for 
their retirement through private retirement funds. This again assumes a level of myopia 
that is difficult to test because almost all countries offer some level of incentive, 
compulsion or minimal provision. The AXA survey23 suggests that pensioners are, as a 
whole, happier with their income than those still working, which may mean that the 
balance is about right.  
While the case for myopia may be overstated, there is the alternative argument, 
mentioned in 2.5.2 above, that people whose income is “bunched” ought to be given an 
opportunity to lower their average rates of tax by deferring income.  
Whether seen as incentives or opportunities for tax rate smoothing, it would seem that 
the rewards for deferral should be applied more or less equally to different earning 
patterns. The current system however creates significant disparities for three different 
earning patterns: 
• In some cases the marginal rate of deduction on contributions will be the same as 
the marginal rate on pensions. This is likely to apply to those at the extremes of 
the income distribution. They see no gain from deferment. 
• Those in the middle of the income distribution will be able to claim tax 
deductions on contributions (technically described as employer contributions in 
Australia) at a higher rate than the rate of tax that they pay on pensions. As people 
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 Presentation by John Hills to the 2005 AGM of the Pensions Policy Institute 
pensionspolicyinstitute.org.uk/uploadeddocuments/John_Hills_AGM_Slides_7_June05.pdf  
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may be in the position of paying no tax on their pensions, this difference can be as 
high as 40% in South Africa and the UK and 33.5% in Australia (where the 
contribution tax is not refundable). 
• In many cases however, the rate of tax saved on contributions is lower than the 
rate of clawback imposed on the pension. For those on low wages, they might 
obtain no deduction for contributions and yet suffer loss through the means test at 
50% in South Africa, 40% in the UK and 49% in Australia (where the 40% rate of 
clawback has to be increased to allow for the 15% tax on superannuation 
contributions, which is not refunded).  
Concessions on investment income change this ratio. The longer the concessions are in 
force, the greater the benefit of contributing. The combined effect is shown in table 1 for 
a variety of South Africa rates. An Australian table would follow the same pattern. Hills 
produces a range of between 80% and 255% for the UK equivalent of the last column.36 
There are indeed significant rewards for upper-middle-income people, but for the quarter 
of the population (in all three countries) that is likely to be drawing a reduced state 
pension as a result of means tests, there are significant disincentives to deferring income. 
People in this category will be misled by generic financial advice that retirement savings 
are tax advantaged.  
As already noted, lump sums enjoy significant tax concessions in every country. In South 
Africa, members of provident funds can take their entire benefit as a lump sum, which 
may often be too small to be taxed so the members face a marginal rate of zero. All 
superannuation benefits in Australia can be taken as lump sums with a significant tax 
free allowance, but the un-refunded 15% tax on contributions means that the effective 
rate is at least 15%. In both countries higher marginal rates apply to larger payouts. In the 
new UK system introduced in April 2006, 25% of the value of the pension at retirement 
will be tax free.  
The need for an incentive is reduced in Australia where contributions are compulsory. 
Additional voluntary contributions (whether they are made in or out of the 
superannuation system) are however also subject to means tests.  
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2.7.5 Work incentives after retirement age 
As discussed in 2.6.2, retirement, disability and unemployment benefit issues are difficult 
to distinguish if entitlement to pension is set at a fairly young age. Remaining employed 
becomes less economical in any event, and high rates of clawback create significant 
disincentives to work. With South Africa’s high levels of unemployment, encouraging 
early retirement can be seen as opening up jobs for younger people. The flat population 
pyramid makes it a relatively inexpensive way of providing unemployment benefits. For 
countries facing population aging that have labour shortages, higher retirement ages 
appear to be a necessity, and people ought to be encouraged to remain in the workplace 
as long as possible. Means tests ought then to be supplemented by other measures to 
encourage people to return to work. 
Table 1: Incentives to defer income - South Africa with means tests 
 
Marginal rate 
of deduction 
for 
contributions 
Years of 
investment 
income tax 
concessions 
Marginal tax 
or clawback 
rate on 
benefits 
Benefit: 
contribution ratio 
18.0% 10 18.0% 104% 
18.0% 40 18.0% 128% 
40.0% 10 40.0% 116% 
Same tax 
rates 
40.0% 40 40.0% 227% 
18.0% 10 0.0% 127% 
18.0% 40 0.0% 156% 
25.0% 10 0.0% 144% 
25.0% 40 0.0% 205% 
30.0% 10 0.0% 158% 
30.0% 40 0.0% 251% 
30.0% 10 25.0% 118% 
30.0% 40 25.0% 188% 
35.0% 10 18.0% 143% 
35.0% 40 18.0% 252% 
35.0% 10 25.0% 131% 
35.0% 40 25.0% 231% 
40.0% 10 0.0% 193% 
40.0% 40 0.0% 379% 
40.0% 10 30.0% 135% 
Reducing 
tax rates 
40.0% 40 30.0% 265% 
0.0% 10 50.0% 48% 
0.0% 40 50.0% 39% 
18.0% 10 50.0% 64% 
18.0% 40 50.0% 78% 
30.0% 10 50.0% 79% 
Increasing 
tax rates 
30.0% 40 50.0% 125% 
Ratio of greatest to least 9.70   
Assuming 10% nominal investment return, 30% tax on investment   
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2.7.6 Tax on investment income 
It can be seen from table 1 that the effect of the tax concessions on investment income 
(which can be seen by comparing the effects of 40 years vs. 10 years of contributions) is 
small relative to the differences between the rate at which contributions are deducted and 
the rate at which they are taxed. The concessions do however have a deadweight loss as 
they provide a distorting effect on investment decisions, allowing for a variety of tax-
planning strategies.  
It is however frequently argued that tax concessions for savings have positive 
externalities in that they promote investment and increase economic growth. It is perhaps 
necessary to rehearse, briefly, the refutations of each of the three mistakes in this 
argument.  
Saving in tax-favoured superannuation barely increases savings. In a review of the 
literature on factors affecting saving, Smith (1990) finds that savings through private-
sector pension funds are likely to reduce other types of savings, although they do 
contribute to an increase in overall savings. Knox (1992), in a typical study, has found 
that the reduction in other forms of savings means that total personal saving appears to be 
increased by only 30% to 40% of contributions to pension funds. Half, or more, of this 
increase is contributed by government in the form of tax concessions. Thus pension and 
superannuation funds make a much smaller contribution to increasing national savings 
than is sometimes assumed - probably less than 20% of the amounts saved.  
Saving does not necessarily increase investment. The classical view is that an increase in 
savings will reduce the cost of investible funds, and so encourage investment. The 
Keynesian view is that increased savings represents a postponement of consumption, and 
that this will discourage investment in plant that would otherwise have provided for this 
consumption. While there is a positive relationship between savings and investment, it is 
not at all clear which comes first. 
Investment does not necessarily increase economic growth. The debate about the 
relationship between investment and growth is unresolved. Aghevli et al (1990) point out 
that the positive correlation that clearly exists between savings, investment and growth is 
consistent with several different hypotheses about causes. It is just as likely that growth 
causes savings and investment as for savings and investment to cause growth. 
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If private capital accumulation through retirement savings made a difference to 
prosperity, one would expect a significant difference between otherwise similar 
economies such as those of the UK and France, and the Netherlands and Belgium, as they 
have taken very different paths in this respect. In fact, the differences are barely evident. 
It is, therefore, not true that there are proven macro-economic benefits for giving special 
tax consideration to retirement funds.  
Even if it were demonstrated that there were significant advantages in encouraging 
superannuation savings, that would not by itself justify tax concessions. There are few 
economic activities that do not have similar advantages; as has been one of the major 
concerns of economists since Adam Smith, and which Olson (1965) particularly shows, 
the better policy is to avoid all concessions to special interests.  
Table 2: Incentives to defer income - South Africa no means tests 
 
Marginal rate 
of deduction 
for 
contributions 
Years of 
investment 
income tax 
concessions 
Marginal tax 
or clawback 
rate on 
benefits 
Benefit: 
contribution ratio 
18.0% 10 18.0% 94% 
18.0% 40 18.0% 72% 
40.0% 10 40.0% 105% 
Same tax 
rates 
40.0% 40 40.0% 131% 
18.0% 10 0.0% 115% 
18.0% 40 0.0% 88% 
25.0% 10 0.0% 130% 
25.0% 40 0.0% 116% 
30.0% 10 0.0% 143% 
30.0% 40 0.0% 143% 
30.0% 10 25.0% 107% 
30.0% 40 25.0% 107% 
35.0% 10 18.0% 129% 
35.0% 40 18.0% 144% 
35.0% 10 25.0% 118% 
35.0% 40 25.0% 132% 
40.0% 10 0.0% 175% 
40.0% 40 0.0% 218% 
40.0% 10 30.0% 122% 
Reducing 
tax rates 
40.0% 40 30.0% 153% 
0.0% 10 0.0% 87% 
0.0% 40 0.0% 44% 
18.0% 10 18.0% 94% 
18.0% 40 18.0% 72% 
30.0% 10 30.0% 100% 
Identical 
tax rates 
30.0% 40 30.0% 100% 
Ratio of greatest to least 5.00   
Assuming 10% nominal investment return, 30% tax on investment   
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Table 2 provides an indication of what the incentives to defer income were to become if 
investment income was taxed at 30% and means tests abolished. It is assumed that no-
one would save for a higher income in retirement than while they were working, and so 
would never be faced by a higher marginal tax rate. The range of the ratio of benefits to 
contributions is halved, but it remains less than 1 for those with a marginal rate of less 
than 30%, which may be seen as unfair. Apart from the arguments made in the fourth 
paragraph of 2.5.3 above that this can be reconciled with both horizontal and vertical 
equity, the after tax return on retirement fund investments is likely to be higher than the 
alternative instruments used by the poor37, or they can negotiate membership of 
alternative savings mechanisms that better suit their circumstances. Mandatory 
superannuation makes the latter impossible in Australia unless people were given the 
option of joining non-complying unit trusts where they paid their own tax on the 
investment income. 
2.7.7 Alternative investments 
Paying inflation protected state pensions to all pensioners would provide them with a 
useful additional investment instrument. It would also allow for retirement funds to adopt 
a more adventurous investment policy with their investments. 
The introduction of a universal government guaranteed pension would reduce – even 
eliminate – calls for the state to artificially create instruments that match pension 
payments or otherwise subsidize pensions for the wealthy. Blake (2000) notes 
suggestions that the state should provide not only more long-term inflation-linked assets, 
but also instruments that would absorb some of the longevity risk inherent in annuities. 
Vitas (1998) says that Chile and other South American governments provide minimum 
guarantee of investment returns, which has a similar effect although with moral hazards.  
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 Of the 2 out of 150 Financial Diaries families with unit trusts, which can be assumed to offer comparable 
returns to retirement funds, one was a taxpayer (facing a marginal rate of 25%) the other not. Most families 
had bank accounts which offer lower yields. Although informal loans to friends and family may have offered 
higher returns, this would have been at some risk. See 
http://www.financialdiaries.com/files/Financial%20Diaries%20Financial%20Styles%20smaller.pdf 
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2.8 Just deserts 
Recognizing just deserts is equivalent to saying that people’s actions matter and must 
have their proper consequences. In the context of benefits and taxation, this suggests a 
correspondence between the two. It is possible to find some arguments for means tests 
from this perspective, but they largely vanish under closer scrutiny.  
2.8.1 State pensions 
State pensions, unlike private income, might be said to be un-deserved and thus it could 
be argued that they can be treated differently when it comes to clawing them back.  
The amounts of clawback are determined by reference to private income and not the 
pension. In order to justify means tests using an argument from desert, one would have to 
make a far more difficult case. It would be necessary to prove that those on a partial 
pension (subject to the means test at 50% in South Africa) were less deserving than those 
with the full state pension.  
It would appear to be an impossible task to justify a blanket clawback without a much 
more careful analysis of just deserts. Needy pensioners may have been significant 
contributors to the fiscus over their lifetime, and their current low income may be the 
result of economic bad luck, poor health, or a commendable generosity - rather than 
idleness or imprudence. From the perspective of desert, such distinctions would have to 
be made. That they have not been made, suggests that this idea of deserts is not regarded 
as an important justification for the high rate of clawback applied in means tests.  
One could imagine practical ways of implementing such a policy: for instance, applying 
it to those who had not been taxpayers for 20 years or more (as is the case in some 
countries), and also to those who could not explain why they were no longer in 
possession of their lump sum retirement benefits. Alternatively, it may be regarded as 
just too hard to achieve, or desirable to forgive undeserving recipients for their failure to 
pay adequate taxes. 
Another response would be to justify the payment of a universal (non-means tested) 
pension on the grounds of desert rather than need or equality. In the first place, most 
pensioners are likely to have worked since they were children, and even if they have not 
paid income tax or contributed greatly to indirect taxes, they are all likely to have made 
some contribution to the economic wealth of society. It can also be argued that some of 
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the state’s taxation income arises from economic rents (e.g. the value of land, mineral 
wealth and band-width) that should be given equally in some form to all residents. It 
appears, from research such as Evans and Kelly (2005) and St John and Willmore (2001) 
that there is majority public support for universal pensions in a number of countries 
including Australia and New Zealand, which has had one for some time. It can be argued 
that a universal pension would make a real contribution to social solidarity. 
2.8.2 Grandfathering 
The taxation arrangements of all three countries are greatly complicated by the protection 
of historic privileges, or grandfathering. This applies in some cases to allowances and 
income that are not means-tested, and to income and benefits that are not taxed. The 
resultant complexity is widely regarded as expensive and a deadweight loss on the 
economy.  
One argument made to defend grandfathering is the rule against retrospective legislation. 
The rule relates to the procedural principle of certainty. It relates to desert because, in 
this context, it is necessary to prevent people from being unfairly penalized for making 
decisions that subsequently prove to be inappropriate because of changes in the law, and 
provides justification for transitional arrangements. It cannot however be used as a 
legitimate argument to protect tax privileges, to prevent government from making 
relatively minor changes to rates of tax, or when the individuals concerned are able to 
rearrange their circumstances to avoid harm that they would otherwise have suffered. 
The UK is in the process of eliminating all grandfathering in its pension tax regime. 
South African and Australia might consider doing the same. 
3 REFORM 
3.1 Bringing it together 
This part of the paper first summarizes the arguments for reform, discusses the results of 
the Australian debate of the nineties to understand why it failed to lead to the 
abolishment of the means tests, and then suggests how reform might be achieved. 
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3.1.1 The debate 
Means tests are justified as making them more affordable by targeting the needy. It has 
been shown, however, that the issues are not so much about saving expenses but about 
distributing tax and clawback charges equitably. Means tests are a poor mechanism for 
this because: 
• They involve a greater intrusion into the lives of most pensioners, applying an 
unfair social stigma. 
• They are not well targeted at needs. 
• They present declining levels of clawback and tax, and so are offences against the 
vertical equity element of equality.  
• They are expensive to administer, probably impossible to do so accurately. 
• If intended as incentives to save more or work in retirement, they do not fulfil this 
function for a large proportion of the target population. 
• They might be justified in terms of just deserts, but this would require the 
introduction of a proportional residence requirement or a measure of how long tax 
was paid.  
• They might be justified as treating the recipients of pensions, disability benefits 
and unemployment benefits equally, but differentiation can be justified in terms 
of the desirability (from an individual and societal perspective) to get people back 
into the workforce. 
3.1.2 The Australian debate 
The means-test debate in Australia in the mid-nineties may be instructive in 
understanding how other debates may proceed.  
The Institute of Actuaries of Australia (1994) recommended the introduction of a 
universal non-means-tested state pension in a package of other superannuation 
suggestions. They placed a particular emphasis on the inefficiencies arising from 
attempts to avoid the impact of the means test – which is a real problem in Australia, but 
appears to be less so in South Africa. The submission emphasised that the Institute was 
advocating an alternative structure rather than a particular package of changes to taxation 
but, after some debate, modelling of the cost implications was included in this and a 
subsequent submission. This proved unfortunate, as Gallagher (1994) showed that the 
costs had been underestimated and that the proposals appeared to significantly benefit 
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wealthier pensioners. This led Barber et al (1995), in their strategic review of the 
pensions’ means tests for the Government, to reject the Institute’s recommendations. The 
arguments that the costs were too high appear to have been accepted by subsequent 
papers to the Institute, such as those of Somogyi et al (1995) and Rice (1998). 
The outcome of this debate is unfortunate. If a much better administrative arrangement 
happens to unfairly favour wealthier pensioners, the obvious solution is to increase the 
taxes that apply to this group. Such an increase would also justify the removal of the 
administratively cumbersome reasonable benefit limits that currently apply to the 
wealthiest.  
3.1.3 Reducing tax expenditures 
Section 2.6 argues that the redistribution of wealth can be made fairer by abolishing 
means tests and current tax concessions to pensioners, and probably some increase in 
other forms of taxation. Increasing the tax on the investment income of retirement funds 
would be an obvious source for this additional requirement. (As suggested above, another 
alternative would be to tax pensioners at a higher rate than other people. This would not 
have to be any more complicated than the current position in all three countries.) 
The question this section addresses is whether a tax on the investment income of 
retirement funds would currently be sufficient to abolish the means tests. It could be 
made to be so in future by adjusting the level of the state pension and other taxes at the 
time.  
Abolishing the means test in South Africa would currently cost some R10bn, which 
could also be recouped by taxing payments and the reduction or abolishing of tax 
concessions for older people. The exact amounts are not readily determinable, but it 
would probably not be necessary to entirely remove tax concessions on investment 
income (R6bn).38 
Abolishing the means test in Australia would cost some $10bn, but some 30% of this 
would be immediately recouped by taxing the resulting pensions, and the balance could 
                                                    
38
 This is extrapolated from Smith (1995) and the South African budget reports on retirement fund tax. 
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be recouped by removing tax concessions to superannuation investment income ($5.7bn) 
and removing the senior tax offset ($1.8bn).39  
The National Association of Pension Funds (2005) says the UK system has been called 
the “most complex in the world”. The report suggests the introduction of a citizen’s 
pension that would be set at a level that required no means tests. Their estimate of the net 
cost in 2010 is of the order of £13bn, of which £2bn would be recovered by the tax 
system. They suggest that the balance of the cost should be recovered from redirecting 
the national insurance contributions for the earnings related state scheme and raising the 
retirement age. UK pension funds currently pay limited tax on their investment income 
so there would also be scope to recover amounts from investment income. 
Reducing tax expenditures on retirement funding would significantly simplify the system 
of retirement fund taxation, creating obvious efficiency gains to government and people 
who would not have to devote as much time to understanding the system (and avoiding 
its negative consequences): 
• It abolishes means tests. 
• It eliminates tax concessions currently enjoyed by the elderly. 
• It allows for the elimination of the tax concessions currently enjoyed by 
retirement funds, which also reduces opportunities for tax arbitrage. 
• It removes the need for caps on benefits for the wealthy. 
Administration would also be simplified. Extrapolating UK costs of the savings credit to 
the other countries suggests savings in the hundreds of millions as the social welfare 
agencies no longer perform means tests. State pensions could be paid without deduction. 
Employers and financial institutions paying benefits would determine PAYG deductions 
on the assumption that a pension was being paid to those over the retirement age. The tax 
collecting agencies would be responsible for ensuring that those with multiple income 
sources were assessed correctly. It is not clear how much additional work this would 
create; for most institutions it would represent a change in the work that they do but not 
an increase. The Australian Tax Office, for instance, already has data on some 50% of 
pensioners. The same is likely to be true in the UK and in South Africa in respect of 
those pensioners who have private incomes.  
                                                    
39
 See Tax Expenditure Statement at treasury.gov.au/documents/950/PDF/TES_2005.pdf 
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3.2 Institutional factors 
If the arguments against means tests are so strong, why do they persist? If we can find no 
good reasons, perhaps there are bad ones? 
Lundberg (2005) discusses some of the institutional and political reasons for the 
structure of pensions systems in different countries. He raises the role of history, political 
interests and “policy entrepreneurs”. It may well be that the answer mainly lies in 
historical institutional accidents.  
3.2.1 Fault lines  
In all countries, recommendations as to the level of the state pensions and clawbacks are 
made by the same people who look at the levels of unemployment and disability benefits. 
They are given a constrained budget, and effectively prevented from considering rates of 
taxation.  
There appears to be a wide gap between the people in the departments responsible for 
social security and those for taxation. The best of the former are motivated mainly by 
compassion, the latter by efficiency; they come from different intellectual disciplines, 
read different newspapers and journals, appear likely to vote for different parties and are 
advised internationally by different agencies. The International Labour Office (ILO) 
advises the former and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) interact 
with the latter. Ervik (2003) and Asher (2002) comment on some of these differences. 
Policy development in social security departments such as the South African Department 
of Social Development operates within a given budget that has to be applied to meet 
urgent needs and reduce inequality. The department officials are required to treat 
different groups of their clients fairly. There is no question of making a trade-off with the 
tax on investment income of retirement funds or tax concessions given to pensioners. In 
both cases, concessions are likely to be regarded as being favourable to pensioners in 
general, and thus worth supporting. Given the limited budget and the range of needs that 
present themselves, a steep means test meets a number of the criteria of justice listed 
above.  
From the perspective of tax policy, social security means tests are regarded as a reduction 
in expenditure and not as taxation income. They do not fall within the purview of those 
responsible for determining marginal tax rates and the question of the taxation of 
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retirement fund income. People developing policy face ongoing arguments that taxation 
should be reduced, and counting the clawback of pensions as a reduction in expenditure 
is consistent with doing so. Within the confines of their brief, they also meet many of the 
criteria of justice. The combination however does not. 
3.2.2 A South African experience 
My experience in South Africa was of enormously difficulties in obtaining an 
interdepartmental view on the matter. I was a member of the steering committee set up to 
produce recommendations that arose from the National Retirement Consultative Forum 
in 1997. This was set up by the Department of Finance (since renamed the Treasury), as a 
result of the recommendations of the Smith Committee (1995), to attempt to gain a 
national consensus on a variety of pension issues – including all aspects of compulsory 
membership and taxation. The steering committee suggested to the Department, in early 
1998, that the matters could not be determined independently of the Department of 
Welfare (since renamed Social Development). Whether as a result, or independently, an 
inter-departmental task team was convened by the Department of Social Development in 
1999 to review the social security system. It recommended the investigation of a 
comprehensive and integrated social security structure. The output of this investigation 
was the report of the Taylor Committee (2002) of which I was also a member. The report 
recommended that means tests (for pensions and other categorical grants, such as 
children’s allowances) be abolished and the lost revenue recaptured through the taxation 
system. The recommendation was however overshadowed by the Committee’s major 
recommendation (from which I dissented) of a new, non-means-tested, basic income 
grant payable to all residents. The controversy over the latter may well overshadow the 
important, unanimous, recommendation that means tests should, wherever possible, be 
avoided. 
3.3 Lobby groups  
The institutional arrangements would probably not be sufficient to maintain means tests 
in their current form if it were not for a few powerful interests. 
3.3.1 Potential losers 
Potential losers may be expected to resist reform. 
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Major losers will be wealthier individuals who are currently benefiting from tax 
concessions offered to pension funds. Those currently drawing benefits will be barely 
affected if the majority of the additional revenue comes from tax on investment income. 
They could however be effected by an increase in the tax on pensions. 
It may be that, in the long run, moving away from means tests would put some pressure 
on the level of the state pension, and so potentially also disadvantage those with the 
lowest income, who are currently not affected by the means test. This is to be regretted, 
although the argument of 2.4.2 above is that there is no way of accurately measuring who 
are the poorest, and that targeting is invariably spurious.  
The winners are those of lower middle income who are, or would be, subject to means 
tests.  
3.3.2 The gerontocracy 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) describe how the old in every country, with plenty of 
time to lobby, extract a greater share of resources, and shape the pension system to 
maximise their power. Their thesis would explain tax concessions that favour the old, 
and how these are seldom questioned in political debates. All tax expenditure on 
retirement funds may fall into this category, particularly concessions such as the 
exemption of the investment income of pensioners within retirement funds - in South 
Africa and Australia.  
3.3.3 The industry 
The long term savings industry, which includes retirement funds, insurers, and service 
providers, including actuaries, has an interest in a larger, more tax-favoured, industry. In 
South Africa and Australia, it can be relied upon to call for the reduction of taxes on 
pension and superannuation fund investment income particularly.  
3.3.4 Public interest groups 
Non-government organizations can speak effectively for the rights of pensioners. They 
understandably interpret their role as to speak for the poorest, and so are unlikely to be 
immediate supporters of a change that benefits those slightly wealthier. As suggested 
above however, the losses to those on the lowest income will be small, and are abolishing 
means tests is ultimately likely to benefit everyone in the lower income brackets.  
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In South Africa, the position is clouded by the fact that whites will benefit more 
proportionately from the abolition of the means test. Lost tax concessions for wealthier 
pensioners will however fall almost entirely on whites. 
In all countries, public interest groups may baulk at paying pensions to the wealthy. They 
may also not be easily persuaded by proposals that the wealthy will be worse off once 
their tax concessions are removed. One way of addressing this objection is to increase the 
level of income and assets at which the means test applies so that very few people are 
affected. As long as the level is inflation adjusted, this removes most of the objections to 
the means test. It is however administratively untidy. 
3.3.5 The beneficiaries 
It can be noted that the beneficiaries are not likely to be represented by anyone, nor are 
they likely to speak up for themselves. There is evidence that they feel stigmatized.  
3.3.6 Recommendations 
If this analysis of the problem is true, the next step is to recommend that responsibility 
for determining means tests be transferred to the same government office as that 
responsible for deciding the incidence of taxation. This responsibility should extend to 
the evaluation of all means tests offered by central, state and local government. The 
clawback of means should be recorded clearly as a charge on income rather than a 
reduction in pensions and other allowances. If the logic of this paper is ineluctable, then 
one could expect such an office to recommend a move to a more just approach to means 
tests. 
The administration of the evaluation of means should also be centralised with the 
administration of taxation. It should then become more efficient and lead to lower levels 
of intrusion in people’s lives.  
4 CONCLUSION  
This paper has shown that there are good reasons to abolish means tests and replace them 
with additional taxes in South Africa, Australia and the UK. The reasons relate to money 
and mechanisms. 
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On the question of money, means tests for pensioners should not be seen as one of 
targeting of needs and affordability. Targeting that effects over half the pensioner 
population does not deserve the title; needs are invariably measured relatively and arise 
more from notions of equality than personal necessity; seeing the problem as one of 
affordability misses the fact that the means tests can be seen as a source of state revenue 
rather than a reduction in expenditure. The financial question is not one of affordability 
but of redistribution. The high rates of clawback - identified by the inequitable kink in 
figure 1 – create vertical inequality and perverse incentives - as demonstrated in table 1. 
Relatively simple tax changes can easily recover the loss of income arising from 
abolishing the means tests.  
It is the mechanisms that are used rather than the redistribution question that create the 
most egregious problems. Three major offences against justice are the unwarranted 
interference in the lives of pensioners, the injustice of laws too complex to be correctly 
administered, and the deadweight costs to both the affected pensioners and the 
government of attempting to do so. 
The internal structure of government and an alignment of established interests make it 
difficult to achieve reform. Reform is not however impossible. 
• Government needs to be persuaded that means tests and taxation should be 
considered together as a single policy issue. Means tests operated by different 
government departments and local governments, which can push marginal rates of 
clawback to over 100%, should be included.  
• Those in the retirement industry who lobby for tax preferential treatment for 
contributions, without considering the needs of the means-tested, need to be 
corrected.  
• Public interest groups need to be persuaded that focusing on the poorest may be 
too narrow. 
There is a moral imperative for those with power. As the New International Version has 
it: ‘speak up for those who cannot speak for themselves’. 
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 CHAPTER 4 - CONFLICTED SUPER STRUCTURES: ARE 
AUSTRALIAN INVESTORS BEING SHORT-CHANGED? 
 
Presented at the 12th Australian Colloquium of Superannuation Researchers - to be 
published by Edward Elgar as a chapter of the Selected Papers 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Are members of superannuation funds in Australia being short-changed? The different 
types of superannuation funds do charge significantly different fees. Some of the 
difference clearly arises from the quality and scope of the service offered, but there are 
other, less innocent, explanations for the high level of fees. Of particular concern are the 
conflicts of interest in some organizational structures. 
The next section of this chapter identifies the various types of funds. The third describes 
the main kinds of regulatory protection provided to members, some of which give rise to 
additional expenses. The fourth section examines the role of market or regulatory failures 
in explaining the apparently excessive level of charges of some funds. The fifth section 
looks at the functions performed by fund trustees, and identifies potential conflicts of 
interest as an alternative explanation of additional charges. The sixth section looks at the 
charges associated with the different types of funds and identifies the main drivers of 
expense. The final section suggests some topics for additional research and addresses 
some policy questions. 
2 TYPES OF FUNDS  
Australian superannuation funds are classified in a variety of ways in legislation and in 
the industry statistics published by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA)40. There are inconsistencies in the definitions depending on the purpose for 
which they are used, but the main classifications are summarized in Table 1.  
                                                    
40
These can be found on the superannuation section of their website (apra.gov.au). They currently include 
the "Quarterly Superannuation Performance" and the "Annual Superannuation Bulletin", which replaced 
"Superannuation Trends" in 2005. The latter has been used in this chapter. 
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Table 1:  Australia - Main types of superannuation funds 
APRA 
CLASSIFICATION 
Is employer 
sponsored 
Operates in the 
public sector 
Operates in the 
private sector 
Funds with 1–4 members 
Small APRA funds Possibly No Yes 
Self-managed 
superannuation funds Possibly No Yes 
Approved deposit funds 
with 1-4 members No No Yes 
Funds with 5+ members 
Corporate funds Yes No Yes 
Public sector funds Yes Yes No 
Industry funds Possibly Possibly Possibly 
Retail funds Possibly No Yes 
Special purpose funds  
Pooled superannuation 
trusts 
No Possibly Possibly 
Approved deposit funds 
with more than 5 
members 
No Possibly Possibly 
Eligible rollover funds Possibly Possibly Possibly 
Note: 'Possibly' means that the fund may in some cases have the characteristic in the column 
heading 
Source: Author's mapping of the APRA statistical publications and SIS legislation 
 
In this chapter, we are concerned only with complying funds.41 Complying funds qualify 
for favourable tax treatment of investment income, and contributions to such funds may 
be tax deductible. These funds can be classified in four ways: by trustee, by contractual 
party, by benefit structure and by manner of investment. 
2.1 By trustee 
With the exception of retirement savings accounts, all superannuation funds must be 
managed by a trustee. The trustee is generally a corporate body with its own board of 
directors but in some circumstances may refer to a group of natural persons. I mean both 
                                                    
41
  Defined in part 5, division 2 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act) 
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types when referring to trustees in this chapter. There are currently three classes of 
trustee licence, the non-public offer entity licence, the public offer entity licence, and an 
extended public offer entity licence42 for trustees of a public offer fund that also operate 
other funds. 
2.2 By contractual party 
Superannuation funds can also be classified according to the party that initiates the 
contract of membership. 
2.2.1 Employer-sponsored funds 
A fund is a ‘standard’ employer-sponsored fund43 if all contributions to the fund are 
made as a result of an arrangement between the employer and the trustees, and just an 
employer-sponsored fund if the contributions are made as a result of an arrangement 
between the members and their employer. APRA’s statistical collections sort employer-
sponsored funds into three types: corporate funds, public sector funds and industry funds. 
Corporate funds are sponsored by a single employer or group of employers in the private 
sector. Public sector funds are sponsored by the government or its agencies.44 Industry 
funds are sponsored by a diverse group of employers in the same or a related industry, in 
either the public or the private sector, where the common link and driving force is often a 
representative union. Legislation in 2005 entitled most members to choose their funds.45 
2.2.2 Public offer funds 
Public offer funds46 are open to individuals, self-employed or otherwise, who then have a 
direct arrangement with the trustees to which the employer may or may not be party. 
Some are employer-sponsored funds, especially industry funds that have opened their 
doors to the public. But most are commercial companies that initially catered to 
                                                    
42
 Defined in section 29B of the SIS Act and SIS regulation 3A.03. 
43
 Defined in section 16 of the SIS Act. 
44
 This definition is not to be confused with that given in section 10 of the SIS Act, which refers to funds set 
up by some law or under the control of a state body. 
45
 See part 3A of the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act  
46
 Defined in section 10 of the SIS Act. 
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individuals, but later also to groups of employers. They are the retail funds of the APRA 
statistics. 
Approved deposit funds47 are public offer funds whose operations are restricted to 
receiving a transfer of benefits from other funds or certain payments from the Australian 
Taxation Office (ATO).  
A pooled superannuation trust48 is a unit trust whose only investors are other 
superannuation entities. Life insurance companies may invest in a pooled superannuation 
trust; designate a portion of their assets as a ‘virtual’ pooled superannuation trust; or 
place the assets backing annuity products in a pooled superannuation trust of their own. 
The assets backing life insurers’ annuity products are shown in the APRA statistics as the 
‘balance of statutory funds’. Pooled superannuation trusts are not counted in the 
statistical returns, as this would result in double counting of superannuation assets. No 
statistics are collected for virtual pooled superannuation trusts. 
Retirement savings accounts49 are open to applications from individuals and operate like 
bank deposits. They are intended for people with small balances in their superannuation 
funds, and for those who wish, for short periods, to make use of the capital guarantee 
they offer. They do not have registered trustees and are not defined as public offer funds. 
Members have a contractual relationship with the bank or life insurance company 
offering the account, which may then be seen as having a fiduciary responsibility towards 
its account holders. 
2.2.3 Member-initiated funds 
There are two types of small, member-initiated funds. The first are the self-managed 
funds, in which each trustee is also a member of the fund.50 They are regulated by the 
ATO rather than APRA because no prudential risk is involved. The second are the small 
                                                    
47
 Defined in section 10 of the SIS Act. 
48
 Defined in section 10 of the SIS Act and regulation 1.04 of the SIS Regulations. 
49
 Defined in, and administered in accordance with, the Retirement Savings Accounts Act 1997. 
50
 Defined in section 17A of the SIS Act. 
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APRA funds.51 Established by members, their operations are delegated to a separate 
trustee. They are regulated by APRA because of the prudential risk involved.  
2.2.4 Eligible rollover funds  
Trustees face various restrictions52 in the amounts they can charge in administration fees. 
If they believe that a member’s account is too small to be managed economically, they 
are allowed to transfer that person’s benefit into an eligible rollover fund (without first 
obtaining the permission of the member).53 Eligible rollover funds are intended to 
provide low-cost services for small accounts, and so are restricted in what they can 
charge.  
2.3 By benefit structure 
Defined benefit funds are defined variously in the SIS Act as funds that have at least one 
member with a prospective benefit related to salary, or taking a fixed pension.54 
Accumulation funds55 are defined as those funds that are not defined benefit funds. The 
APRA statistical returns add an intermediate category of hybrid funds that have both 
defined benefit and accumulation members. However, because trustees are allowed to 
categorize funds subjectively, some retail funds with defined benefit members have 
defined themselves to be accumulation funds for purposes of the statistics.  
                                                    
51
 These are defined as ‘certain small funds’ in section 121A of the SIS Act. 
52
 See part 5 of the SIS Regulations. 
53
 Defined in part 24 of the SIS Act. 
54
 Under section 83A of the SIS Act, a defined benefit fund is a public sector fund that has at least one 
defined benefit member (that is, a member who is entitled at some point to be paid a benefit related to salary); 
or a private sector fund that has at least one defined benefit member, and arrangements whereby contributions 
are not hypothecated to individual members. Section 228 dispenses with the latter limitation but widens the 
definition of a defined benefit member to include members receiving a fixed pension. Regulation 1.03 of the 
SIS Regulations uses the section 228 definition, while the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 
1992, which sets out the compulsory minimum contributions to superannuation funds, uses the definition 
given in section 83A.  
55
 Defined in regulation 1.03 of the SIS Regulations. 
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APRA statistics show that over two-thirds of the assets in Australian funds are in 
accumulation funds, with over 90 per cent of the balance residing in funds defining 
themselves as hybrid funds. The accumulation funds can be divided further into those 
that offer choice of investment type and those that go further to offer choice of 
investment manager. The latter are often called master trusts, although there appears to 
be no legal definition of this term. 
Table 2:  Manner of investment of funds’ assets 
APRA 
CLASSIFICATION Assets held by the fund Tax on investment earnings 
Directly invested  Shares, property, fixed interest 
etc. managed internally Paid by fund on direct income 
Shares etc. managed under a 
specialist mandate Paid by fund on direct income 
Wholesale or retail unit and 
property trusts 
Paid by fund on income that is 
passed on by the manager 
Placed with investment 
manager 
Pooled superannuation trusts Paid by pooled superannuation trust 
Held through life 
insurance companies Life insurance policies Paid by life insurance company 
Source: Author's mapping of APRA(2003) and taxation legislation 
 
2.4 By manner of investment 
The underlying assets of a fund can be held directly, or through a range of alternative 
vehicles. Table 2 shows how the manner in which APRA classifies fund investment is 
related to the type of investment held and the tax consequences of each type.  
3 MAIN FORMS OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 
This section discusses the main forms of regulatory protection provided to fund 
members. Some regulations can be expected to limit the costs associated with 
superannuation; others may increase them. The discussion focuses mainly on the APRA-
regulated funds (that is, those managed by people other than the members), and on 
accumulation funds. 
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3.1 Fiduciary responsibility 
The commercial law framework for Australian superannuation funds is based on the law 
of trusts. It is set out, inter alia, by Glover (2002):  
Investors, and more particularly members of superannuation funds, enjoy 
significant protection from the common (or general) law. Corporate officers and 
advisers with whom we are concerned are disciplined at general law as 
‘fiduciaries’. The term refers to the law’s code for the maintenance of the honesty 
and integrity of persons in positions of ascendancy and trust. Its centrepiece is an 
‘inflexible rule’ which prohibits fiduciaries, such as corporate officers and 
advisers, from putting themselves in positions where their interest and duty 
conflict.56 
‘Interest’ refers to the personal financial interests of fiduciaries, ‘duty’ to their duty to 
members or perhaps shareholders. Glover goes on to identify conflicts of interest and 
duty where a director may owe different duties to the shareholders of different 
companies. He points out that the traditional formulation of the rule is strict: ‘Possibility 
of a conflict is enough to attract the rule. … Exposure of one’s self to temptation is made 
wrongful. Directors, as it were, are not given the chance to be dishonest’ (Glover 2002). 
He describes a failure in this area as fraud. 
The prohibition on exposing oneself to conflicts of interest is common in the rest of the 
world, where it is also sometimes included in the basic law of agency. Civil law 
jurisdictions, which do not recognize trusts, incorporate the provision in other law 
governing fiduciaries.  
The responsibilities of a fiduciary also include a requirement to be prudent, and a duty of 
care. 
3.2 The main legislation 
Superannuation funds are subject to various, largely concessionary, tax provisions set out 
in the Income Tax (Assessment) Act 1936 and the Income Tax (Assessment) Act 1997.  
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 Glover is here quoting from Bray v Ford [1896] House of Lords Appeal Case 44, 51; see also Phipps v 
Boardman [1967] 2 House of Lords Appeal Case 46, 123.  
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The confusingly named Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 requires 
employers to make superannuation contributions on behalf of employees, currently set at 
9 per cent of remuneration. The ‘guarantee’ arises from the obligation placed on 
employers to guarantee that they have made the required contributions. The government 
takes on no financial obligations and there are no investment guarantees. 
The Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act of 1993 and its accompanying set of 
regulations—the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (henceforth, 
the SIS Act and Regulations)—provide for compliance with tax, guarantee and other 
policy issues, and for prudential supervision. They can be seen as codifying, adapting and 
extending the provisions in the general law.57  
3.3 Equal representation on the board 
The board of trustees of retail funds will normally consist of individuals with varying 
degrees of commercial connection with the shareholders. Other boards of trustees may 
consist of member representatives, employer representatives and independent trustees. 
The SIS Act requires half the trustees of a standard employer-sponsored fund to be 
member representatives,58 who may be elected directly or appointed by a representative 
union. Employer representatives may also be appointed by an organization representative 
of the employer’s interests. While employer-appointed trustees can be expected to have 
greater technical knowledge of issues related to superannuation, member-appointed 
representatives are likely to be better at communicating with members. The trustees' duty 
to place members' interests first is reinforced by this diversity in the right to elect or 
appoint trustees.  
Public offer funds that have standard employer-sponsored members are only required to 
have policy committees on which members must be represented. The latter have no rights 
beyond the right to be consulted.  
Pensioners are not entitled to representation on fund boards.  
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 In particular, part 6 of the SIS Act sets out provisions that require trustees to be prudent and free from 
inappropriate influences (direction). 
58
 Part 9 of the SIS Act. 
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3.4 Fitness of trustees  
APRA has the power to disqualify inappropriate persons from functioning as trustees, 
actuaries or auditors.59 The skill level required of a trustee in trust law is that of ‘an 
ordinary prudent person’60 without any particular skills in the management of 
superannuation. Recent regulations61 however require the trustees of a fund to have 
‘skills relevant to the duties of a trustee’, and APRA's fit and proper guidance note 
suggests that the trustees as a whole should have ‘sufficient knowledge’ to make 
‘informed decisions’. APRA therefore appears to require somewhat higher standards of 
knowledge and skill than the law. 
3.5 Investment choice 
The protection of the general trust law against conflicts of interest in the area of 
investment choice is overridden in at least two sections of the SIS Act. First, the SIS Act 
makes specific provision to permit investments made at less than arm’s length.62 The 
protection given is that the price must be determined on an arm’s-length basis. APRA 
says of investments made on an arm’s-length basis: ‘The test to apply is to consider 
whether a prudent person acting with due regard to their own commercial interests would 
have made such an investment’.63 Second, the SIS Act contains complicated provisions 
that expressly permit in-house investments in related parties, including the employer 
sponsor, under some circumstances.64 The requirement in trust law to invest prudently is 
made explicit, and the trustee is required to develop a strategy that considers investment 
risk, diversification, liquidity and the ability to meet liabilities.65 
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 Parts 15, 16 and 17 of the SIS Act.  
60
 Section 52(b) of the SIS Act. 
61
 SIS Regulation 4.14 (4) 
62
 Section 109 of the SIS Act. 
63
 Superannuation Circular No. II.D.5. 
64
 Part 8 of the SIS Act. 
65
 These are set out in section 52(8) of the SIS Act. 
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3.6 Accounting procedures 
Trustees are required to keep the assets of the fund separated from their own; prepare 
minutes, records and annual accounts; and make them and any other relevant information 
available to members.  
3.7 Risk management planning 
The SIS Regulations require trustees to submit a formal risk management strategy and 
business plan to APRA. The business plan must specifically address all the risks faced by 
the trustees and the fund, including:  
• governance-related risk (definition, delegation and segregation of responsibilities, 
outsourcing, fraud);  
• operational risk (information systems and records, strategy); 
• investment-related risk (market, credit or liquidity); and 
• risk mitigation through insurance. 
3.8 Waiver of charges on small accounts 
Some accounts of less than A$1,000 are given member protection, to ensure that the 
administrative charges on the accounts do not exceed their investment earnings.66 This is 
a rather wasteful element of the system given the miniscule value of the long-term 
benefits; after all, A$1,000 represents less than a year’s contributions for those on the 
minimum wage. In the meantime, uneconomic small accounts are proliferating—there 
are over 25 million accounts but fewer than 10 million workers. A high proportion of the 
uneconomic accounts belong to young, part-time and casual workers with low wages and 
high turnover. They would be much better off if they had the money to repay their 
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 Defined in part 5 of the SIS regulations in terms of the general power to make regulations set out in section 
31 of the SIS Act. 
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debts.67 In other instances, members should be encouraged to consolidate their accounts 
rather than be given this trivial protection. The member protection rules do, however, 
establish the principle that charges can be capped.  
4 MARKET, REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE  
The puzzle that this chapter addresses is the difference in costs between retail and 
industry public-offer funds. Retail funds charge members 1–4 per cent of the account 
balance per annum in fees, in addition to upfront deductions of up to 5 per cent of the 
contributions. Industry funds offer a similar if not identical service for charges of not 
much more than 1 per cent per annum, normally with no entry charge, despite having 
much smaller account balances on average. It is sometimes held that the apparently 
excessive costs of the retail funds are due to some form of market or regulatory failure. 
This section briefly analyses this possibility. 
4.1 Market failures 
The standard economic explanations for market failures of this sort are monopolistic 
practices and information asymmetries.  
4.1.1 Monopolistic practices 
There are a dozen or more large institutions competing in the public offer market, as well 
as many smaller players. Given the relative ease of entry and the numerous participants, 
one might expect a high level of competition and a low level of fees in the industry. The 
Productivity Commission (2001), which specifically investigated the effect of legislation 
on competition and barriers to entry, found no evidence of a lack of competition in the 
industry. Partly as a consequence, it recommended additional restrictions to entry in the 
form of compulsory licensing of all trustees, with a view to giving members additional 
regulatory protection. In studies undertaken for industry bodies, Clare (2001) and Rice 
and McEwin (2002) both concluded that the charges of funds largely reflected a 
competitive industry. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), 
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 The notion that people should begin to save early for retirement is demonstrably wrong—certainly if they 
want to own their own homes. This is because the net yield on superannuation assets is likely to be much 
lower than the interest on a mortgage, let alone other consumer debt. 
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in a more detailed 1998 study of the consequences of a proposed merger between two 
large players in the funds industry, also found no evidence of a lack of competition in the 
industry.68 Thus, if fees are too high, it would appear to be necessary to look elsewhere 
for an explanation.  
4.1.2 Information asymmetries 
It has been argued that funds are able to charge excessively high fees because members, 
or their employers, are kept poorly informed about the full extent and level of the fees 
being charged. This possibility has led to considerable debate about the adequacy of 
product disclosure, especially the need for improved comparability of fee structures 
across funds, and for the disclosure of commission earnings by intermediaries.69  
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) is responsible for 
regulating the behaviour of all financial market participants, including the trustees of 
public offer funds. ASIC also regulates financial advisers. Legislative changes in the past 
5 years 70 have set new standards for the disclosure of information, including requiring 
the licensing of financial advisers by ASIC.  
There can be no doubt that the fee structures of superannuation funds are complex but 
not insuperably so for a reasonable person prepared to devote time to the subject. A 
report by ASIC (2004a) provides a basis for determining a standard approach to 
disclosure. It lists eight different types of fees and makes some suggestions for 
uniformity. Further regulatory developments in this area seem inevitable.  
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 Of the takeover by the National Australia Bank group of Lend Lease in 1998, it says:  
"The merger does not breach the concentration thresholds in any possible market. A number of possible 
markets were examined: broad ‘funds management’ market; ‘wholesale’ and ‘retail’ funds management 
markets; separate markets for life insurance, superannuation, retail investment products; and narrow markets 
based on particular products (the latter are the least likely market definitions due to considerable demand- and 
supply-side substitutability). E.g., wholesale funds management—merged entity 7.4%, post-merger CR4 
[concentration ratio of the top four firms] 35.2%; life insurance 22% and 60%; super 13.8% and 46.8%; retail 
investment products 20.3% and 50.3%" http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/538590 accessed 
23 March 2007.  
69
 Some of the issues related to disclosure are discussed at greater length in Bateman (2001). 
70
 The Financial Sector Reform Act (2001) and subsequent changes to the Corporations Act (2001).  
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The investment management component of superannuation charges is particularly 
transparent and subject to competition in master trusts, which offer a wide choice of 
investment manager. As discussed below, however, the fees of master trusts do not 
appear to be particularly competitive.  
Again, it seems that information asymmetry does not offer a sufficient explanation for 
the high fees charged by some funds, suggesting that other factors must be at work. 
4.2 Regulatory or legal failures 
4.2.1 Fiduciary responsibility 
The inflexible prohibition of trust law against conflicts of interest and duty is not always 
obeyed, or enforced. It is often argued that it is inconsistent with modern commercial 
practices—mainly those of directors with many interests or of large commercial firms 
providing advice to a large number of clients.71  
‘Everybody is doing it’ is, however, a poor argument. It is easily rebutted by ‘but that 
does not make it right’. The requirement to avoid conflicts of interest and duty is an 
ancient legal doctrine that provides one of the foundations of the division of labour that 
allows for our current economic prosperity. It follows from the recognition of human 
frailty in the face of temptation. Undermining it may risk undermining all contracts of 
agency, all delegation, all trusteeship, all professionalism.  
The concept of fiduciary responsibility is particularly important in long-term contracts 
such as superannuation. It is difficult if not impossible for some employees to change 
funds. In such circumstances, competition and symmetrical information at the point of 
sale are of little value; the essential point is to ensure that the fund continues to be 
managed on behalf of the members. Of course, the need to attract new members and 
retain those that do have the option to move provides an ongoing competitive discipline, 
but this is not necessarily enough. 
Eliot Spitzer, the New York attorney-general from 1998 to 2006, has stated that conflicts 
of interest have become institutionalized in many parts of the financial services industry 
                                                    
71
 Teele (1992) provides an example, and gives instances of legal judgments and sections of the Corporations 
Act that have diluted the effects of the law. 
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(O’Brien 2004). His efforts to prosecute a number of financial firms for succumbing to 
conflicts of interest led to apparently reputable organizations in the United States paying 
billions of dollars in fines and compensation. This scandal was similar in many respects 
to the mis-selling problems of the UK life insurance industry in the 1990s.  
It appears that, prima facie, conflicts of interest cannot be ruled out as an explanation for 
excessive fees in the Australian superannuation industry.  
4.2.2 Agency risks 
Agency risks have been investigated in the economics literature over the past three 
decades, although, perhaps surprisingly, they are not often mentioned in the context of 
market failure. The cure suggested in the literature is greater monitoring of agents and 
better alignment of the incentives of agents and principals.72 The increased disclosure 
that has thus far been the major regulatory tool in Australia perhaps arises from this 
economists’ perspective. But an alternative more legal view, expressed below, is that the 
key to the management of agency risks lies in a more appropriate application of the law 
of agency. 
4.2.3 Specific prohibitions 
The essential prohibitions in the law of agency are prohibitions of conflicts of interest, 
which underline the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty: 
• An agent or trustee is entitled to remuneration but should not make a secret profit. 
The level of remuneration should not only be disclosed, but should be agreed— in 
this case—by the member or sponsoring employer. 
• An individual should not enter into any contract both as a principal and as an 
agent or trustee of another person. 
• The agent or trustee should not make a profit, disclosed or otherwise, that might 
be seen as influencing the agent’s decision to the possible detriment of the 
principals—or in this case of the members. 
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 Debatable perhaps, but see the definition of agency costs in The Economist’s useful economics dictionary 
at <http://www.economist.com/research/Economics>. 
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This is not to say that it is always clear whether conflicts exist or not. Even if there are 
no conflicts of interest, principals cannot be sure that their agents perform their duty of 
care, being diligent and earning their remuneration. These problems are not however 
addressed here.  
The three prohibitions set out above are examined in more detail in section 5 of this 
chapter, where I look at the functions of trustees in greater detail. Before doing so, 
however, it may be helpful to look at some of the insights of institutional economics. 
4.3 Institutional factors 
Keneley (2004) makes reference to some of the relevant literature in the field of 
institutional economics. This literature focuses on issues relating to the structure of firms 
and of markets, and the way that these have evolved to deal with transaction and 
information costs. Both within firms and in the market, unwritten ‘rules of the game’ can 
govern behaviour—with both positive and negative effects.  
4.3.1 Regulatory capture 
Of some interest in this context is the theory of collective action, which predicts that 
small organized groups can influence regulation and capture benefits from the rest of 
society. One example of this is the recognition that large organizations may, intentionally 
or otherwise, influence regulation to make it more difficult for small organizations to 
flourish.  
The tax, disclosure and prudential regulations surrounding Australian superannuation 
have reached what is perhaps an incomparable level of complexity. The main 
superannuation acts and regulations run to over 800 pages; the 2001 financial sector 
reforms added 150,000 words to this legislation. Advisers must understand not only the 
difficult provisions of the two income tax acts but also the rules for social security 
benefit payments. These complexities cannot but entrench the position of large firms that 
can afford the necessary specialists, thus making it more difficult for smaller firms to 
compete and driving up the price of administration. This point was recognized but 
dismissed by the Productivity Commission (2001) without giving reasons. It should 
perhaps be revisited. 
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4.3.2 Rules of the game: investment ‘cults’ 
Given the common and not entirely unfair references to the ‘cult of the equity’, some 
consideration may be given here to the belief system surrounding investment markets. 
The belief that it is possible to beat the market appears to be more widespread than is 
justified by the research. Investment managers, operating on behalf of fund members, 
fulfil the important additional economic function of allocating savings to where they are 
most productive. If the investment managers are successful in their task, the expected 
return on all assets, after adjustment for risk, will be the same for all managers. Put 
differently, no manager will be able to outperform any other manager when considered 
ex ante. The intervention of random events does mean, however, that the returns 
produced by different managers will differ ex post—even in an efficient market. 
It is a difficult problem to discern whether the market is efficient and whether the ex post 
difference results from skill or is random. Behavioural economists have found that 
people are prone to recognise patterns in random events where none exist. Ferson et al 
(2002) found that this problem extended even to experts using sophisticated statistical 
tools. Blake and Timmermann (2004) reported findings showing that UK investors were 
influenced excessively by good past performance in spite of its possible lack of meaning. 
The question of whether the investment performance of managers persists over time has 
been researched intensively. In a finding that remains largely unchallenged, Carhart 
(1997) showed that it does—but only in the case of underperforming funds. He found 
weak evidence of persistent outperformance among funds that were able in some way to 
quickly capture new evidence in the market. On the other hand, he found strong evidence 
of persistent underperformance by other funds. Part of the underperformance can be 
explained by excessive trading; the rest must come from the purchase or sale of 
investments at uneconomic prices. One possibility is that managers are trading at an 
uneconomic price for some personal benefit, at the expense of fund members. Blake and 
Timmermann (2004) conclude that information on past performance should be made 
available to members so that they are able to avoid underperforming funds. 
Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003) found some evidence of the persistent 
underperformance of retail funds in Australia. This requires further investigation; a 
starting point would be to establish whether conflicts of interest can explain the 
transactions concerned.  
Chapter 4: Conflicted superstructures 
 99
In spite of the difficulties outlined above, there is some assistance available to help retail 
investors choose the best managers. This includes the specialist media, including the 
financial sections of most newspapers; financial advisers to individuals including the 
apparently increasing availability of fee-for-service financial advisers; investment 
consultancies that collect and analyse data; asset consultants, who largely advise 
companies; and managers of managers, who work for master trusts. At this stage there 
appears to be no evidence one way or the other that any of these are successful in 
distinguishing between the investment performance of two apparently competent 
managers. They may, however, be able to help investors avoid the less reputable 
managers. 
Why does this industry not focus more intently on what appear to be excessive expenses? 
In spite of the advances in computers that should have reduced costs over the past 30 
years, charges for investment management can be two or three times what they were in 
the 1960s. Moreover, they are two or three times higher than the costs actually reported.73 
This represents a real puzzle given the competition within master trusts referred to 
earlier. 
Taleb (2001), who provides an insider’s view of the funds management industry, 
repeatedly makes the point that completely random results will lead to wide differences 
in the performance of investment managers. Random differences are the result of luck, 
not good judgment, but people (and he includes himself in this) are not really able to 
distinguish between the two. The consequence appears to be that we are too easily 
persuaded to pay too much for investment management. 
This position may be overstated. The excessive investment charges (if they exist) are a 
small percentage of assets, and make little difference when accounts are small. It is 
justifiable, in some instances, to ignore them. But as funds mature and their average 
account balances increase, the amounts involved become considerable. It may be that 
members do not adequately appreciate the difference, which is why greater disclosure 
and more investor education are needed. This education should focus mainly on teaching 
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 Investment expenses, as reported by life insurance companies, amount to some 0.2 per cent of assets. Even 
allowing for some outsourcing not included in this figure, this is considerably lower than the 0.5–1.5 per cent 
charged under typical circumstances. 
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investors that past performance does not govern future returns—except perhaps in the 
case of underperforming managers, who are likely to continue to perform poorly—and 
that fees make more of a difference to returns in the long run. 
4.3.3 Rules of the game: commissions 
The early 1990s saw growing dissatisfaction with traditional front-end-loaded insurance 
and superannuation savings contracts. In these, as much as the entire first-year premiums 
on a new policy were often allocated to commission and other selling expenses. The 
apparent excesses of the front-end-loaded commission system led to a move to a new 
system involving much smaller front-end charges on savings contracts but the addition of 
trail commissions. The effect of this change was to reduce the initial costs of taking out a 
policy, but to increase it over the term of the policy, as explained in Appendix 1. Even a 
0.5 per cent annual trail will erode the value of a person’s contributions by 30 per cent 
after 30 years. It may be that the long-term effects of the new system were not initially 
evident, and that changes will be made as the larger trails begin to bite. Many people are 
evidently making such changes already, as can be seen from the growth in self-managed 
funds, which are more cost effective once the value of an account exceeds about 
A$100,000.  
4.3.4 Social relationships 
Another perspective is given by two sociologists. In a careful two-year study of the 
culture and behaviour of nine large pension funds in the United States, O’Barr and 
Conley (1992, page 70) confirm the author’s experience of ‘surprising and sometimes 
disturbing’ evidence of ‘an unsystematic approach’ to investment decisions. They 
observe that ‘relationships are often more important than managing the bottom line in 
evaluating and deciding whether to retain managers’.  
5 TRUSTEES AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
We now turn to the ways in which conflicts of interest may lead to excessive costs. 
Figure 1 shows the main cashflows in the superannuation relationships, and highlights 
flows that may arise from potential conflicts of interest. The discussion that follows is 
grouped around the main functions of trustees: distribution, administration and 
investment. 
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5.1 Distribution 
Something must bring members to a fund initially. Trustees must then find ways of 
persuading members or their employers to continue to contribute to the fund, and of 
attracting new members. This could also be called the marketing function.  
5.1.1 Non-public-offer employer-sponsored funds  
The trustees of corporate and public sector funds deal directly with employers and 
members, thus avoiding direct distribution costs. However, they still need to justify the 
fund’s ongoing existence, and to market its benefits. Trustees wear two hats if they are 
also directors or managers of the employer. This creates a potential conflict of interest 
when discretionary benefits are discussed: as trustees, managers are supposed to put the 
interests of members first, but as managers, they have an interest in reducing the 
employer’s contributions.  
The equal representation rules provide some balance in this respect. They can also be 
expected to create a certain competitive tension between employer representatives and 
member representatives on the board of trustees, although there is some debate about the 
productivity of this tension. It has been suggested that union directors are valuable 
members of the board because they are able to provide information that might not 
otherwise be available, and because they often have more time to devote to the board 
than other outside directors (Anonymous 1982). But Williamson (1984, page 1206) 
worries about the appointment of union directors ‘deflecting strategic decision makers 
from their main purposes … by forcing them to address operating level complaints …’ 
and, more seriously, about ‘the problem of opportunism that inclusion of partisan 
constituencies on the board invites.’  
5.1.2 Public-offer industry funds  
Industry funds with direct links to sponsoring employers are also able to avoid direct 
distribution costs and enjoy the ‘benefits’ of any tension between member and employer-
appointed trustees. In cases where trustees are not members of the fund, there is an 
agency risk that they will pursue their own interests at the cost of members.  
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Figure 1: Sources of Conflicts 
 
The non-profit nature of industry funds also sets up a tension between them and the retail 
funds that is identical to the tension between mutual and for-profit insurance companies. 
The non-profit industry funds and mutuals do not face the same conflicts of interest 
between members and shareholders as the for-profit retail funds and insurance 
companies. It is however widely held that their trustees or directors are not subject to the 
same level of discipline by members or policy holders as that imposed on the elected 
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directors of retail funds and insurance companies by company shareholders (see, for 
example, HM Treasury 2004).  
In developing a distribution channel, industry funds rely on direct contact with 
employers; union pressure on employers to persuade them to join; and, more recently, 
advertising to attract individual members. 
5.1.3 Retail funds 
Retail funds do not have the inherent links to members of the funds just discussed, and so 
must market themselves actively if they are to attract and retain members. The retail 
funds are mainly invested in life insurance policies,74 and have in large measure inherited 
their distribution systems from the life insurers that initiated them. While superannuation 
may be distinguished from life insurance, it is probably unhelpful to make the distinction 
in this context. Many funds pay for life and disability insurance for members. The 
remuneration of the sales channel will include commissions from insurance sold to the 
same clients for insurance that is both inside and outside the superannuation fund. 
The life insurance sales system can be classified into four channels. The first is the 
traditional high-pressure channel, paid purely on commission. It is peopled by agents, 
normally in some ‘dealer group’, who sell only one company’s products, and by brokers 
who sell the products of more than one company. These people have been described as 
the archetypal salespersons. A scholarly analysis of their social status, and the extreme 
moral and financial pressure placed on them, is given by Guy Oakes in a book reviewed 
by Smith (1991: page 287): 
The general thesis of this book is that these salesmen … are subject to two 
inherently conflicting principles: a commercial idiom that stresses sales at all costs 
and a service idiom that stresses concern and sensitivity for the needs of clients. … 
[T]he author reviews the five essential steps of selling insurance: prospecting, 
approaching, interviewing, closing (making the sale) and providing service to 
clients. … After presenting both idioms, he offers a brief discussion of the major 
antimonies of the profession, namely, sacralization and manipulation, opportunism 
                                                    
74
 Retail funds held 57 per cent of their assets in life insurance companies in 2003, as can be seen in Table 3 
discussed in section 6.1. 
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and professionalism, toughness and sensitivity, sincerity and dissimulation. The 
book ends with an analysis of the ways in which most salesmen succeed in 
remaining ignorant of their own conflictual situation. 
Given the unpleasantness and costs of this system, it may be asked why it perseveres. 
Zultowski (1979) surveys research on the widespread belief that life insurance ‘is sold 
and not bought’ that provides some justification for the high-pressure approach. The 
agents reported that less than 20 per cent of sales were initiated by the policy holders, but 
the policy holders felt the statistic was closer to 50 per cent. There appears to be no 
formal research into the matter since then but there is also little evidence that the position 
has changed.  
In Australia, where superannuation contributions are compulsory, this argument cannot 
be said to hold. It may be argued, however, that high-pressure sales forces actively seek 
out small businesses and the self-employed and persuade them to contribute to 
superannuation, thus contributing towards greater compliance with the law.  
Berger, Cummins and Weiss (1997), who investigated the coexistence of insurance 
distribution systems with widely differing fee structures, found that higher charges did 
not translate into higher profits, although they did seem to be related to a better-quality 
service. It would be an exercise beyond the scope of this chapter to determine whether 
any of the participants in the industry earned monopoly-type profits. What is clear is that 
the additional costs of the distribution system of retail funds accounts for a significant 
proportion of the difference in charges between them and industry funds. An open and 
perhaps more pressing question is whether the extra costs are justified.  
A conflict of interest occurs when commission-remunerated salespeople purport to be 
‘financial advisers’—a conflict that is aggravated if they claim to be independent. A 
strict interpretation of the law on conflicts would prohibit salespeople from purporting to 
give ‘advice’, and then receiving a commission from a third party that depended on the 
nature of that advice. However, the compensation given to those who had been mis-sold 
life insurance in the United Kingdom was not based on this strict interpretation of the 
law, but rather on legislation that required advisers to demonstrate they had given the 
‘best advice’.  
In the Australian context, it would seem that members of corporate and industry funds 
receive less expensive advice than those in retail funds. On either a best advice rule or a 
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strict interpretation of the law, this might seem to expose some retail funds to similar 
demands for compensation. However, the SIS Act and the Corporations Act expressly 
permit the payment of commissions to advisers, thus undermining a strict interpretation 
of the general law.  
The second main channel for life insurance sales is less pressured but also commission 
based. In this channel, the incomes of the salespeople are not entirely dependent on life 
insurance or superannuation sales; they may also broker general insurance, occasionally 
recommend a product in their role as professional accountants or lawyers, or be based in 
bank branches where they also serve customers’ other needs. Their business can be said 
to come to them; they are described as the ‘farmers’ of the life insurance business, 
against the ‘hunters’ of the first channel who have to go out and find their customers. For 
brokers, bank branches that generate leads can be twice as efficient as having to prospect 
for clients. To the extent that they are commission remunerated, they face the same 
conflicts as the salespeople in the first channel. But to the extent that they cannot justify 
their commissions in terms of the need to find clients, they may face a greater burden in 
justifying high commissions. Some members of this channel charge fees for their advice 
and deduct their commissions from these. In such cases, there is no conflict of interest. 
A problem, which applies to both channels and was investigated by ASIC (2004b), 
develops when a company pays overriding (additional) commissions to apparently 
independent brokers if they place larger volumes of business with it. While widely 
accepted previously, this practice is now discouraged.  
The third channel for life insurance sales is the bank branches where employees are paid 
regular salaries and bonuses rather than by commission. Here it would seem to be the 
bank that faces the conflict of interest. Glover (1995) suggests that banks may in some 
circumstances owe a fiduciary duty to their customers. To the extent that a bank, and not 
its employees, receives the commissions paid by a retail superannuation fund, and thus 
makes a secret profit, there is a conflict of interest between it and its customers. 
Determining this profit is not easy. Australian banks report relatively small profits from 
superannuation business, even though the estimates given in the next section suggest that 
superannuation and investment management charges make up perhaps half of their 
consolidated fee income from all sources, or 25 per cent of their total revenue. The actual 
contribution to profit depends on a relatively subjective allocation of overheads, so 
cannot easily be determined. 
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The final channel is direct distribution of life insurance products by mail or internet. 
There is unlikely to be a conflict of interest if the charges are adequately disclosed, 
although a problem may arise if a bank or other apparently reputable organization 
endorses an overpriced product. A bank that endorses a product priced at several times 
the going market rate may well be exposing itself to subsequent claims for damages. 
5.1.4 The role of employers 
Employers are compelled by law to contribute to superannuation on behalf of their 
employees. Employers who are not governed by an award would appear to owe a 
common law duty of care and good faith to their employees when selecting appropriate 
superannuation fund.  
It is clear from the decline in the number of corporate superannuation schemes over the 
past few years that there are advantages for employers in merging their funds into larger 
industry and retail funds. APRA data on fund transfers show that it is the retail funds that 
have benefited most from this trend, even though they charge considerably more than the 
industry funds, and often because of the commissions that are paid to the intermediaries 
who initiate such a move.  
A significant factor in this trend has been the willingness of retail funds to tackle the 
costs and other difficulties associated with administering residual defined benefits. 
Although defined benefit funds do not need to do as much data processing as 
accumulation funds, and so ought to be cheaper to run, their greater need for actuarial 
services creates a significant overhead. As a result, the smaller defined benefit funds, 
which often suffer from poor systems and controls, can be considerably more expensive 
to run than accumulation funds. While the retail funds define themselves as accumulation 
funds in the APRA statistics, some have been active in acquiring hybrid schemes—a 
market that appears of less interest to the industry funds. Retail funds have apparently 
also been more flexible in accommodating other idiosyncrasies in the fund rules.  
These factors may explain the success of retail funds in acquiring defined benefit and 
hybrid funds, but they do not explain why they have been able to acquire so many 
accumulation funds. Is it because employers are reacting against union domination of the 
industry funds? Are the retail funds so very much more efficient administratively? Or is 
it that the industry funds do not give enough support and advice? 
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Or one could be more suspicious. Do employers receive benefits from dealing with 
commissioned advisers in addition to advice on the superannuation fund? Is it possible 
that employers’ duties to employees are being compromised by pressure from bank 
managers? The latter possibility is suggested by the market share gained by the life 
insurance companies attached to the four large banks. The growth in their assets over and 
above that of other life insurers, during the years 1998–2003, suggests that the four large 
banking groups captured over 70 per cent of the flows out of corporate funds in 1998–
2003, despite having an overall market share of only 40 per cent. 
5.2 Administration 
Trustees have to collect contributions and keep records of all member details. They must 
pay benefits to members, or arrange for members’ assets to be transferred into other 
funds. Other administrative tasks include the payment of taxes and levies, ensuring fund 
compliance with legislation and regulations, and amending the trust deed where 
necessary. In this context, the provision of life and disability insurance can also be 
regarded as an administrative service. Trustees need to be aware that some of their duties 
may give rise to a conflict of interest.  
5.2.1 Outsourcing 
Outsourcing may give rise to conflicts of interest. If trustees pay for the costs of 
outsourcing out of their own fees, paid to them by members, a conflict of interest does 
not arise. But if instead they use the fund’s money to pay for an outsourced service, then 
a conflict may arise if the supplier is linked in some way to the trustee. Trustees face a 
conflict between their duty to members and their interest in, or duty to, suppliers, if they 
exercise their own discretion when choosing and paying an outsourced supplier. This 
problem is particularly relevant in the retail fund sector, where trustees and service 
suppliers frequently form part of the same group of companies, and in industry funds, 
where union-appointed directors often have links with union-owned suppliers. 
A second area of conflict arises when the consultants to a fund recommend an outsourced 
service provider, and in consequence receive a commission from that service provider. 
An egregious example would be for consultants to recommend unnecessary or expensive 
insurance on which they are paid a commission. 
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5.2.2 Delegation 
Not many trustees are experts on superannuation; they are therefore reliant on the help of 
experts in the administration of their funds and the investment of assets. Some trustees 
may be tempted to abdicate and yield power to the professionals. An argument can be 
made that members are best represented by lay (non-expert) trustees who control the 
professional service providers. It needs to be emphasized that this system requires some 
diligence on the part of lay trustees if they are to preserve the balance of power. 
Professional service providers will always face the temptation to usurp power, for 
reasons of efficiency as well as commercial interest. 
Two of the trends currently observable in the retirement fund industry illustrate the 
dangers of giving greater power to the professionals. The first is the tendency to devolve 
the power of choice of investment manager from trustees to members, even though the 
members are in a weaker position than the trustees when it comes to monitoring the value 
of investment management services. This surely explains some of the increase in costs 
that has inexorably accompanied the introduction of choice. The second is the suggestion 
that paid professional trustees sit on the board, as recommended, for instance, by Myners 
in his review of institutional investment in the United Kingdom (HM Treasury 2001). 
This again has apparent advantages, but clearly weakens the position of lay trustees on 
the board. If trustees want independent advice, they would be better advised to contract 
for it rather than surrender some of their powers. 
5.2.3 Trustee discretion over benefits 
Another potential area of conflict arises when trustees who are also members of the fund 
amend the trust deed or exercise their discretion in the governing rules to increase the 
benefits payable to one or more class of beneficiary. This often involves the application 
of reserve funds.75 It seems impractical to prevent members from being trustees. 
Nevertheless, they do need to be conscious of when their interests are affected; ensure 
that those interests are appropriately disclosed; and absent themselves from votes on such 
matters.  
                                                    
75
 Maclean (2000) discusses how this problem can be managed and how it has been dealt with by the courts. 
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5.3 Investment 
The money collected from members has to be invested with a view to providing the best 
possible mix of risk and return. Trustees normally delegate the choice of assets to a 
professional investment manager. The assets themselves are normally held by a custodian 
who buys and sells on instructions from the investment manager. Outsourcing this 
function to organizations linked to the trustees potentially creates the same kinds of 
conflicts described above for the outsourcing of administration. Giving members a choice 
of investment manager removes this problem so long as the choice is unfettered and 
members are given unbiased advice.  
5.3.1 Stockbroking and shelf fees 
The investment industry has its own peculiar, institutionalized conflicts in the soft 
commissions paid by stockbrokers to investment managers and, occasionally, other 
investment advisers. These normally take the form of research services and terminals that 
are provided free if the stockbroker earns sufficient commissions from the investment 
manager. That the commissions paid by stockbrokers are seldom disclosed separately in 
the accounts of superannuation funds means that the profits are entirely secret, thus 
aggravating the problem. This is not to recommend a narrow focus on the direct costs of 
dealing, as this could be counterproductive. Every market dealer knows that a large buyer 
or seller can move the price of the more liquid stocks, and competent dealers can easily 
justify their charges. These charges should, however, be disclosed. 
Another conflict arises when investment managers are required to pay shelf fees for the 
right to be included on the investment menu of a master trust. If not disclosed, these 
would constitute a secret profit. But they represent a conflict even if disclosed, as fund 
administrators may be biased towards those managers that offer to make higher 
payments.  
5.3.2 Business opportunities 
A more difficult element of the conflict-of-interest prohibition is that which arises from 
business opportunities. Investment managers who find unusual investments that they 
regard as good value may face a conflict between investing in them on their own behalf 
and including them in their clients’ portfolios. Buying on one’s own account before one's 
clients is clearly prohibited, but failing to buy the asset for clients at all is not as clear cut 
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as it may be justified on the grounds that it is inappropriate (for example, too speculative 
a use of trust money). 
This argument has dubious provenance, as modern investment theory would suggest that 
risk is related more to general exposure to the market than to exposure to individual 
assets. It is perhaps even more dubious when the assets are held in a superannuation fund 
for internal staff—as might happen in a financial institution—which then appears to 
outperform the funds for clients. The best way for investment managers to manage this 
particular agency risk is to hold all their personal assets, especially superannuation, in 
pooled funds that are available to their clients. This is required by some institutions, 
although the idea has not found its way into the ethical codes.  
On another front, the right to participate in potentially lucrative initial public offerings 
involves a conflict of interest if the investment manager is allocated shares or 
underwriting commissions that are passed on selectively to clients.  
5.3.3 Self-investment and adviser-linked investments 
The exemptions in the SIS Act for in-house assets include significant accommodation for 
corporate superannuation funds to make investments in employers—if these investments 
were made before the relevant part of the legislation was passed. Public sector funds also 
face pressure to invest in the debt of the sponsor. In both cases, investment returns may 
suffer. 
Also worth mentioning, because it has led to a number of actions by APRA, is the 
practice of financial advisers recommending investment choices in which they have a 
personal interest. This is more prevalent among fringe operators, but major groups with 
private equity or other more exotic investment options are also compromised if the 
profits they make are not entirely disclosed. 
5.4 Trustee discretion over fees  
Trustees are entitled to remuneration for their services. However, the level of this 
remuneration should be disclosed and it should be predetermined. A contract that permits 
trustees to increase the fees paid to themselves places them in an impossible position of 
conflict. Any increase clearly benefits them and harms the members; thus, this cannot be 
permitted.  
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The problem seldom arises in corporate funds where trustees normally fulfil their duties 
as part of their general work obligations. The same is true of industry funds, although 
they are more likely to pay attendance fees or, in some cases, fees determined by an 
external body such as the Remuneration Commission. If these allowances can be 
determined objectively to compensate trustees for expenses or losses incurred as a result 
of their duties, they do not create a conflict. If the fees are significant, then mechanisms 
need to be found to ensure that they are not determined by the trustees themselves.  
It is common for retail funds to charge a fee that may be increased at the discretion of the 
trustee, normally with some period of notice. If members are entitled to move their 
accounts to another fund without penalty, then this may be an acceptable practice. But if 
their accounts are locked in—by the decision of the employer, for instance—then this 
discretion should not be exercised by the trustee without giving members a chance to 
change funds.  
5.4.1 Conflicts Faced by Corporate and Life Insurance Directors 
It would seem that the fiduciary duties of the directors of a corporate trustee are indirect, 
through their responsibility to the corporate trustee and its shareholders. In terms of the 
SIS Act,76 they have a duty to exercise ‘a reasonable degree of care and diligence’ in 
ensuring that the trustee fulfils its duties. 
It would not be surprising if the remuneration of directors was linked to the profitability 
of the trustee, or if their performance objectives included increasing revenue or reducing 
costs. Although the expense of their activities might have to be borne by members, as 
long as the activities themselves were legal, this would be unremarkable. It can be argued 
that a remuneration package that rewards directors for increasing business is in the 
interest of members. Directors do obviously face conflicts of duty when making 
decisions that might involve the corporate trustee in a conflict of interest. An inflexible 
application of the law would prevent them from making such decisions.  
The same comments apply to life insurance directors, in the general law and in the Life 
Insurance Act 1995, because 85 per cent of their business is related to superannuation. 
Under the Life Insurance Act, they are required to put the interests of policy holders first 
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where these might conflict with those of shareholders. This would seem to prohibit them 
from exercising discretion to increase policy charges unless perhaps policyholders had a 
right to surrender their contracts without loss. 
6 COSTS AND RETURNS 
This section looks in greater detail at the differences in costs between the different types 
of funds, and discusses whether they might be a consequence of some market or 
regulatory failure. 
6.1 Costs 
The typical costs of the different types of funds are reported in Clare (2001) and Rice and 
McEwin (2002), in their survey of charges in the superannuation industry. This section 
confirms most of their findings. 
The costs of funds are reported to APRA, but not in a form that allows for easy 
comparison. The main reason is that expenses are not reported unless the assets are 
directly invested (see Table 2 above for the different types of indirect investment). Thus, 
with some minor exceptions, the charges of the investment managers of the indirect 
investments, and the tax on investment income earned by pooled superannuation trusts 
and life insurers, are not reported. Funds invested entirely or almost entirely in life 
insurance policies may report no expenses at all to APRA; the life insurer pays them all.  
The accounts of pooled superannuation trusts and life companies, but not of wholesale 
trusts, are reported to APRA. Using this information, it is possible to estimate the asset 
allocation – as is done in table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Asset allocation of funds by type of fund  
 
Total 
(A$ 
million) 
Direct & 
Special 
Mandate 
Life 
Insurance 
Companies  
Pooled: 
Whole-
sale  
Pooled: 
Retail  
Proportion 
in Quarterly 
Survey  
Corporate 55,104 45% 7% 44% 5% 45% 
Industry 62,579 44% 3% 41% 12% 44% 
Public sector 115,767 87% 0% 10% 3% 87% 
Retail funds 192,316 10% 57% 26% 7% 10% 
Small funds 127,504 66% 12% 22% 0% 66% 
Post-
retirement 
12,679 0% 100% 0% 0%  
Total 565,949 
     
Source: APRA (2003), APRA’s unpublished Quarterly Survey 
 
It is therefore possible to estimate the costs incurred in the underlying vehicles by 
examining their APRA returns.77 The costs of life insurance companies appear to average 
some 1.9 per cent of assets per annum; those of pooled superannuation trusts average 
around 0.7 per cent of directly managed assets. Using this information and the asset 
allocations shown in Table 3,78 it is possible to estimate the total costs incurred by the 
different types of funds—before any deduction for tax, and without any allowance for the 
profit margins of life companies and pooled superannuation trusts (see Table 4). As 
funds pay tax at 15 per cent, members would probably be charged 15 per cent less than 
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 Life company expenses were estimated from APRA (2001), which remains the latest reported. The 
information on pooled superannuation trusts was obtained from a specially requested APRA statistical report. 
78
 APRA’s quarterly Superannuation Trends reports the allocation of assets across the various investment 
channels, but does not break this down by type of fund. Its quarterly survey of over 350 funds with assets of 
over A$60 million does not cover the small funds, but accounts for some 94 per cent of the assets of the 
remainder. It therefore seems likely that its figures on asset allocations can be used as a reasonable 
approximation for the whole. The allocation of small funds’ assets to the various investment channels is then 
estimated as a residual. 
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the figures shown in the final column. However, the profit margins of retail funds may 
more than make up for this.79  
These costs do not include stock brokerage, but probably include most other 
commissions. There may also be other costs that are netted off income. The totals are 
more or less consistent with the published charges of the larger industry and retail funds, 
although the incompleteness of the data mean that the results should be treated as mere 
approximations. 
Table 4: Funds’ costs as a share of their assets by type of fund (%) 
 
Direct 
Charges 
Specialist 
Mandates 
Indirect 
charges 
by Life 
Offices  
Indirect 
charges by 
Wholesale 
Managers 
Indirect 
charges by 
Retail 
Managers 
Total 
Charges 
Corporate funds 0.48 0.24 0.07 0.32 0.07 1.17 
Industry funds 0.65 0.19 0.03 0.30 0.18 1.35 
Public sector 
funds 0.40 0.39 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.91 
Retail funds 0.84 0.03 1.09 0.19 0.11 2.26 
Small funds 1.22 0.00 0.24 0.16 0.00 1.62 
Post-retirement 
streams 
  1.91   1.91 
Note: It is assumed that specialist mandate fees are 60 basis points per annum; that the wholesale holders 
of life insurance policies (corporate, industry and public sector funds) are charged only 100 basis points; 
and that retail unit trusts charge 150 basis points. These are no more than informed guesses based on 
discussions with industry participants and a sample of product disclosure statements.  
Source: Author's calculations based on APRA (2001, 2003).  
 
The total costs of the entire industry can now be estimated (Table 5 below). It is assumed 
here that life company profit margins are about 25 per cent of costs,80 and that banks 
account for some 60 per cent of the retail funds. While these assumptions are 
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 It would not be possible to determine objectively the profit margins of the different types of funds, even if 
all the data were available. This is because the determination and allocation of overhead expenses is 
necessarily subjective. 
80
 This figure can be justified by reference to the planned profit margins reported to APRA and found in 
APRA (2001).  
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approximate, it does appear that fund management charges make up perhaps as much as 
50 per cent of the non-interest, fee, commission and other income reported by Australian 
banks and perhaps 25% of total revenue.81 This would explain, in large measure, the 
importance attached to funds management by the banking industry. It would be 
interesting, although difficult, to investigate whether this plays a role in the high return 
on equity enjoyed by the big Australian banks, and whether this could be ascribed to a 
lack of competition.  
6.2 Returns 
The table in Appendix 2 calculates the relative investment performance of the different 
types of funds after taking hidden expense differentials into account. Once this is done, it 
would appear that there is very little difference between the gross investment 
performance of corporate, industry, public sector and retail funds. This is to be expected 
and so tends to confirm the overall level of charges as determined here. While these 
results are inconsistent with the findings of Coleman, Esho and Wong (2003), the 
differences can be explained by the incorporation of hidden expenses and taxes. 
6.3 Discussion 
Australians are paying some 3 per cent of their total personal incomes in charges to the 
fund management industry, broadly defined. These can be broken down into three types 
of charges: distribution charges, administration charges and investment management 
charges.  
6.3.1 Distribution costs (retail funds) 
The cost of distributing retail products amounts to some 10 per cent of new 
contributions, or as much as 1.5 per cent of the income of the 30 per cent of Australians 
who have superannuation in retail funds. This figure of 10 per cent is higher than the 
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 There is currently (March 2007) a gap between 2001 and 2005 in the statistics available on the APRA 
website. Table 6 of Australian Banking Statistics gave a breakdown of fees and net interest income as can be 
seen at http://www.apra.gov.au/Statistics/Australian-Banking-Statistics-June-2001.cfm. These statistics were 
derived from the June 2003 report.  
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charges actually disclosed by the funds, but includes charges on rollovers from one fund 
to another in the numerator while excluding the rollovers themselves from the 
denominator. The justification for this is that rollovers are not new money, making 
marketing payments difficult to justify from a national or policy perspective. Including 
gross rollovers would halve the distribution costs of retail funds to 5 per cent, bringing 
them in line with disclosed costs.  
Table 5:  Total wealth management and insurance industry  
(A$ million) Direct Charges Total Charges 
Superannuation funds 
  
Corporate funds 260 700 
Industry funds 410 900 
Public sector funds 460 1,200 
Retail funds 1,600 5,000 
Small funds 1,600 2,200 
Post-retirement streams 0 300 
Superannuation total 
 4,330 10,300 
Other providers  
  
Life companies 
 2,200 
Public unit trusts  
 2,400 
Total wealth management 
 14,900 
Type of charge  
  
Distribution (retail funds) 
 2,100 
Administration 
 7,200 
Investment management 
 5,600 
Total  
 14,900 
Major institutions  
  
Life insurers 
 5,700 
Banks 
 8,700 
Other  
 500 
Total  
 14,900 
Source: Author's calculations based on APRA (2001, 2003) and other tables in text 
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Distribution costs appear to account for over 40 per cent of the total charges of retail 
funds. In return, investors receive some assistance in complying with the superannuation 
1guarantee legislation, advice on financial planning and budgeting, help in negotiating 
Australia’s complex tax and social security regulations, and advice on the choice of 
investment manager and asset class. Some of this is necessary but much of it is not. In 
particular, the investment advice provided by retail funds is of doubtful value (especially 
where advisers receive commissions related to their advice).  
Mandatory disclosure of distribution costs does not appear to have reduced expenses 
elsewhere in the world, and seems unlikely to do so in Australia. A more rigorous 
interpretation of the common law conflict-of-interest prohibitions may be necessary to 
reduce distribution costs significantly. Prohibiting the payment of commissions entirely 
would be draconian. An alternative might be to restrict the payment of commissions to 
circumstances in which the intermediary does not purport to give advice. This might be 
easier to manage if salespeople were to sell a limited range of products with specified 
terms and conditions. This is already the case in the United Kingdom, where ‘stakeholder 
pensions’ are ‘CAT marked’.82 
6.3.2 Administration charges 
Administration costs account for about half of funds’ total charges. However, the costs of 
administering self-managed funds—averaging A$7,300 per fund per annum, or A$3,100 
per member —are disproportionately high, amounting to about one-quarter of total 
charges. It is difficult to explain the costs of self-managed funds as being driven by their 
greater flexibility, given the enormous range of investment choice available in public 
offer funds. Indeed, direct property is the only type of investment not available in public 
offer funds, and, as Roberts (2002) shows, self-managed funds make relatively little 
investment in this area.  
Other possible explanations for the higher costs of self-managed funds are their outlays 
on expensive retail funds, or the opportunities self-management provides for reducing tax 
and the means test. Given that self-managed funds provide almost entirely for relatively 
well-informed, wealthy individuals who could use public-offer industry funds if they 
chose to, and who might in any case be expected to be able to look after themselves in 
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 CAT’ refers to (limits on) charges, (wide) access and (standard) terms.  
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negotiations with administrators, the latter seems the most likely driver of the higher 
costs. This is wasteful; reducing tax is a negative sum game as the tax must be collected 
elsewhere and the costs are not recoverable. 
Allocating administration charges (before tax) to the larger funds produces a cost of 
A$56 per member per annum for industry funds; A$136 for retail funds; A$168 for 
public sector funds; and A$328 for corporate funds. These figures appear to be in line 
with the published charges of public offer funds. The costs of public sector and corporate 
funds may be understated to the extent that their administration is subsidized by the 
employer.  
The differences in cost appear to be related to economies of scale, the difficulties of 
administering residual defined benefit schemes and the profit margins of the commercial 
enterprises (guessed as 25 per cent of costs). There may also be a difference in the level 
of service provided. A large part of the administrative costs of retail funds may be related 
to their more active quest for members; the high charges of corporate and public sector 
funds may be related to the higher average account balances of members, who are likely 
to take a more active interest in their accounts. 
Given that the retail funds appear to make an adequate profit at an annual average of 
A$136 per account, we can make the heroic assumption that this provides the benchmark 
for a quality service. This would mean that unnecessary administrative charges in the 
superannuation system amount to at over A$1.5 billion—or about half the total cost of 
superannuation. (This makes no judgment about the administrative cost of insurance and 
other non-superannuation investment contracts.) Of this, around 40 per cent can be 
ascribed to the small self-managed funds and appears to be related to tax planning 
opportunities. The balance would appear to come from residual defined benefit expenses. 
It may well be worth investigating ways of simplifying these, for example, by switching 
members to accumulation funds while providing investment guarantees. 
6.3.3 Investment management charges 
Investment costs seem to average 60–80 basis points annually. This is shy of the charges 
displayed on the websites of some of the large retail funds, and of the charges claimed 
for unit trusts and about equal to the investment costs claimed by industry funds. 
Members of superannuation funds would therefore seem to be getting a relatively good 
deal, even if the profit margin in these charges appears to be at least 50 per cent.  
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While the investment management industry is clearly a competitive one, the high profit 
margins for this function do merit further investigation, perhaps along the lines suggested 
by institutional economics (see section 4 above). Investors should be educated to 
understand the random nature of investment markets and the significance of costs for 
long-term returns. It should be emphasized that past performance is likely to predict 
future performance only in the case of underperforming funds.  
There ought to be scope for a reduction in superannuation investment charges, but it is 
however difficult to see how significant savings could arise.  
7 CONCLUSIONS83 
The higher costs of retail funds are largely explained by the costs of their distribution 
system. While a purported benefit of the system is that it includes advice to members, 
much of this advice may be biased (because advisers are paid by commission) or is 
unnecessary. The system also contains a number of other conflicts of interest that may 
lead instances of excessive charging. Part of the distribution costs of retail funds, and 
what looks like the higher administration costs of self-managed funds, arise from the 
complexity of the tax and social security codes and - in the case of the self-managed 
funds - the many opportunities for tax planning. 
The investment management charges of all funds appear to be high relative to the 
underlying costs. This is difficult to explain, as the costs are clearly disclosed and there is 
significant choice and competition in this area. However, one factor appears to be 
investors’ lack of knowledge about investment markets, and in particular their failure to 
understand the impact of charges on long-term returns. 
The main policy conclusions would seem to be as follows. First, where conflicts of 
interest exist, further actions should be taken to eliminate them or mitigate their 
consequences. Second, the government should simplify the country’s tax and social 
security regulations. Third, there is a need for investment education that emphasizes the 
significance of costs for long-term returns, the random nature of investment markets and 
the meaninglessness of differences in past performance—except in the case of 
                                                    
83
 This is the original conclusion. A postscript at the end of the chapter makes some applications to South 
Africa. 
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underperforming funds. Finally, trustees should expressly be permitted to pay for 
financial advice for members without incurring any liability for wrongful advice. 
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APPENDIX 1: COMMISSIONS: HOW SHOULD THEY BE FUNDED? 
There is clearly a need for a distribution network for life insurance and superannuation 
products, and for advice on income tax and means test management. If advice is 
desirable, how should it be funded?  
The Previous System 
When most advisers lived off front-end-loaded commissions on insurance policies, the 
business model would have been structured along the following lines. 
• The agent would be paid, on average, 50 per cent of the first year’s premium on 
each new policy in commission and very little if any thereafter.  
• If the average policy premium was equal to 2.5 per cent of the client’s salary, then 
an agent’s income per client would average: Client’s salary x 2.5% x 50% = 1.25% of the 
client’s salary. 
• The agent would need to sell about 80 policies a year to earn as much as an 
average client. Usually it did not take long for agents to attain this level of income. In the 
meantime, the life insurance company employing the agent would provide some bridging 
finance to cover the first few months of training and establishment. 
• If the agent was able to persuade each client to take out a new policy every four 
years, the agent would need to build up a portfolio of about 300 clients to maintain the 
same level of income.  
In practice, very few agents proved able to find this number of clients, resulting in a high 
turnover of agents, and many lapsed policies. While policy holders lost money on lapsed 
policies because they received little in the way of refunds, and life companies bore heavy 
costs in building up agency forces, the agents themselves took significant financial 
risks—up to 80 per cent dropped out in the first two years, with many earning only 
minimal income during this period. 
The Present System 
The new rules of the game make front-end-loaded contracts unacceptable. The new 
commission structure for superannuation is as follows. 
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• Agents are paid up to 4.5 per cent of the client’s contributions (including rollovers) 
and up to 0.4 per cent per annum of the client’s assets. 
The consequences of this system for agents and clients are as follows: 
• If clients pay, on average, 12 per cent of their salaries into superannuation, on 
which the agent collects 3 per cent, and if they have accumulated one year’s income in 
assets, on which the agent collects 0.3 per cent per annum, then the agent will take: 
Client’s salary x 12% x 3% + client’s salary x 0.3% = 0.66% of the client’s salary. 
• This means that the agent needs only (100/0.66) or about 150 clients to earn as 
much as a client does on average, but that the agent is not viable until she has 
accumulated all 150. In the interim, the agent will need to make up the shortfall in 
income elsewhere. This is very difficult for most people, suggesting that there will be a 
decline in the number of new agents (as in fact appears to have been the case over the 
last few years). It should be noted, however, that one way for new agents to address the 
problem is to persuade clients to transfer their benefits from one fund to another, and 
earn a commission on the transfer.  
• At the same time, the costs to clients have risen. Total charges under the new 
system are more than twice those of the old front-end-loaded system, reducing the benefit 
of a lifetime’s investment by 20 per cent or more. 
This system is obviously very much in the interests of existing financial advisers. As they 
reach retirement, they are apparently able to sell their renewal commissions to the life 
companies and banks at multiples of 2.5–4 times their annual value.  
Towards a New, Fee-based System? 
The most desirable system would be one in which payment for advice was separated 
from the decision on how much to invest, and where. At the moment, product providers 
do not want to offend financial advisers—their major source of business—by 
recommending fee-for-service brokers (although, interestingly, the Corporations 
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Regulations84 exempt fee-for-service advisers who give tax advice from registration 
under the Corporations Act). 
It is also difficult even for trustees with the best intentions to change the system. 
Members would rather pay for advice indirectly through their superannuation fund than 
pay for it directly, because of the tax advantages of doing so and because they do not 
have to take the cash out of their current household budget. On the other hand, it would 
be a brave trustee who paid for advice for members out of the fund. Such a trustee would 
rightly be concerned about falling foul of the sole purpose test contained in section 62 of 
the SIS Act, which does not permit superannuation moneys to be used for any purpose 
other than those listed in the act: being retirement savings, life insurance and the payment 
of commissions. Also, members might sue the trustee if the advice provided should prove 
to be inadequate. This is an area in which some clarification from the regulator would be 
helpful.
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  Corporations Regulations 2001, 7.1.29(4). 
Chapter 4: Conflicted superstructures 
 126 
APPENDIX 2: INVESTMENT RETURNS OF FUNDS (1997–2003) 
The investment returns of funds for 1997–2003 are shown in Table 6. They are included 
here to show that the apparent difference in investment performance between retail and 
industry funds is largely explained by the difference in hidden expenses. The returns 
provided to APRA are not intended to measure investment performance, and are not 
sufficiently detailed or accurate to be reliable for this purpose.  
Table 6:  Aggregate gross returns of funds by type of fund (%) 
 Corporate Funds Industry Funds Public Sector 
Funds 
Retail Funds 
Returns to end Junea 
1997 20.07 15.85 17.93 12.02 
1998 10.13 9.70 9.72 7.47 
1999 8.45 9.35 9.17 8.83 
2000 13.21 12.35 14.63 9.76 
2001 5.87 5.43 4.57 4.94 
2002 -3.35 -0.85 -4.86 -3.48 
2003 -0.53 0.90 -0.89 -0.53 
Adjustments for indirect charges 
Expensesb 0.48 0.53 0.13 1.48 
Income taxc  0.12 0.04 0.00 0.41 
Capital gains taxd 
1997 0.32 0.08 0.01 0.60 
1998 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.21 
1999 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.33 
2000 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.40 
2001 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
2002 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 -0.36 
2003 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.23 
Foundation units 
1997    0.70 
1998    0.53 
1999    0.39 
2000    0.30 
2001    0.22 
2002    0.17 
2003    0.12 
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Estimated gross performance 
1997 20.99 16.50 18.07 15.20 
1998 10.79 10.31 9.86 10.09 
1999 9.07 9.96 9.31 11.44 
2000 13.96 12.97 14.77 12.34 
2001 6.43 6.00 4.70 7.04 
2002 -2.92 -0.30 -4.74 -1.79 
2003 -0.07 1.46 -0.76 1.24 
Arithmetic 
average 
8.32 8.13 7.32 7.94 
Notes: 
a The investment performance of all except corporate funds is based on quarterly averages as 
reported in APRA's Superannuation Trends; estimates of the performance of corporate funds are 
extrapolated from the performance of the larger funds participating in APRA's unpublished quarterly 
surveys. 
b The indirect charges of life companies and pooled superannuation trusts are estimated from 
the expenses reported for their underlying investments; the indirect charges of unit trusts are rough 
estimates based on a sample of Product Disclosure Documents. 
c Assumes an income tax rate of 15 per cent on 4 per cent of the underlying assets.  
d Assumes a capital gains tax rate of 12.5 per cent on gross returns less 500 basis points, and 
that 50 per cent of future benefits are counted. 
e Foundation units arise from front-end-loaded contracts sold in the past, the costs of which are 
still being deducted from members’ returns. The amounts shown here are informal estimates after 
discussion with industry participants. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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POSTSCRIPT: COMPARISON WITH SOUTH AFRICA 
While the Australian and South African retirement industries share a number of 
characteristics, the contrasts are interesting. 
The major legal difference is that retirement funds in South Africa are not assets held in 
trust by a trustee but have been given their own legal persona by the legislation. The 
Pension Funds Adjudicator has expressed “the view that a pension fund at common law 
is a universitas personarum - a voluntary association with corporate personality”85. This 
does not appear to make much of a difference to the fiduciary duties of the managers of 
the funds or to the structure of the industry. 
It may however partly explain the greater involvement of South African members in fund 
governance and a lower level of choice of fund. Few South Africans can choose to move 
the fund balances without changing employers, and there is no equivalent to the self- 
managed superannuation schemes.   
The next chapter mentions Rusconi’s (2004) analysis of South African charges, which is 
similar to that given in section 6 of this chapter. Investment and administration charges 
appear to be of the same order. Distribution costs are also higher for individual rather 
than group contracts. The major difference is that most of the commission is payable in 
advance in South Africa rather than as a trail. The discussion in appendix 2 above is 
relevant. It should however be noted that South Africa’s higher inflation increases the 
costs of front end commissions. This is because higher rates of inflation and nominal 
investment returns reduce the value of the nominally level premiums paid in later years.  
Given the absence of compulsion in South Africa, one would expect the costs of 
distribution to be higher. Rusconi’s analysis shows that they are very much higher for 
shorter term policies. Providing group arrangements for people would appear to provide 
one way of avoiding such high charges.
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 “A universitas is distinguished from a mere association of individuals by the fact that it is an entity distinct 
from the individuals forming it, that its capacity to acquire rights or incur obligations is distinct from that of 
its members, which are required or incurred for the body as a whole, and not for the individual members.” 
Quoted in Venter v Protektor Pension Fund (PFA/KZN/20/98) from Webb v Northern Rifles 1908 TS 462 
 CHAPTER 5 - PENSION BENEFIT DESIGN AND THE 
INTEGRATION OF INSURANCE BENEFITS OVER THE 
LIFE CYCLE 
 
Forthcoming in the South African Actuarial Journal  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Investment risks aside, retirement schemes can significantly aid their members navigate 
pre-retirement risks: death, disability, dismissal and divorce, as well as post-retirement 
longevity risks. This paper discusses the possibilities - and the imperatives - in the 
context of the South African retirement fund industry. It is written particularly to 
evaluate the relevant recommendations of the Taylor Committee (Taylor et al, 2002), on 
which the author served. 
Providing retirement, death and disability benefits within a single scheme allows the 
charges for each to be offset against each other, creating direct cost savings and allowing 
for less underwriting, and therefore wider coverage. The reason for the offset is that 
members of groups subject to higher mortality and disability risks will need less 
retirement income. Integrating payments made from retirement funds during periods of 
voluntary and involuntary unemployment can reduce the moral hazards associated with 
unemployment insurance. The value of savings for retirement can also provide 
alternative funding for periods of involuntary unemployment, which can later be made up 
by delaying retirement. Divorce is probably not insurable, but retirement schemes should 
not provide perverse incentives and could be made more flexible to deal with a greater 
variety of life histories. 
This paper places these risks in the context of what we know about the financial 
lifecycle, identifying strands of research that provide insight into the stages and the risks. 
Section two of the paper describes the lifecycle; section three the associated risks. These 
sections expand material from Asher (2003). Some effort is also expended in attempting 
to understand the underlying reasons for the reduction in retirement age experienced over 
the past century. 
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Section four then discusses how retirement funds can provide for non-investment risks 
before retirement. Defined benefit (DB) funds do offer some of the integration required, 
but are now recognised as too opaque, unfair and often excessively risky for employers. 
The challenge is therefore to adapt the design of defined contribution (DC) retirement 
funds to provide the necessary integration. Some of the suggested changes would be 
easier after tax and other regulatory reform.  
Section five then proposes a regulatory structure for private pension funds - in particular 
the questions of compulsory membership and minimum requisite benefits. It is concluded 
that all benefits should be paid as pensions. South Africa law does not currently require 
compulsory contributions to retirement funds, but the idea is frequently discussed and 
was recommended by the Taylor Committee. This section evaluates the justice of 
regulations requiring compulsion and minimum benefits using also the theory of 
collective action.  
Section six concludes that there is much work ahead in developing pension funds that 
efficiently meet the needs of all their members. 
2 THE LIFECYCLE 
The financial life cycle provides a framework for considering the financial security needs 
of the middle class members of retirement funds and their immediate families. In outline, 
it divides a person’s adult life into two main stages: of accumulation while in 
employment, and de-cumulation in retirement. Within the first stage, there is normally a 
period before children, a period with children in the household and a final period when 
they have left. 
Financial security is defined here as a level of certainty that the members of the middle 
class family can maintain their accustomed standard of living in the face of idiosyncratic 
risks. (These are risks that affect only some households, not those that would lead to a 
general decline in standards of living.) The effects go beyond the financial: continuity in 
housing and leisure consumption are required for people to continue to interact easily 
with their family and friends. 
The financial lifecycle does not really apply to casual workers and subsistence farmers 
who cannot save and so are obliged to work while they are able, and rely on ex gratia 
state or family support when they are not. Those who inherit wealth that they pass on to 
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their children may also display less of a change of financial circumstance over their life 
course, and have limited needs for insurance or retirement funds.  
2.1 Economic research 
The interest of economic research in the financial life cycle is spelt out in Modigliani’s 
(1986) Nobel lecture. Deaton (2005) places it in wider perspective, which includes 
principally the determinants of savings. The idea is hardly novel: the need for the young 
to accumulate wealth, and of the old to be supported, are present in the three thousand 
year old account of Jacob’s youthful accumulation of wives and herds under Laban, and 
reliance on his sons in his later years86. Urbanization, and its attended mobility, has 
however made it necessary to develop new institutions to replace the extended family 
and rural community as a source of financial support87. Beginning with Germany, a 
number of countries introduced national pension arrangements that clearly recognised the 
lifecycle. Rowntree (1901) provided an early systematic evaluation of the variations of 
poverty over the life cycle: affecting families with young children and the elderly 
particularly. 
In spite of its macro economic origins, and appropriately because the etymology of 
economics derives from the management of a household, the elements of the cycle as 
they affect individuals have also been intensively investigated in the economics 
literature. Polachek and Siebert (1993) provide an excellent reference for the factors 
affecting income, which is used in the following sections, as is Hadjimatheou's (1987) 
useful treatment of consumption and savings questions. In the actuarial literature, Cooper 
(2002) also describes the results of a model of savings and consumption over the working 
life. 
More recent research is particularly sophisticated. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) 
calibrate a model that incorporates utility of consumption over the lifetime, and 
stochastic investment returns, with US household savings data. They show the 
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 Jacob's adult life is covered in Genesis 29 to 48. 
87
 The Canadian Museum of Civilization website has a useful summary of an extensive literature review of 
the economic history of the late nineteenth and earl twentieth centuries. (civilization.ca/hist/pensions/1867-
1914_e.pdf) for the summary and (civilization.ca/hist/pensions/cpp-biblio_e.html) for the bibliography. 
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precautionary motive supplements lifecycle savings. Gomes and Michaelides (2005a,b) 
return to Modigliani's original problem by showing how the savings pattern generated by 
the life-cycle can be calibrated to the equity premium and the level of interest rates for 
countries with different demographic structures. 
2.2 Income 
We know that average full time incomes generally rise initially - until at least the early 
thirties - with people's increasing skills and commitment to the workforce. The process 
has been explained by “human capital theory”, of which Becker (1983) is the originator. 
Human capital incorporates knowledge and skills that arise from education, training and 
practice. Murphy and Welch (2002) model the relationship with US wages over a 30 year 
period. 
Human capital depreciates over time, more rapidly in an environment of rapid technical 
and institutional change. The rate of depreciation is however difficult to determine, with 
Groot (1998) finding rates of 15% per annum, and Arrazola and De Hevia (2004) finding 
them much lower. The capacity to work also eventually declines with age – beginning at 
an earlier age for manual workers. Once people begin to think of retirement, they are also 
likely to reduce their investment in their human capital because it will be of use for a 
shorter period. Incomes tend to decline from this point on.  
Noonan (2005) reports on difficulties experienced by some older workers in keeping 
their jobs. Stock and Beegle (2004) find that this can arise from discrimination against 
older workers and retirement rules and incentives that encourage earlier retirement. 
These both appear to contribute to the observed fall in average incomes as retirement 
approaches. 
2.2.1 Education 
The rise in incomes is quicker and less protracted for those with less education, who are 
more likely to rely on physical strength. Increasing education delays entry into the 
workforce, but income growth often persists into the fifties. Income growth perseveres 
for longer in larger organizations as a result of promotions to senior positions. This might 
be interpreted as returns to firm-specific capital, but Neal (1995) however finds evidence 
only of industry-specific returns to experience. The high income of senior people in large 
organizations therefore requires other explanations. 
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There is considerable data on the investment returns to education. Psacharopoulos (1994) 
summarises his review of the literature: 
“...primary education continues to be the number one investment priority in 
developing countries; the returns decline by the level of schooling and the country’s 
per capita income; investment in women’s education is in general more profitable 
than that for men; returns in the private competitive sector of the economy are higher 
than among those working in the public sector; and that the public financing of higher 
education is regressive.” 
The advent of computerization appeared to have had the effect of increasing the wages of 
those able to use them, but Allen (2001) finds that it has not reduced the wages of older 
workers relative to younger ones. 
2.2.2 Sex 
The pattern of income by age and sex is likely to differ in different societies, but the 
research is largely limited to developed countries, and heavily weighted to the USA. The 
observed patterns do however have intuitive appeal:  
• Single women's salaries are similar to those single men's salaries by age.  
• Married women's income drops at the birth of the first child, and they seldom 
catch up. Kristen and Malone (2005) explain a large portion of the loss by the 
additional housework associated with children, which reduces the opportunity to 
earn. 
• Married men have the highest average income. On the one hand, they have 
partners who take a disproportionate share of domestic chores so enabling them to 
invest more in their earning power, and on the other they are expected to meet 
more of the family's financial demands. 
Discrimination, most often on grounds of race, sex and age can create deviations from 
these generalizations. Hellerstein et al (1996) in a study of 60,000 US plants finds 
evidence that older males are relatively overpaid, while less qualified women are 
underpaid relative to productivity. Such statistics are obviously situation specific, but are 
consistent with general impression of relative social power. The discrimination against 
older workers reported in above relates to the ability to obtain a job, so is consistent with 
older males earning higher wages on average. 
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Waldfogel (1998) finds evidence that more generous maternity leave reduces the 
differences between women with and without children, suggesting that the cost of re-
establishing oneself in the workforce (rather than the efforts spent on housework or 
discrimination) explains some of the lower wages earned by married women. 
The previous two paragraphs are significant for people deciding to retire: a return to 
work at a later age may well be at a lower income level, which means that the decision 
cannot be taken lightly, and that it represents a loss of future wage earning power. 
2.3 Expenses  
It is particularly difficult to measure the costs of living precisely, given the vast number 
of potential purchases and the ability to substitute when prices change. Nelson (1988) 
discusses the difficulties in measuring economies of scale, and Deaton (1998) provides 
an overview of some of the difficulties in measuring prices over time and quality 
changes.  
Expenses do however have a different trajectory to income over the lifecycle: 
• Setting up house - and buying cars - is expensive. To obtain an idea of the costs, 
one can use the websites of general insurance companies to calculate the value of 
household contents, and it can amount to years of income. This obviously has 
significance for those who need to set up another household after a divorce. 
• The cost of children generally rises with their age and drops when they leave 
home. A range of methods have been used to adjust household income for the 
number of adults and children. There must be some overhead costs, and marginal 
costs are likely to reduce as the number of people increase: more expenses can be 
shared, bulk purchases can reduce unit costs, and there will be more opportunities 
to provide goods and services for other members of the household. It is doubtful 
whether any households reach the size where diseconomies of scale arise from the 
need to achieve co-ordination.  
Family living allows for economies in expenses compared with living singly. The 
benefits of living together are not however only financial and continue into retirement. 
Brantervik et al (2005) report that Swedish aged living alone or with spouses in poor 
health are more likely to be malnourished. Ogg (2005) looks at European data and 
describes the particular problems faced by the separated and divorced. 
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• Medical costs appear more or less proportional to the number of people in the 
household until retirement, after which they rise rapidly. Evidence however is that 
they (especially if they include the cost of care) are much heavier in the years 
preceding death rather than related to age per se, especially if one includes the 
cost of care. Van Weel and Michels (1997) suggest that medical costs in the last 
year of life account for 40% of lifetime costs.  
• Other expenses reduce after retirement, more so as health deteriorates as found, 
for instance, by Banks et al (1998).  
2.4 Savings 
Savings depend on the interaction of income and expenses. The following crude stages 
can be outlined: 
• Twenties and increasingly early thirties: people start work, establish a separate 
household, marry and have children. They save for deposit on buying a home. 
Young people are likely to be “liquidity constrained” when they start work: 
consumption is constrained by an inability to borrow. 
• Late twenties to late forties: most middle class families will borrow to buy a 
home. Paying off debt is prudent before saving for retirement can begin. 
• Forties and fifties: at this stage, pension provision becomes important. Pension 
assets of at least fifteen times the required pension are probably necessary. This 
converts to perhaps 7 years of income or 30% of earnings over twenty years. 
• Healthy over sixties: Depending on finances, inclination and opportunity, people 
can choose to work or enjoy the leisure of retirement. There is likely to be some 
withdrawal of savings for leisure activities. 
• Unhealthy over sixties: People are increasingly unable to work and in need of 
help in their activities of daily living. Significant dissaving may occur for medical 
expenses and formal care.  
The cycle is effectively normative: deviations can be costly. Delaying children increases 
the risk of congenital defects and infertility. Too little saving may lead to financial 
hardship in old age; excessive savings may create an unnecessary reduction in 
consumption and more than enough assets later.  
It is clear that there are many working people who think that they should save more. 
Many of those already retired also think that they should have saved more while they 
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were working. Hurst (2003), analysing the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics 
(PSID) data, finds that there are a significant number of families that fail to plan for 
retirement, and whose expenditure myopically follows changes to income. They 
predictably end up with less assets in retirement, although appear to have adequate 
pension benefits. Laibson et al (1998) provide a detailed analysis of motivation for 
saving, and document that a majority of their US survey are in favour of compulsory 
savings and limitations on pre-retirement withdrawal - seeing them as helpful restrictions 
on their own behaviour. This research helps explain the dispersion of wealth at 
retirement that Venti and Wise (1998) found to be less dependent on lifetime income 
than expected. 
On the other hand, in an international survey88, AXA finds that the majority of retirees in 
most countries regard their income as sufficient. As many report that their post-
retirement living standards have increased as have reduced. It is not entirely clear 
therefore whether the view that people do not save enough arises from a clear picture of 
the life-cycle or from an un-informed, but established, myth that more saving for 
retirement is always good.  
The models shown in figures 1a and 1b suggest that the popular view that one should 
save lots and save early is misguided. (The underlying data is given in the appendix.) The 
numbers are stylised and chosen to produce level consumption over the lifetime. They 
illustrate that couples will usually be liquidity constrained when they are attempting both 
to buy a house and look after children. If they want to enjoy consumption over their 
lifetime that varies less, they should save less at that time. Only if children are delayed 
should savings become significant earlier in adult life. 
2.5 Nuclear families 
The lifecycle is not only a middle class, but a nuclear family construct. It assumes that 
retired people are not supported by their children within an extended family, and – in the 
form described in figure 1 – assumes that parents support their young children. The 
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 AXA (2006) AXA Equitable Retirement Scope: Retirement — a new life after work? Report 
axaonline.com/axa/pressroom/2006/2006_01_24_Retirement_Survey_International.pdf 
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lifecycle would be less pronounced and retirement funds less necessary in societies 
characterised by extended families living together.  
Figure 1 a: Children Early
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Figure 1 b: Children Late
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2.6 Retirement as a social phenomenon 
As a middle class, nuclear family construct, the life-cycle as outlined above is largely of 
modern origin. Costa (1998) shows how retirement ages have declined in all the 
countries for which statistics are available for most of the twentieth century. People can 
work until older ages, but institutionalised retirement ages, public pensions funded out of 
both earmarked and general contributions, and tax concessions, have encouraged them to 
retire earlier. Buetler et al (2004) confirm, with individual data, that compulsory savings 
does create an incentive for earlier retirement.  
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Schulz (2002) writes of the emergence of retirement as an active phase in the middle 
class over the past century. He refers to “irrefutable evidence” that a major reason has 
been the need to ease unemployment at younger ages. While unemployment at younger 
ages has been high at times and may have been a contributing factor to lower retirement 
ages, table 1 below shows that leisure is not currently distributed evenly over the life-
cycle – if Australian data is representative. Earlier retirement has accompanied a 
significant increase in the employment of women, including the mothers of young 
children who work almost three times more hours than men in the last of the family 
phases shown. Jager et al (2003) confirm that this extra work creates stresses in their 
report on European countries. They suggest that while the Dutch and Swedes have 
similar views on the equality of the sexes, the Dutch approach of specialization within 
the household (women are more likely to work part-time) leads to lower levels of stress.  
Erlich and Kim (2005) find a link between the generosity of national retirement benefits, 
family disruption and lower levels of fertility. They explain this by a reduced need to 
have children for support in old age, and the greater economic freedom enjoyed by 
women when they have their own pensions. Other explanations are possible. Generous 
pension arrangements are however characterised as much by higher contributions and 
earlier retirement, as higher pensions with less need for support from children. Higher 
contributions for younger people have themselves created a greater need for younger 
women to work, and earlier retirement has created a greater demand for their labour. 
These stresses would also cause family disruption and lower fertility.  
This issue needs to be explored as it relates to the debate on compulsion that is discussed 
in section 5 below. The shifting of working hours from richer and older, but active, men 
to working mothers - as a result of institutional changes - suggests an intersection of 
class, patriarchy and gerontocracy power interests rather than needs. The idea of the 
gerontocracy is described by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999). They suggest that active 
pensioners make up a dominant political bloc in all democratic countries when it comes 
to the defence of social structures that benefit and build its constituency. Such structures 
would include discrimination against older workers that pressure them into an earlier 
retirement. 
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Table 1: Time allocations* by household type (Table 5 in Apps and Rees, 2003) 
House-
hold 
type 
Life-
cycle 
phase 
Male hours of work Female hours of work 
  Market Domestic Total Market Domestic Total 
I & II 1 2314 554 2972 1811 1014 2285 
 2 2359 1369 3775 15 4103 4118 
 3 2394 1358 3859 111 3664 3762 
I 4 2415 1185 3600 355 3170 3525 
 5 2362 817 3179 504 2393 2897 
 6 2367 815 3182 670 1781 2451 
 7 1862 1093 2955 0 2026 2026 
 2 2432 1464 3943 1378 2908 4286 
 3 2478 1306 3784 1615 2679 4291 
II 4 2464 1095 3559 1915 2285 4200 
 5 2527 856 3383 2120 1753 3873 
 6 2369 958 3327 2217 1568 3785 
 7 2062 1083 3145 1202 1458 2660 
I & II 8 0 1458 1458 0 1750 1750 
*Weighted data means, hours pa. 
Type I Traditional – female partner has minimal workforce participation 
Type II Non-traditional – female partner works long hours or full-time 
Phase 1  No dependent children and a female partner under 40.  
Phase 2  Children with an average age under 5.  
Phase 3  At least one child aged 5 to 9 years. 
Phase 4  Children are predominantly in the 12 to 14 year age group. 
Phase 5  Older dependent children still living at home.  
Phase 6  No children, female under 55 or male under 60; one working 
Phase 7  Between phases 6 and 8 
Phase 8  Both partners retired. 
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A Marxist analysis of this apparent distortion of the social structure would lead to a 
search for the “ideological superstructure” or “false consciousness” that would justify it. 
In South Africa and other Anglophone countries, where funded private retirement funds 
make up a core element of the financial system, there is a set of myths around the 
benefits to individuals and society of saving for retirement. For individual benefits, there 
is common misperception addressed in 2.4 above. On economics, there is the 
unsupported view that retirement saving contributes to investment and to economic 
growth discussed inter alia in section 2.7.6 of chapter 3 above.  
There is also the commonly held view that a successful career involves hard work when 
one is young followed by an early retirement. These myths are institutionalised by 
compulsory pension fund membership with their consequential earlier retirement ages, 
subsidies for mothers to be in the workforce, and reinforced by an ideology of equality 
that leads younger mothers to accept fewer hours of leisure. 
While issues of aging have been the subject of investigation in the sociological literature, 
the assumption is that discrimination based on age is due to stereotyping and prejudice 
that should be addressed by “information, contradiction and confrontation” (Bytheway, 
2005). To the extent that social structures have advantages for particular groups and are 
embedded in the legal and institutional structure, however, there is the further need for 
political reform and institutional development.  
The existence of an ideological superstructure is not intended by this writer to suggest 
that its proponents are hypocritical, selfish or stupid. The economic arrangements that 
generate it and the theoretical constructs that support it are likely to emerge slowly as by-
products of other developments. Recognising the ideology, and initiating the education, 
reforms and developments necessary to overcome its negative impacts are also likely to 
take time.  
3 RISKS DURING THE LIFECYCLE 
Much intriguing data on the volatility of income, expenses and savings has come from 
the PSID, and equivalents such as the British Household Panel Survey and the European 
Community Household Panel. Duncan (1988) reports from the PSID that relatively few 
US families remain persistently in poverty, but that a third or more of the population 
suffer significant drops in per capita household consumption at some point in a decade. 
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The most important cause of the reduction is reduced wages (normally reduced 
overtime), or total unemployment. Changes to family composition (particularly leaving 
home and divorce) are also major contributors to financial instability. Also of interest is 
the spread and volatility of income progression in the light of changes to inflation and 
other economic variables. 
This section considers the size and nature of these risks and the potential for retirement 
schemes to provide insurance cover. 
3.1 Death 
Death before retirement can create financial stress for remaining family members. This 
section describes the needs and suggests how the benefits should be determined. 
3.1.1 Orphans 
The most obvious need is for the support of orphans. The presence of children in a 
household not only increases expenses but also diverts time from parents' opportunities 
to earn. Most poverty, worldwide, is felt by single parent families (most often headed by 
mothers) with young children. The problem is greatly exacerbated if both parents are 
dead, which is likely when AIDS was the cause.  
It would appear highly desirable for all retirement funds to offer life cover for orphans. A 
problem arises if the funds do not know of the existence of the children of members. This 
can be avoided if the premiums are charged to all members, but this may be seen to be 
unfair. The reintroduction of a dependent's tax rebate would provide greater incentives 
for parents to report the existence of dependent children to their employers, and thus to 
their fund. 
3.1.2 Spouses  
To the extent that wives have sacrificed a significant portion of their earned income in 
order to look after their children, they will be more dependent on the earnings of their 
husbands, and will need cover in the event of his death. Cover for children's expenses 
may not compensate for this loss. Cover on the wife's life is not normally necessary as 
household arrangements usually appear to enhance the husband's earnings. 
In those rare circumstances where husbands reduce investment in their own human 
capital to take up household duties, the needs will be reversed.  
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Offering cover to men but not women is likely to be seen as unfair discrimination, so 
spouses' benefits should be made optional in retirement funds. This allows the cover to 
be adapted to fit all circumstances. 
Requirements for cover go beyond retirement. Society’s poorest members include elderly 
widows and divorcees - as described in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991). It appears that 
their husbands spend most of their retirement benefits on themselves.  
3.1.3 Debt repayment 
Banks and other moneylenders frequently require cover in order to ensure quick and easy 
repayment on death. The cover may well be necessary to protect the family, but there is 
frequently no attempt to determine the borrower’s total need for the insurance. Credit life 
cover for smaller loans particularly appears to be sold purely to earn additional 
commissions for the supplier.  
If retirement funds offer life insurance, then additional cover may well represent over-
insurance. There would therefore be an argument for laws governing retail loans to 
require moneylenders to accept the cover from retirement funds as security in the event 
of death. This in turn would require the funds to be able to pay some of the proceeds of 
life cover to the lenders, and to notify them before cover ceases. 
The amounts recoverable would need to be limited to a portion of the cover in order to 
ensure that families were not impoverished in order to pay excessive debts. If benefits 
were only payable as pensions, this would be easier to ensure. 
3.1.4 Funeral expenses 
Funeral expenses are important for people where the cost of a culturally appropriate 
funeral is significant relative to income. This cover is widely offered by informal burial 
societies and a variety of group and individual life policies that normally cover the whole 
family. While not permitted in a retirement fund, over half the employers responding to 
the Sanlam Survey (2006) offer funeral benefits to the employees; most of these cover 
children. 
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South African law89 limits the insurance that can be taken out on the life of children. The 
limits may be circumvented - mainly inadvertently - if people are members of a number 
of different groups offering funeral cover. This presents a perverse incentive. Fisher and 
Young (1965) report that restrictions on the amount payable on the death of a child were 
introduced in 1875 in the UK for fear of encouraging infanticide. In 1948, this was taken 
further and life cover on children under 10 was prohibited altogether. While infanticide 
is seldom reported in South Africa, there are over 6 000 unnatural deaths90 of children 
under 14 annually, which provide grounds for doubt. Given the ubiquity of funeral cover, 
it would appear undesirable to offer more. 
3.1.5 Other death related expenses 
Life insurance is also bought to provide a bequest to children, or if there are other assets, 
to pay the estate duty. This type of cover does not represent a need and should at most be 
optional in a retirement fund.  
3.1.6 Determining the requirements  
The amount of life cover required by the dependants of an individual in any future year 
can be derived as either: 
a) net expected income in the year times the proportion not spent on oneself, or  
b) one's contribution to household expenses and upkeep of others.  
Lilly (2006) provides a detailed analysis as how the required cover might be determined 
by a financial advisor. His analysis is relatively complicated and includes relatively 
minor items such as specific provision for funerals. Given the difficulty of determining 
future income, needs and investment returns precisely, it would not seem that such detail 
can be justified. Rough calculations based on one of the two formulae suggested above 
are likely to be adequate. 
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 Section 55 of the Long Term Insurance Act 1998 restricts the maximum cover that can be given for 
children to R10 000 for those under 6 and R30 000 for those under 14. 
90
 This number can be calculated from “Causes of death in South Africa 1997-2001: Advance release of 
recorded causes of death” (P0309.2) published by Statistics South Africa. Actual deaths are however 
believed to exceed reported deaths by a significant margin. 
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The cover required for each year is likely to be relatively level, when expressed as a 
percentage of income. Allen (1970) reports common US benefit formula were for 
spouse's pensions of between 20% and 50% of income with orphans' pensions of between 
5% and 15% each. The greater participation of women in the workforce since that time 
would suggest that proportions should be more heavily weighted toward orphans. 
A formula for orphan's cover could be 15% of income for each child until they become 
financially independent, with maximum cover of 40% or 50% of income. These 
percentages would approximate a division of the income of a household into one part for 
each child and one for each adult.  
The need is clearly for a monthly pension, but South African income tax rules on 
annuities make lump sum cover more tax efficient because the entire annuity and not just 
the interest portion is taxable. The same applies to spouse's pensions. Antiquated tax 
rules of this type are designed to capture investment annuities, but have been amended to 
allow structured settlements in many other jurisdictions91. Tax regulations should also be 
amended in South Africa and extended to cover insurance based annuities. In the interim, 
even retirement funds that offer monthly cover should offer a commutation option that 
allows the beneficiary to purchase a tax efficient annuity with the commutation. 
3.2 Disability  
Where disability leads to an unpreventable loss of income, there is a need for income 
replacement – whether the disability is temporary or permanent, total or partial. 
Disability also leads to additional costs of living and often of working. Zaida and 
Burchardt (2005) confirm this from their survey of a sample of disabled people in the 
UK. 
It appears that insufficient attention is given to disability insurance in South Africa, 
where fewer people have private disability cover than life cover, although more people 
would have cause to claim during their working life. The position can be quite different 
if governments offer cover. In developed countries particularly, disability income 
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 For discussion see Chapter 22 of the report of the Road Accident Commission Report 2002 (Satchwell J) 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/PARLIAMENTARY_INFORMATION/PUBLIC
ATIONS/ROAD/s10-22.pdf 
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payments can be very significant. An OECD report92 shows a variation from 1.3% of 
GDP in Canada to 5.6% in Norway. This variation suggests that it is possible to make 
expensive errors in the design of a system of insurance, either denying needy claimants, 
or overpaying those who could be working.  
This section attempts to outline a sensible and compassionate approach to the issues.  
3.2.1 Rehabilitation 
Disabled people need rehabilitation. Tate (1992) confirms that return to the workforce 
and “normal” life is often a possibility, and often the best cure. Rehabilitation may 
require special equipment and other provision, and needs special effort from family, 
employer and insurance provider. It is difficult, painful and sometimes humiliating for 
the disabled person. It is however superior from a human point of view and appears to be 
less costly. These points are illustrated by De Jong et al (2006) who find, in their Dutch 
study, that the cost of disability benefits can be significantly reduced by more rigorous 
management of the payment of benefits – without a consequential knock-on in higher 
unemployment benefits.  
Goodman and Stapleton (2006) describe what they call a “new paradigm” of attempting 
to re-integrate the disabled in society. Their point is that current US government 
expenditures are not appropriately geared to this objective. It is suggested here that this 
new paradigm can be overplayed. It is not new, having been, inter alia, the inspiration for 
the phasing out of hospitals for those with mental illnesses in many countries. This 
Tucker (1990) reports the consequences in the growth of the homeless: over a third of 
those in American cities had been patients at institutions for the mentally handicapped. 
Rehabilitation is not easily achieved. 
3.2.2 Heterogeneity  
It was clear from representations to the Taylor Committee that there is a wide range of 
differing needs, and that the disabled were not uniformly represented. It seems to this 
author that four main groups can be identified. If there is to be a new paradigm for the 
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 From Marin B & Prinz C (2003) Facts and Figures on Disability Welfare: A Pictorial Portrait of an 
OECD Report Vienna: European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and Research, 36 quoted in Social 
Security Administration (2006) 
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disabled, it is suggested that it should be based on recognition of the heterogeneity of 
disabilities, which this classification attempts to capture in some way. 
3.2.3 Physical disabilities needing rehabilitation 
In this category are those who are intellectually able but blind, deaf or have lost the use 
of their limbs, as well as many with epilepsy, multiple sclerosis and similar diseases. It is 
characterised largely by people who want to return to work, although they may need 
encouragement at times. The category has, practically, to be divided between those who 
would otherwise be capable only of unskilled work, and those with the ability to perform 
skilled work. Tate (1992) confirms the former find more obstacles in returning to work – 
even in his US study, where unemployment is less of a problem than South Africa.  
Representations to the Committee from people in this category93 confirmed that they 
want to participate as fully as possible in society. To the extent that they need help, they 
would like training and equipment that gives access to jobs. With help, they expect to be 
able to make a full economic contribution. It was argued by some that the disabled 
should not be paid income replacement benefits at all, as the benefits would tend to 
marginalize them.  
For disabilities with these characteristics, it does seem appropriate that insurance pays 
the costs of rehabilitation rather than income replacement. Given the demography and 
high unemployment rates of the unskilled in South Africa, and the absence of 
unemployment benefits, some income replacement benefit would however appear to be 
necessary for those with fewer skills. 
3.2.4 Backache and depression 
This group includes people suffering from non-specific backache and some types of 
depression: painful conditions that make many aspects of life and work more difficult, 
but do not prevent working. Claims in this category fluctuate dramatically with economic 
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 The Committee received representation from the SA Federal Council on Disabilities, the National Council 
for Persons with Physical Disabilities in SA, the SA National Council for the Blind, the Deaf Federation of 
SA and the SA National Epilepsy League 
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and social change, and can represent more than half of all disability expenditures94. The 
Taylor Committee however received no representations from organizations representing 
people in this category.  
There is evidence that insurance cover for these conditions is largely misconceived. That 
on backache is strongest. Nachemson (1999) records that backache alone accounts for 
one third of claims in North America and in 1987 accounted for claims made by 8% of 
the Swedish workforce. His review of the medical research shows that the diagnosis 
rather than the condition is the cause of most claims, and that “compensation prolongs 
symptoms and disability”. He continues: “In our efforts to be kind to people, politicians 
and physicians perhaps have been doing the wrong thing. We are perhaps making people 
sicker by some insurance schemes.” He is particularly scathing of some workers' 
compensation arrangements where there is a lax management of claims. He reports on 
widespread success in reducing claims for backache by reducing the benefit payable, and 
limiting claims for work related injuries to the 6 weeks it takes for physical healing to 
occur.  
Many claims for depression may fall into the same category, but medical research does 
not appear to have investigated this in sufficient depth to be sure. In a recent in-depth 
study of 19 individuals, Millward et al (2005) however report on “the unwitting role that 
can be played by the health care system in reinforcing the ‘sick role’ and in so doing 
providing a continued justification for an ‘off-work’ identity.”  
There is evidence that modern medicine can cure many forms of depression cost 
effectively95, which should suggest that the number of claims should be falling rather 
than increasing as is the case in many countries.  
It would seem from a financial and social perspective that benefit payments for these 
conditions should be circumscribed by strict claims management and, where necessary, 
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 As reported in Berkowitz M (2002) Designing an Early Intervention Demonstration to Return Applicants 
for Social Security Disability Benefits to Work www.dri.uiuc.edu/research/p01-01c/final_report_p01-01c.doc 
and by Conti et al (2006) 
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 The US National Alliance on Mental Health claims $7 saved for every $1 spent. 
www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_Yourself/About_Public_Policy/Policy_Research_Institute/
Policymakers_Toolkit/Facts_for_Policymakers_Treatable_Causes_of_Disability_-_Major_Depression.htm 
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reduced benefits. As an alternative to paying a fixed lower benefit for backache and 
depression, the total benefits available for this category might be limited to a stated pool 
of money, which would be shared among those claiming at a particular time. The benefit 
would therefore be self-adjusting, its size declining as more people were claiming in this 
category. By reducing claims and making them more stable, it would significantly reduce 
the premiums for disability insurance so making it more attractive for those that really 
need it. 
3.2.5 Intellectual and mental conditions 
This grouping includes people of working age with intellectual shortcomings, the 
severely mentally-ill, and some people addicted to drugs and alcohol. The Committee 
received submission from organizations serving rather than representing people in this 
category96; the focus was on sheltered employment and hospital services.  
Noble (1998) confirms that there are people, with these conditions, who will not be able 
to participate in workplace without ongoing expert, or at least informed, assistance, 
which sometimes should be delivered in an institutional setting. Their families are often 
not able to cope on their own. The idea that such people should be looked after in the 
community is meaningless unless there are appropriate social structures to embody the 
concept. If structured care is not forthcoming, people in this category can be disruptive: 
occupying and defacing public spaces, and possibly being a physical danger. The US 
National Association of Mental Illness (NAMI) report97 that 16% of the US jail 
population suffers from serious mental illness, while 30% of those in public psychiatric 
hospitals are forensic patients.  
NAMI is an active lobbyist for more appropriate spending on the mentally ill, believing 
that it could save money in the USA in the relatively short run. They are advocates of 
supportive housing (within communities), adapting jobs to be more suitable and earlier 
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 Cheshire Homes and the Department of Health 
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 See www.nami.org/update/unitedcriminal.html (no longer active) and 
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Press_September_2006&Template=/ContentManagement/Cont
entDisplay.cfm&ContentID=38175 
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and more specialised treatment.98 Some of these ideas are likely to be applicable to South 
Africa. 
If permanent rehabilitation is not possible and income replacement monies likely to be 
wasted, benefits for people in this category need to include structured support that 
perhaps be deducted from compensation for lost income. Benefits should in many of 
these cases be paid to third parties and subject to appropriate controls. Retirement funds 
and insurers should investigate collaboration with organizations supporting such people. 
3.2.6 Other conditions 
Those in this category require income replacement. Included are people who are 
bedridden or housebound. The Committee received a number of representations from 
organizations representing people living with HIV/AIDS, but all from organizations 
concerned with state support for orphans rather than for adults who had previously been 
members of pension funds. 
If people have a condition that is temporary they need support until they are able to 
return to work. If the condition is not temporary, they will need income support until 
death. One concern is that people in this category may leave employment because they 
have exhausted their sick leave, and then lose their life insurance. This is a particular 
problem where there is no disability cover or if it ceases after a fixed period.  
3.2.7 Long term care 
Broe (2005), arguing against the “traditional ‘age structure’ that homogenises the old”, 
uses three age related categories for the retired. He describes the middle group between 
approximately 75 and 85 as “generally mobile independent and cognitively together, but 
in 50% brain function is at risk if stressed and then they need some assistance – and 16% 
have a dementia.” For the very old over 85, “70% have difficulties with cognition, 
executive tasks and/or with balance, gait, mobility and activities of daily living.” Broe is 
concerned with the need for medical care for the older and oldest old, and also with 
preventing declining brain function. Tilse et al (2005) reviews the literature on ageing 
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 See the fact sheets at 
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individuals and the help they need in managing their finances, and report on a survey that 
finds that almost one in three Australians has given help to an aged or disabled person in 
the previous year. It can be noted that most of the assistance is informal and appears to be 
inadequately monitored. 
Institutional long term or frail care is likely to be required for those in Broe's older old 
categories. In an Australian context, which is similar to that of middle class South 
Africans, Madge (2000) considers the costs to the Australian state, which amount to 
some 1% of GDP for care and 2% for medical costs. The costs borne by government are 
dependent on family and social conditions; women in some age categories are three times 
more likely to need institutional care than men, not least because couples are likely to 
care for each other and men are more likely to pre-decease their wives.  
Provision for frail care might be incorporated into retirement fund benefits. As an 
insurance benefit, however, it would be subject to moral hazard: family members will be 
given less incentive to provide the necessary care. The incentives would be better aligned 
if there were a savings component that allowed for some money to be left over for 
bequests. The amount required would however be large, particularly when compared to 
smaller pensions. It is difficult to envisage retirement funds withholding such amounts 
from relatively poor pensioners for what may be decades between retirement and entry 
into frail care. The current method of state-provided means-tested care may well 
therefore be the most appropriate funding method. Means tests in this context represent 
relatively little additional intrusion into the lives of the people concerned, and are 
efficient in providing incentive to family members to limit state-subsidised care. This is 
in contrast to the means tests for the age pension which are intrusive and inefficient - as 
described in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Both types of means tests do fall more heavily on 
those with relatively modest incomes, but the former have at least some merits. 
3.3 Unemployment  
It is often difficult to disentangle periods of unemployment caused by a disability from 
those caused by a lack of jobs for which an individual is qualified. Those rendered 
unemployed by economic and technological change can in some ways be described as 
disabled. Such unemployment may be insurable to the extent that it arises as a result of 
retrenchment. Benefits could be paid for the period required to retrain but would be 
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subject to increasing moral hazards if claimants were not sufficiently motivated to return 
to work.  
As with disability, the payment of unemployment benefits should also be accompanied 
with active retraining and pressure to return to work. Recent OECD99 summaries of the 
international research confirm this. They describe the policies needed to successfully 
combat unemployment. Three are relevant to this section: 
• “make it more attractive for people to work than to stay on welfare benefits; 
• “make sure that benefit recipients receive high-quality services, particularly in 
relation to their quest for jobs, and that this is monitored closely, backed up by the 
threat of benefit sanctions; 
• “provide people of working age with the education and training opportunities that 
they need to get jobs and raise their incomes.”  
The South African position before recent changes to the South African Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF) rules was that individuals were allowed to resign, claim on the UIF 
and simultaneously spend their retirement fund withdrawal benefits – so making 
significant additional money available to them if they were previously liquidity 
constrained, and providing a perverse incentive to claim. UIF benefits are no longer 
available to those that resign, but claimants can still access their retirement fund 
withdrawal benefit while still receiving UIF benefits. This is a problem that ought to be 
addressed. 
Retirement schemes cannot help cover youth unemployment that occurs before people 
have had the opportunity to become members. Stiglitz and Yun (2002) suggest that 
national schemes could be designed to allow people with little or no retirement savings to 
borrow against future contributions. The suggestion should perhaps be explored in the 
context of the funding of tertiary education and training, but is not taken further in this 
paper because of the moral hazards. 
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3.4 Divorce 
Divorce frequently involves financial distress as a separate household has to be formed 
and run. A drop in consumption is almost inevitable. The causes of the other stresses that 
arise from divorce are controversial. Amato (2000) surveys the literature and 
characterises the debate as polemical: 
“Some scholars see the two-parent family as the fundamental institution of society—
the setting in which adults achieve a sense of meaning, stability, and security and the 
setting in which children develop into healthy, competent, and productive citizens. 
According to this view, the spread of single-parent families contributes to many social 
problems, including poverty, crime, substance abuse, declining academic standards, 
and the erosion of neighbourhoods and communities.... In contrast, other scholars 
argue that adults find fulfilment, and children develop successfully, in a variety of 
family structures. According to this view, divorce, although temporarily stressful, 
represents a second chance for happiness for adults and an escape from a 
dysfunctional home environment for children.”  
This rather balanced conclusion seems to stand in contrast to the findings of his survey, 
which overwhelmingly confirms the negative impact of divorce on living standards and 
all aspects of well-being of both parents and children, with women suffering the 
economic effects more. While the studies do not find that divorce is always a destructive 
experience, they do find that divorce, apart from any pre-existing characteristics, is itself 
a cause of misery.  
More recent research confirms all of these findings. Sigle-Rushton (2005) examines the 
hypothesis that early fatherhood, like early motherhood, disrupts the lifecycle 
accumulation of human capital, and thus leads to ongoing financial disadvantage. Avellar 
and Smock (2005) look at co-habiting couples who break up their relationship and find, 
as with married couples, that the brunt of the loss of household economies of scale are 
born by the women, with the presence of children leading to a higher probability of 
descent into poverty. 
Particularly relevant to South Africa are the clear results of Sampson and Groves (1989) 
that family breakdown is associated with crime. More specifically, but not as widely 
investigated, Comanor and Phillips (2002) show that the absence of the father is itself a 
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major contributor to crime. Available data100 show that 20% of South African children do 
not live with their natural mothers, while fewer than 50% live with their natural fathers.  
It is thus important that retirement funds do not create perverse incentives and aggravate 
destructive behaviour, while on the other hand attempt to provide flexibility to ease the 
financial distresses of divorce.  
3.5 Retirement 
Retirement itself can be stressful.  
3.5.1  Reduced expenditure for some 
Banks et al (1998) look at the consumption of UK households at retirement and try to 
explain a small decline. They conclude that at least some arises from negative 
information that becomes available at retirement, which they interpret to mean that many 
pensioners have saved insufficiently. This would tend to be confirmed by Hurst's (2003) 
results. Other possible reasons would be the loss of human capital arising from the act of 
retirement itself, or the reduction in prices arising from pensioner discounts. Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2006) in perhaps a more careful consideration, find that the decline in 
spending is volitional: more time is spent on inexpensive pleasures. 
3.5.2 Difficult transitions 
Larson and Pedersen (2005) look at a Danish sample of pathways to early retirement. 
They identify 3 major paths: direct; after a period of drawing unemployment or disability 
benefits; and other paths that incorporate a variety of transitions including a long period 
of unemployment without a benefit. In their sample, more than one worker in five 
appears to have been driven to retirement by unemployment; even more appear to retire 
for health reasons. These difficult transitions are more likely to affect lower income 
people. Hayward et al (1989) find that better educated and paid people have lower rates 
of ill-health retirement and disability. 
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3.5.3 Other disadvantages 
Even those who retire voluntarily appear to decline in health. Dave et al (2006) carefully 
analyse a rich US panel data set, and find evidence that reduced opportunities for 
socialising, and a lower requirement to exercise sufficiently, appear to cause lower levels 
of health. This appears to be true even for those who found retirement removed them 
from a stressful job. 
4 BENEFIT DESIGN 
This section discusses how retirement fund benefits can be adapted to meet the 
contingencies discussed in section 2. Stiglitz and Yun (2002) make the formal arguments 
for such integration and mention the Provident Funds of Singapore and Malaysia as 
exemplars. While these national funds101 do provide a degree of integration, it is mainly 
administrative. They provide what large South African companies provide as employee 
benefits to Provident Fund members: a choice of partial insurance schemes and mainly 
lump sum benefits102. The more complete integration suggested in this section would 
offer greater benefits. 
4.1 Cross-subsidies in a typical DB scheme 
DB schemes typically included both risk and retirement benefits: widows' and orphan's 
benefits and early retirement on grounds of disability. The payment of a joint pension 
after retirement also offered more protection to divorced spouses and widows. 
The reasons for the switch from DB to DC benefits were normally not related to risk 
benefits. Fore and Hammond (2005) list some of the reasons in the USA as: “higher 
worker mobility; the maturing of DB plans in older and highly competitive 
manufacturing sectors with few new entrants, workers’ desire to control their own saving 
and the high costs of DB plan management, along (in more recent times) with 
unexpectedly poor stock market performance and low interest rates.” They suggest that 
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the main reason has been the “unintended consequence of the risk-management 
mechanisms adopted to reduce risk, correct agency problems, and address pension 
administrative concerns.”  
Kerrigan (1991) describes the South African reasons. The trade unions were particularly 
supportive of the need for change because they obtained fairer withdrawal benefits, 
lump-sums on retirement, greater influence on investment policy and the power to elect 
trustees. The DC funds did away with the complicated cross-subsidies of DB, and the 
lump sums offered greater ease in avoiding the means test that, at that time, reduced the 
state pension by 100 percent of other income. Employers encouraged the shift to DC 
benefits. First, they were reluctant to permit newly elected trustees to make decisions that 
could lead to investment losses. Second, they were not averse to reducing the investment 
risks inherent in DB design, and toward the end of the 1980s, they saw that AIDS 
threatened a significant increase in the cost of risk benefits. 
Many of these disadvantages can be addressed, but it is suggested that DB schemes will 
not again find favour because of the unfair cross-subsidies intrinsic to their design. 
Actuarially fair pension benefits are such that the present value of the contributions is 
equal to the present value of the benefits: every member gets what they deserve. 
Actuarial fairness can be determined ex ante: making reasonable assumptions about the 
future and locking people into predetermined benefit formulae, or ex post, using actual 
experience to determine benefits. 
Pure DC funds are actuarially fair ex post. This is one of their main attractions. DB funds 
could be made fair ex ante, but they normally pay higher benefits to older entrants and 
the married, and often to those with children. Those where the benefit is based on final 
average salary give better benefits to those whose salaries increase the most in their last 
years of work. Skilled people are paid faster growing incomes than manual workers, and 
so the poor and unlucky subsidize the rich and lucky.  
The cross-subsidies can be significant. Consider the effect of an increase in salary on the 
value of the expected pension. The effect grows larger as retirement approaches and is 
proportional to years of service. Ignoring survival factors, and assuming a real rate of 
interest of 2%, the effect will be more than twice as much for a 64 year old as a 24 year 
old. If the older person has 40 years of service and the other just one, the effect on the 
older person's pension will be almost 100 times greater.  
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The problem arises because a lower than expected salary increase gives rise to a 
reduction in the value of the pension. The 64 year old with 40 years service may well 
have a pension worth ten times annual income. A salary increase 5% less than expected 
(not impossible in times of high inflation when the person is only a year from retirement) 
will mean that the pension declines in value by an amount equal to 50% of annual 
income. The reverse applies to those with increases higher than expected. Such dramatic 
side effects of small salary increase differentials are impossible to justify. 
Career average DB designs do not suffer from this problem, and can be made fair if 
income is revalued to adjust for inflation. A revalued career average scheme is very 
similar to a DC fund with the crediting rate having the same effect as the rate of 
revaluation. The difference is that a career average scheme with a uniform rate of 
pension accrual requires increasing contributions with age103. There would not appear to 
be much to choose between such a DB fund and a DC fund with investment guarantees. 
4.2 Integrating death benefits before retirement 
Thompson (1998; chapter 10) points out that the pension payable can be enhanced if the 
death benefit payable to survivors before retirement is limited to their real needs and 
does not include a return on contributions. The improvement is of some significance, 
depending on mortality rates. Allowing for no payment on death before retirement, the 
savings for 30 years of level contributions might vary from some 10% to 40% - the 
former based on US social security mortality104 and the latter on Dorrington's (1989) 
estimate of black mortality in South Africa. 
Figure 2 below shows how a pension fund would accumulate and de-cumulate reserves 
for members experiencing these mortality rates. It also shows the life cover that might be 
required for a family with three children where there was also a need for a spouse's 
pension (40% of salary for the children and 30% for the spouse). While the cost of this 
cover would be 1.9% and 10.7% of salary respectively, the total cost of both retirement 
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and mortality benefits is 15.6% and 16.8% - not greatly different for vastly different 
mortality rates. 
 
Figure 2: Cover and Reserves
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The mortality difference between members of most retirement funds is likely to be much 
smaller than these extremes. A good case can be made for charging the same rate for this 
package of benefits on the grounds of equality, administrative simplicity and the 
elimination of underwriting. In contemporary South Africa, it would, in any event, be 
difficult to apply differentiation that disadvantaged any particular racial group.  
In times before AIDS became a problem, being able to pass recruitment interviews would 
have been sufficient to qualify for life insurance cover. Given the recent improvement in 
AIDS treatments, it is quite possible that this position can be restored if the employer has 
a good record of ensuring treatment protocols are followed. If this is not possible in 
contemporary South Africa, one might be able to subsidise the cover of HIV positive 
members, or choose to exclude them from cover rather than to reduce or eliminate group 
insurance benefits for everyone.  
The most obvious way of achieving this integration is to separately account to members 
for retirement and death benefits, with the former leading to a credit being added to the 
retirement account from the death release, and the latter leading to a charge. Members 
are already accustomed to the charge; the credit may well come as a pleasant surprise and 
will have the advantage of educating members about the benefits of annuitization. The 
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credit will exceed the charge once the retirement account exceeds the death benefit. As 
can be seen from figure 2, the lines may cross some years before retirement.  
4.3 Integrating disability benefits 
Disability can be seen as analogous to retirement as both involve a withdrawal from the 
workforce. Indeed, the discussion of both retirement and disability above suggests that 
there are limited reasons for the state to provide encouragement for retirement of the able 
– except if it can be seen to reduce unemployment amongst the young. It is thus ironic 
that South African retirement funds are not permitted to provide for disability benefits. 
Allowing retirement funds to pay disability benefits would be administratively 
convenient, and allow for better integration of benefits. In the interim many employers 
offer group benefits through separate insurance schemes. 
4.3.1 Offset with post-retirement mortality 
Of particular importance is the offset - between disability and mortality impairment after 
retirement - that would be readily available to a largish retirement fund offering disability 
insurance and compulsory annuitization, but difficult and probably inappropriate for an 
individual.  
The difficulty arises from the need to evaluate the degree of impairment before an 
impaired life annuity can be issued (by a fund or an insurer) where annuitization is not 
compulsory. In addition, even if the disabled member is unable to obtain an impaired life 
annuity, the providers of regular annuities will need to take anti-selection into account in 
the pricing of their annuities, which increases the price of annuities even further.  
The likelihood that an impaired life annuity would be inappropriate arises from the wide 
variety of conditions that lead to disability and impaired mortality, as well as the fact that 
different rules will invariably be applied by different funds. A taskforce of the Institute 
of Actuaries of Australia105 reported: “Analysis of total and permanent disablement 
statistics from an insurer indicates that two-thirds of those claiming total and permanent 
disablement benefits do not have a substantially reduced life expectancy.” On the other 
hand, it is clear that those taking early retirement can experience a significant reduction 
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in life expectancy. The Continuous Mortality Investigation Reports106 gives the 
additional mortality of UK life office early retirement pensioners in CMI 16. Table 
Pen1.2a provides a smooth additional mortality loading of some 30% under 70, 20% 
under 75 and 5% under 80. This produces annuity rates some 25% higher than normal – 
equivalent to an addition of 10 years at ages between 55 and 65, and more for younger 
ages. 
These annuity enhancements would be significant relative to disability costs. Duggan et 
al (2005) calculate that the US decision in the early eighties to increase the age of full 
entitlement to an age pension from 65 to 67 will lead to an increase in disability claims 
equal to just 4% of the savings in pension payments. 
4.3.2 Temporary disability 
Disabling conditions can persist for some time without being obviously permanent. In 
many instances, there will be a possibility of recovery. For such cases and all disabilities 
at earlier ages, it is clear that people require insurance and retirement fund trustees 
should endeavour to ensure that they are offered as employee benefits outside the 
retirement fund – until it becomes possible to do so internally. 
It is suggested that all disability cover should include provisions for rehabilitation 
benefits in addition to income replacement, and that the terms governing the payment of 
benefits should make the distinction suggested in section 3.2.2 above. Funds and insurers 
should be resolutely committed to restoring people to the workforce. Contracts should be 
drafted to that they allow for additional support for living expenses where necessary, and 
pay benefits to third parties if appropriate.  
If regulation makes this difficult for a retirement or benefit (disability) fund, 
arrangements should be made with a medical aid to fill the gaps.  
4.4 Dealing with divorce 
Divorced spouses and their children frequently have difficulty in accessing their fair 
share of retirement fund benefits.  
                                                    
106
 Published in the UK by the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries  
Chapter 5: Pension benefit design 
 160 
One obstacle is that the law on divorce107 effectively includes only the withdrawal benefit 
from the retirement fund. Another is that lump sums paid on retirement are spent by the 
member on himself with the consequences of poverty for divorced spouses and widows 
recorded by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1991). 
Ensuring that there are no financial incentives for one party to initiate divorce should 
clearly be an objective of law reform. In its absence, trustees of retirement funds should 
ensure that their funds do not contribute to such incentives. Given that men often have a 
financial incentive to initiate a divorce, this means that the benefits of wives and widows 
should be protected as much as is possible. 
This could take two forms: 
a) The payment of benefits as annuities that are likely to be shared with wives, or 
can be attached by Court orders if partners are separated. 
b) Ensuring that lump sum payments are appropriately divided between spouses in 
terms of their marriage contractual arrangements. If, for instance, marriage is by South 
Africa's default accrual system, it would seem that lump sum benefits accruing during the 
marriage belong equally to both spouses – even if they are not separated. It seems that 
trustees not taking this into account when paying benefits may find themselves exposed 
to claims for negligence. 
4.5 Integrating unemployment benefits 
The withdrawal benefits of retirement funds are available to fund periods of 
unemployment. This has the effect of reducing retirement funding, which at least in some 
cases, will lead to later retirement. Stiglitz and Yun (2002) show this is theoretically 
desirable, and Larson and Pedersen (2005) show that it appears to work well in Denmark 
where those who have not claimed from the unemployment fund are able to draw down 
the equivalent of a no claim bonus and go on early retirement. It is suggested however 
that retirement fund rules should withhold the withdrawal benefit until UIF benefits have 
been exhausted. It would also meet the need of unemployed members – and their spouses 
- if the withdrawal benefit was paid in monthly instalments until it is extinguished, or the 
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member is re-employed. Such an arrangement might be made more palatable to members 
who fear unemployment if it were accompanied by an insurance benefit that extended the 
benefit paid by the UIF.  
4.6 Inappropriate insurance 
Some of the insurance currently offered to South Africans resembles an unlucky dip. 
Benefits payable only because of accident are of particularly dubious value. If cover is 
required, then it is required regardless of the cause. The attraction of accidental benefits 
is that they apparently have a lower price, are easier to sell as no medical questions have 
to be asked, and they can be offered by short-term insurers as well as long-term assurers.  
Disability contracts may also offer benefits on a fixed scale for loss of the use of various 
parts of the body. These bear no necessary relationship to the financial losses involved 
but may give the impression that they can replace disability insurance that offers more 
complete coverage. 
The position is aggravated by legislated schemes that only provide cover for accidents. 
Workers' compensation regulations require employers to offer cover to employees 
injured while on duty. Accident cover is the cheapest way to do this. It is also offered by 
the Road Accident Fund (RAF) for death and disability if the driver can be shown to 
have caused the accident. Furthermore, the Assessment of Damages Act 1969 prevents 
the deduction of the victim’s own life assurance benefits in assessing a claim for 
damages. This means that the victim who successfully claims may be over-insured. 
Disability benefits are likely to be reduced to ensure that members are not able to claim 
more than 75% of their income in benefits, but Nachemson's (1999) criticisms of 
workers' compensation arrangements mentioned in section 3.2.4 above are likely to 
apply.  
Also problematic are lump sum benefits, which are common but invariably inappropriate 
as disability cover.  
a) The need for a monthly amount to pay expenses is the same as on retirement or 
bereavement. Disability, however, is likely to be more stressful, making it more difficult 
to manage a large lump sum especially if the condition involves intellectual dysfunction.  
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b) Lump sums are normally paid on total and permanent incapacity after a waiting 
period of at least six months. They cannot easily be adapted for temporary or partial 
disability. While they do fund costs of rehabilitation, the cover is at best belated. 
c) If the amount of the lump sum is not reduced as the members’ accumulated 
retirement savings increase, lump sum cover may also be excessive at ages close to 
retirement. 
Trustees of retirement and benefit funds should obviously avoid inappropriate lump sum 
and accident covers. Given that statutory accident cover is likely to apply for some time, 
they could consider offering a benefit that was reduced in the case of the member 
receiving workers' or RAF compensation. While the amounts concerned may not appear 
significant, one by-product would be to make members conscious of their total need for 
cover. An alternative approach would be for the employer to offer full life cover and not 
merely accidental death cover as part of its workers' compensation obligations. 
5 THE PROPOSED POLICY FRAMEWORK 
These considerations provide the basis for the design of pension funds that meet people's 
needs. Legislation however requires greater justification than this. Justice, the traditional 
criterion for evaluating policy recommendations, can be evaluated by determining 
whether the legislation is intended, in a procedurally just manner, to maximise the 
realization of five sometimes conflicting objectives: equality, liberty, efficiency and 
recognition of people's just deserts, as well as provision for their basic needs. The 
proposals developed below consider each of these objectives. This section looks first at 
the compulsory membership of funds, the minimum benefits that should be provided with 
a brief consideration of consistent charging and governance requirements. 
5.1 Compulsion 
On the question of compulsion per se, perhaps the most common argument is that people 
are myopic. While bolstered by Hurst's (2003) findings reported in 2.4.3 that many 
people actually want to be compelled to save, justice would require there to be a careful 
balancing of the advantages of compulsion against the resultant loss of liberty. One 
cannot argue that a section of the population is myopic without wondering whether it is 
the putative experts that have missed something. The discussions in section 2.6, 3.2 and 
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3.5 certainly suggest that it is disability benefits that are really required, and that experts 
might be requiring people to save too much for retirement.  
5.1.1 Retirement funds as common goods 
A more satisfying argument can be developed if the group or national provision of 
retirement and risk benefits is considered as a common or public good. Olson (1965) 
writes about the "anarchistic fallacy", which is the "illusion that mutually useful 
relationships will spontaneously evolve in a free society". Assuming self interest only, 
individuals will not contribute to public goods - where personal costs exceed benefits. 
Group members must be persuaded that there will be limited free riding (other 
individuals not paying their fair share). 
Pension funds (with the other benefits recommended here) provide a common good at 
two levels. At a community level, if people who are able to provide financial security for 
themselves fail to do so, they become free riders and they or their families a burden on 
others. At a national level, the amount spent on social welfare for those who could have 
looked after themselves is not great. Tax concessions for retirement funds exceed any 
savings in social pensions, as shown, for instance, in Chapter 3 above. The free riding 
would be more likely to be felt in local communities, where people may feel obliged to 
support their relations and friends that have fallen on hard times – or feel guilty if they 
do not. Such support is likely to be unsatisfactory if entirely ad hoc; while as soon as 
thought is given to an appropriate structure, it becomes clear (in terms of just deserts) 
that people should make their own contributions.  
At the employer level, more efficient group schemes might not come into existence 
because of the likelihood that members will free ride on the efforts of the few that might 
set up the scheme. Once schemes were in existence, without compulsion, the 
prevarication of some members would constitute free riding in that it would require the 
additional costs to sell benefits to each individual. Rusconi (2004) shows that these can 
more than double the costs. These benefits extend to the reduced need for underwriting 
for active members, and the ability to support disability benefits for older members if 
they are required to annuitize their retirement benefits.  
There is a further advantage in that better informed members of a group can protect the 
more naïve. Campbell (2006) describes various research which suggests that a large 
proportion of financial service consumers (buyers of housing finance in his examples) 
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fail to make obviously advantageous decisions. In group schemes, sophisticated members 
of the group will act as buyers for all, while communal pressure or regulatory 
intervention can prevent exploitation of the weak or naïve.  
It is true that members of group retirement funds have to surrender some of their power 
to make individual choices. It is therefore consistent with maximising people's freedom 
that retirement funds should limit the benefits offered to a minimum level likely to be 
needed by all (or at least the overwhelming majority) of members. Members with 
additional requirements can make voluntary provision for these. Trustees may however 
provide for optional additional benefits to be offered by the retirement fund.  
5.1.2 Contributions 
Accepting the advantages for those who can afford to contribute, it does not follow that 
compulsory membership should be extended to those in the informal sector for whom 
contributions cannot be collected efficiently. In Chapter 2 above, it is argued that this 
represents an unwarranted interference and an inefficient tax on people struggling to 
make a living in this way. The current state pension provides an adequate base for 
retirement, and would be even more suitable if the means test was abolished as suggested 
in Chapter 3. 
It also does not follow that significant savings contributions are necessary early in the 
lifecycle. It can be seen from figure 1 in section 2.4 above that retirement saving should 
often not begin until the age of 40 or later. Before that time, people are better off 
repaying the mortgage on their homes. The costs of borrowing on a home loan and 
simultaneously investing through a retirement fund are significant. The margin of home 
loan rates over matching fixed interest investments are invariably more than 3% per 
annum in South Africa, to which must be added marginal retirement fund charges and the 
9% tax on retirement fund income. If individuals invest in shares, the costs are balanced 
by the equity premium, but one would have to take an optimistic view of the latter to 
produce a positive expected benefit. Members are therefore unlikely to gain, except 
exposure to unnecessary risk. 
This is the reason that the Taylor Committee recommended compulsion, but that those 
under 40 be permitted to redirect the contributions into repaying their home loans. Forty 
is probably too early for compulsory contributions, especially for those who have their 
children late or are re-establishing their household assets after a divorce. A provocative 
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alternative would be to suggest 60 as the age after which compulsion would apply. Most 
people are capable of working until 70 and the annuity rate for a man of 70 is about 10 
times the annual annuity. This means that a single male could live on 50% of his income 
for the rest of his life, if he contributed 50% for ten years from age 60. From the 
calculations in 4.3.1, this could probably include disability insurance if he were pre-
committed to annuitization. 
Compulsory contributions with possible withdrawals for the purchase of a first house (for 
both the first and subsequent families) and for periods of unemployment appear 
reasonable compromises. Both are currently permitted by the Pension Funds Act 1953.  
5.1.3 Insurance cover 
The Committee also recommended compulsory orphans' and disability cover. The 
arguments have been made above: those who do not pay for cover will leave orphans that 
are provided for by others – or themselves be provided with disability benefits. There is a 
greatly reduced need for underwriting, so allowing more people to obtain necessary cover 
at cheaper prices. Supporting the hypothesis that more sophisticated members protect the 
more naïve, members of group schemes would also appear to get less of the inappropriate 
lucky dip cover described in section 4.6 above than individual policyholders. In South 
Africa, they are more likely to have inflation protected pensions. It can be noted that 
there is already compulsory cover for work and some road accidents.  
5.1.4 Annuitization 
The Committee recommended that all retirement funds offer pensions on retirement, but 
did not recommend whether these should be compulsory or be a default option allowing 
for commutation. 
If some people are myopic before retirement, Broe's (2005) findings about intellectual 
impairments increasing with age, suggest it is much more likely after retirement. This 
makes it surprising that when it comes to compulsory annuitization and compulsory 
contributions, most people appear to be persuaded of the need for the latter, but not of the 
former. One reason is the disincentive of the means test, but this does not apply to all. 
The papers in Fornero and Luciano (2004) suggest a number of reasons for the 
unpopularity of annuities: poor value of money, bequest motives, underestimation of life 
expectancy, crowding out by compulsory annuitization of state benefits, or that a 
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sufficient level of wealth or family support makes longevity insurance unnecessary. 
Suggested by the sociological arguments of section 2.6 are the interests that have allowed 
lump sums to be spent by older men, who leave their ex-wives and widows in relative 
poverty. This latter suggestion also provides a possible explanation for the otherwise 
inexplicable tax advantages enjoyed by lump sums over annuities.  
Weighing heavily in favour of some compulsion is the arguments made in 4.3.1 about 
funding ill-health retirement benefits by pre-commitment to annuitization. Another is the 
likelihood that people over 85 at least need assistance in managing their finances and that 
annuities provide the necessary budgeting and administrative services. The iterative 
argument is that because people cannot know whether they will become incapable of 
managing their finances next year, they should make provision at all times. If people 
should be compelled early in life to save for when they cannot look after themselves, and 
prevented late in life from withdrawing savings for similar reasons, permitting the 
proceeds to be spent between retirement and senescence appears to defeat both purposes.  
5.1.5 Occupational or national arrangements?  
Choice of retirement fund therefore undermines the protection offered by sophisticated 
buyers, economies of scale, universal insurance cover and annuitization. The fact that 
compulsory fund membership is almost universal suggests that the benefits from 
efficiency, extended coverage of needs and a closer match to people's desert are generally 
seen to outweigh the restrictions on people's freedom. This does not address the question 
of whether membership should be of a mandatory national scheme or the occupationally 
based schemes that cover most of the formally employed in South Africa. 
The possible benefits of a national scheme would be for greater efficiencies, and greater 
equality in charging for risk benefits - as the well off could subsidise poorer members. 
There is no doubt that economies of scale are possible; Rusconi suggesting that larger 
funds can achieve cost savings of 50%. His statistics however suggest that there will be 
few further economies to be gained from funds over R1 billion in assets and perhaps over 
1,000 members. The Taylor Committee suggested that ways should be found of 
rationalising small retirement funds to gain these advantages. 
The calculations in section 4.2 suggest that over a lifetime, the difference in contribution 
between those with the lowest and those with the highest mortality would be some 2% of 
salary. The maximum redistributive impact would therefore be of the same order as a 1% 
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increase in the top marginal rate of tax. This seems insignificant. Although this will be 
higher with AIDS, the potential for proper treatment suggests that this is a temporary 
feature around which it would be inappropriate to redesign a retirement system. 
A national scheme can also offer investment guarantees. Investment risks and funding 
issues are not considered in this paper. It can however be argued the state’s resources 
ought not be spent on guaranteeing the investments of the wealthier.  
Employment based group schemes therefore appear to achieve almost all the advantages 
of a national scheme, but allow for greater freedom, more democratic control and may 
well foster efficiency and innovation through competition of service providers. State run 
schemes are also more subject to political pressures to create excessive benefits for some 
classes of members. If these advantages are not already captured by the concept of 
subsidiarity, it would seem an appropriate principle to apply to this question: government 
should be as close as practical to the people governed.  
5.2 Minimum benefits 
This section sets out the minimum benefits that it appears would be required by almost 
all members. The pensions should, obviously, all be subject to mechanisms that would be 
expected to provide compensation for inflation.  
5.2.1 Contributions 
Contributions, whether expressed as employers or employees, should be at least 
sufficient to cover insurance benefits and administration costs and leave at least 7% for 
retirement savings. The minimum contribution rate is clearly debatable. This suggestion 
is based on what would be required for a pension of 50% of average earnings for a single 
male at 65, who contributes for 30 years and earns an average of 2.5% of income. The 
amount in the savings account should be available until the age of 45 to repay a loan on 
the member's house. Contributions should be payable to normal retirement age, which 
should not be less than 65.  
5.2.2 Insurance benefits 
The fund should provide pensions to orphans on death. Orphan's pensions should be at 
least 15% of taxable income each, with a maximum per family of at least 40%, payable 
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until 18, or 23 if the beneficiary is in full time study, or life if the beneficiary is severely 
physically or intellectually disabled. 
Spouses' pensions should be optional, but if they are offered they should be payable until 
normal retirement age, which should be defined as the current age for access to the state 
pension. 
The funds should also provide disability pensions of at least 50% of income plus normal 
contributions to the pension fund. Cover should continue until normal retirement age. 
The cover should include income replacement and the costs of rehabilitation and permit 
partial benefits. The benefit should be payable until retirement. It should be permissible 
to reduce the cover for non-specific back injuries and untreatable depression, and to pay 
benefits to a third party if this appears to be in the interests of the member. 
5.2.3 Unemployment 
Members losing their jobs (for whatever reason) should be entitled to withdraw the 
savings element of their pension, subject to the following limitations: 
• No money should be paid while the member is entitled to UIF benefits. 
• All benefits should be paid as regular pensions unless a court determines that part 
of the pension should be made available as a lump sum in order to settle a debt or 
other obligation. Some part of the pension should be protected against debts 
unless the debt was incurred fraudulently. The regular payment should be no 
greater than the maximum monthly disability benefit. 
• Provision should be made for divorced and estranged spouses to have part of the 
benefit transferred to their pension fund. 
• Once re-employed, any remaining retirement account should be transferred to the 
fund of the new employer.  
The fund should be permitted to take out unemployment insurance so that members do 
not draw down in their savings accounts.  
5.2.4 Retirement 
Early retirement should be covered by disability insurance if it is caused by ill-health or 
by the unemployment rules otherwise.  
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A lump sum commutation of part of the annuity could be permitted at retirement age. The 
simplest approach to this would be to retain the current limitation of 33%. 
The balance of the benefits should be paid out in a lifetime annuity with a spouse's 
reversion of at least 50%. If no residual benefit is permitted, there is no need for a 
minimum withdrawal level. A maximum withdrawal limit could be set with reference to 
an appropriate joint annuity.  
Trustees should be required to ensure that divorced and estranged spouses receive their 
fair share of both lump sums and annuities. 
5.2.5 Discontinuities 
This structure would not necessarily prevent financial distress, and might have to be 
supplemented by additional insurance or savings for any of the following. 
• Insurance cover for orphans and spouses.  
• Disability income. 
• A shortfall in the retirement benefit when compared with the family's current 
standard of living whether funded by earnings or a disability or survivors' 
pensions.  
Funds should provide members with appropriate inflation adjusted projections at normal 
retirement date to alert them to any further needs for savings. They might give their 
members the opportunity to pre-commit to a particular target at normal retirement date, 
and annually calculate the contributions necessary to meet it. This would be in the spirit 
of the observation by Mitchell and Utkus (2004) that people are found to be more ready 
to commit themselves to future savings.  
5.3 Charging and reserves 
This benefit set would allow for cross-subsidies between members. The question arises 
as to the extent that they should be disclosed or prevented. 
An important governance principle to apply would be that the fund should not build up 
reserves that are not allocated to particular individuals. Such reserves necessarily involve 
opaque cross-subsidies and usually depend on the discretion of the trustees, which 
creates uncertainty and the potential for conflicting interests and duties.  
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Because of the significant differences between people of different ages, it would be 
desirable for mortality and disability rates to be age dependent. Flat rates would mean 
that the costs of different funds would differ dramatically because of different age 
profiles – especially if the equality extended to pensioners, whose higher mortality 
releases would contribute significantly to reduced active life costs.  
It does not seem necessary for any other distinctions to be made. Of the numerous 
possible categorizations, sex, income, habits (principally smoking and drinking), marital 
and health status are possibilities. To the extent that they are made, there will be cross-
subsidies from those subject to lower mortality for insurance benefits and in the opposite 
direction when allocating annuitization releases. As illustrated in section 4.3.1, the 
impact over a lifetime is not that significant and may differ for different groups. 
Particularly sensitive cross-subsidies may arise if single people are required to pay for 
spouse's pensions and those without dependent children for orphans' benefits. 
In order to avoid any legal uncertainty debate about potential discrimination, legislation 
should make it clear what types are acceptable and what not. 
Simplest administratively would be to permit no discrimination other than for age for the 
compulsory package of benefits. This is also defensible in that it treats all members of 
the same age equally, and is likely to provide some subsidies to the less well off. 
5.4 Governance 
There are a number of possible approaches to ensuring compulsory membership. South 
Africa is unique in choosing an approach that requires membership of funds to be 
compulsory to all employees of a single employer if the tax advantages are to be 
available. This, together with tripartite agreements covering a number of industries, 
would appear to have proved successful in obtaining a high coverage of the formally 
employed without legal enforcement. It has the particular advantage of not harassing 
smaller employers and the informally employed for which membership would appear to 
be a burden. The Taylor Committee's recommendation was that compulsory membership 
should be enforced by the same bodies as currently enforce workers' compensation 
insurance.  
Another governance question relates to representation of members and the level of 
expertise of the governing bodies. There are some, such as Myners (2001) who suggests 
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that funds should have some professionally trained members of their governing body. 
This has apparent advantages, but clearly weakens the position of the lay trustees in 
board meetings. If trustees want independent advice, they would be advised to contract 
for it rather than to surrender some of their powers. The Taylor Committee recommended 
that lay trustees continue to control South African retirement funds, as reflected its 
preference for democratic rather than technocratic governance.  
6 CONCLUSION 
Retirement funds, in South Africa, are the pivotal institution for the management of the 
middle class financial lifecycle and its attached risks: death, disability, dismissal and 
divorce. DC funds do not integrate these benefits in a way that DB funds were able, but 
there is no going back to the opaque cross-subsidies of DB funds.  
This paper recommends that funds be based on a DC accumulation accounts but required 
to offer a minimum package of pension benefits including enhanced disability benefits. 
Recent research confirms that a more aggressive approach to rehabilitation and return to 
work can be justified – particularly in the case of backache and depression. Legislation 
should require compulsory: 
• contributions, but only if withdrawal from the account is permitted for housing 
and unemployment; 
• preservation except for unemployment, when monthly benefit payments should be 
permitted; 
• annuitization of at least a portion of the proceeds at retirement; 
• orphans' pensions; 
• disability benefits. 
Policy reform is also required in a number of areas that create over-insurance, which is 
both a waste and a moral hazard. There is the need to facilitate the match between life 
cover offered by retirement funds and that demanded by banks and other money lenders 
so that people are not required to over-insure themselves. The accident cover offered by 
workers' compensation arrangements and the Road Accident Fund is often over-insurance 
and should be abolished; people need cover for death and disability regardless of its 
cause. Funeral insurance for family members should also be discouraged in order to limit 
over-insurance that creates perverse incentives. 
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Reform should also facilitate life and disability cover being paid monthly: tax 
considerations discourage the former, restrictions on the benefits that can be paid by 
retirement funds the latter.  
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APPENDIX 
Table for Figure 1a: Children born in twenties
Age Income Housing Total  Accumulated
after Children payments Expenses  Savings
tax
0
23 50000 50000 0 0 47500 2500
24 60000 60000 0 0 57000 5500
25 72000 72000 0 0 68400 9100
26 86400 86400 0 0 82080 13420
27 95040 66528 2500 0 61776 18172
28 104544 73181 2500 0 67954 23399
29 114998 80499 5000 0 80499 23399
30 118448 82914 6000 0 76991 29322
31 122002 85401 7000 37500 85401 29322
32 125662 125662 7000 36408 125662 29322
33 129432 129432 7000 35347 129432 29322
34 133315 133315 7000 34318 133315 29322
35 137314 137314 7000 33318 137314 29322
36 138687 138687 7000 32348 138687 29322
37 140074 140074 7000 31406 140074 29322
38 141475 141475 7000 30491 141475 29322
39 142890 142890 7000 29603 142890 29322
40 144319 144319 10000 28741 144319 29322
41 145762 145762 10000 27904 145762 29322
42 147219 147219 10000 27091 139858 36683
43 148691 148691 10000 26302 147171 38203
44 150178 150178 10000 25536 146554 41828
45 151680 151680 10000 24792 145960 47548
46 153197 153197 10000 24070 145390 55356
47 154729 154729 5000 23369 139842 70243
48 156276 156276 5000 22688 139316 87204
49 157839 157839 0 22027 133811 111231
50 159417 159417 0 21386 133327 137321
51 159417 159417 0 0 111942 184797
52 159417 159417 0 0 111942 232273
53 159417 159417 0 0 111942 279748
54 159417 159417 0 0 111942 327224
55 159417 159417 0 0 111942 374700
56 157823 157823 0 0 111782 420741
57 156245 156245 0 0 111625 465361
58 154683 154683 0 0 111468 508575
59 153136 153136 0 0 111314 550398
60 151604 151604 0 0 111160 590842
61 147056 147056 0 0 110706 627192
62 142645 142645 0 0 110264 659572
63 138365 138365 0 0 109837 688101
64 134214 134214 0 0 109421 712894
65 130188 130188 0 0 109019 734063
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Table for Figure 1b: Children born in thirties
Age Income Housing Total  Accumulated
after Children payments Expenses  Savings
tax
0
23 50000 50000 0 0 47500 2500
24 60000 60000 0 0 57000 5500
25 72000 72000 0 0 68400 9100
26 86400 86400 0 0 82080 13420
27 95040 95040 0 0 90288 18172
28 104544 104544 0 0 99317 23399
29 114998 114998 0 0 107500 30898
30 118448 118448 0 0 107845 41501
31 122002 122002 0 0 108200 55303
32 125662 125662 0 0 108566 72399
33 129432 129432 0 0 108943 92887
34 133315 133315 0 0 109331 116870
35 137314 137314 0 0 109731 144453
36 138687 97081 2500 0 97081 144453
37 140074 98052 2500 0 98052 144453
38 141475 99032 5000 37500 99032 144453
39 142890 100023 6000 36408 100023 144453
40 144319 101023 7000 35347 101023 144453
41 145762 145762 7000 34318 145762 144453
42 147219 147219 7000 33318 147219 144453
43 148691 148691 7000 32348 148691 144453
44 150178 150178 7000 31406 149424 145208
45 151680 151680 7000 30491 148659 148229
46 153197 153197 7000 29603 147923 153504
47 154729 154729 7000 28741 147214 161019
48 156276 156276 7000 27904 146531 170764
49 157839 157839 10000 27091 148875 179728
50 159417 159417 10000 26302 148243 190902
51 159417 159417 10000 25536 147477 202842
52 159417 159417 10000 24792 146734 215526
53 159417 159417 10000 24070 146012 228932
54 159417 159417 10000 23369 145311 243039
55 159417 159417 10000 22688 144630 257826
56 157823 157823 5000 22027 138810 276840
57 156245 156245 5000 21386 138010 295075
58 154683 154683 0 0 111468 338289
59 153136 153136 0 0 111314 380111
60 151604 151604 0 0 111160 420555
61 147056 147056 0 0 110706 456906
62 142645 142645 0 0 110264 489286
63 138365 138365 0 0 109837 517815
64 134214 134214 0 0 109421 542608
65 130188 130188 0 0 109019 563777
  
CHAPTER 6 - THE RELATIVE INVESTMENT 
PERFORMANCE OF THE COMMUNITY GROWTH FUND 
 
First published in the South African Actuarial Journal (2005) 5: 1-26  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The explicit use of ethical or social criteria in the choice of institutional investments 
grew considerably in the last two decades of the twentieth century. A major question, 
raised by the growth in number and size of institutions adopting such criteria, has been 
the effects on investment performance. 
In South Africa, the Community Growth Fund (CGF) was the first institution to 
explicitly adopt social criteria. The balance of this paper is divided into four sections. 
Section 2 gives an outline of the history and structure of the CGF. The third section looks 
at the reasons why share prices move both absolutely and relative to each other. The 
fourth then briefly discusses socially responsible investment. The final part looks at the 
relationship between the CGF social criteria and investment performance.  
The conclusion is that, if anything, and contrary to some prior opinions, the CGF social 
criteria have had a positive impact on investment performance. 
2 HISTORY AND STRUCTURE  
2.1 Unions and provident funds 
The creation of the CGF was rooted in two uniquely South African conditions. 
The first is the South African retirement system. State involvement is limited to the 
provision of the flat basic old age grant (currently R780 per month), and the regulation of 
private provision. This is unusual in that there is no mandatory requirement to contribute 
to state run earnings related retirement provision. South Africa may also have been the 
first country to provide an explicit legal framework for retirement funds with the passing 
of the Pension Fund Act, 1956. The thriving private industry that has developed is a 
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major contributor to national savings1. High and volatile rates of inflation, and the 
limited availability of other inflation protected investments, have meant that equities play 
an important role in retirement fund portfolios. 
The second root is the links between the black trade unions and retirement funds. Black 
South Africans were prevented from joining trade unions until the early eighties. This 
changed following the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission (1979).The 
pensions arena became the first in which the new movement showed its strength. 
Government happened, at the same time, to put forward a Bill proposing to restrict 
pension fund members from withdrawing their interest when leaving the sponsoring 
employer.2 The withdrawal benefits were seen as a critical support during periods of 
unemployment, and the new unions successfully led a campaign that lead to the 
withdrawal of the Bill. 
Retirement funds therefore became a critical issue for the new union leadership. After the 
campaign against preservation, the major issue of the eighties was the transfer of 
workers’ benefits from defined benefit pension schemes, controlled exclusively by 
employers, to union designed provident funds. These are typically defined contribution 
schemes controlled by boards of trustees, half of whom were elected by members or 
appointed by trade unions. They pay lump sum benefits on withdrawal and at retirement, 
which were much more favourable to lower paid workers. This is because the benefits on 
withdrawal are not subject to the penalties previously imposed on early leavers, while the 
lump sum on retirement allows pensioners to escape the means test that would otherwise 
have prevented them from drawing the state old age pension.3 
                                                     
1
 Statistics available from the South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin suggest that over a third of the 
total fixed capital stock is owned directly and indirectly by retirement funds. This adds the assets of public 
and private funds including those on the held by life insurers and allowing for double counting. In the March 
2005 bulletin, the numbers can be found in tables S37, 41, 42 and 129.  
2
 The Bill emerged from the First report of the Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into Certain Specific 
Pension Matters (The Meiring Committee) 1980. 
3
 One large pension fund, advised by the author, saw 1000 people retire in 1989. 980 of these would have 
gained no net benefit from the pension fund as their state pension would have been reduced by an equal 
amount (and sometimes more). 
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Having gained control of the funds, some unions began investigating ways of exercising 
greater influence over the companies in which they were investing. 
2.2 Formation of the CGF 
From the papers available to the author, the idea of the CGF was first mooted in a 
meeting between staff of the Cape Town based Syfrets Managed Assets (SMA) and 
Labour Research Service (LRS) in May 1991. The LRS facilitated contacts with the 
largely Johannesburg based union head offices, leading to the official launch of the CGF 
in June 1992. 
The CGF is operated by a management company, jointly controlled initially by SMA and 
Unity Incorporated, a non-profit company set up by the seven sponsoring unions. The 
management company subcontracted its functions to SMA and its affiliates. The author 
became the independent acting chairman of the board of the management company and 
served as Chairman until 2002. 
The seven trade unions came from both the large trade union groups. Affiliated to the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) were the National Union of 
Mineworkers (by far the largest investor in the fund), the Construction and Allied 
Workers’ Union, the Transport and General Workers’ Union, the Paper, Printing, Wood 
and Allied Workers’ Union. The others were from the National Council of Trade Unions 
(NACTU): the National Union of Food, Wine and Spirits and Allied Workers, the 
Transport and Allied Workers’ Union, and the Metal and Electrical Worker’s Union of 
South Africa. The Memorandum of Association of Unity set out Unity’s main business 
as: 
“To advance the concept of socially responsible investment and to promote the 
influence of the Trade Union Movement in the economy through: 
- establishing and holding shares in Unit Trust Management Companies; 
- establishing financial vehicles, whether on its own or jointly with other 
organisations, for personal, Trade Union and Retirement Fund investments …” 
2.3 Investment process 
There were initially 16 social criteria, weighted as follows: 
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Table 1: Initial social criteria 
Criterion Weighting % 
Job creation  14 
Industrial relations 14 
Employment conditions 13 
Training 7 
Equal opportunities  7 
Health and safety 6 
Product safety 5 
Rejected participation in privatisation 5 
Profit retention – for expansion 5 
Affirmative action 5 
Operations located in South Africa 4 
Environment 4 
Worker participation 4 
Disclosure 4 
Political profile – not abused 2 
Social spending  1 
TOTAL  100 
SMA nominated those companies that they wished to include in the investment universe. 
The LRS and Unity then evaluated these companies. The process involved an initial 
questionnaire to be completed by the company, and then interviews with management 
and union organisers. It proved difficult at times to get co-operation from companies and 
some unions not affiliated to the CGF. The LRS then prepared a report that was 
submitted to the Unity board of directors for approval.  
Once approved, SMA was able to buy shares for the CGF. The Unity board was keen to 
publish the results as quickly as possible, but SMA persuaded them to keep the names of 
approved companies confidential until they appeared as investments in the published 
reports of the CGF. SMA had been chosen for its exceptional investment performance in 
the years preceding the launch and its management was concerned that publishing the 
names of the companies in which they intended to invest, would push up share prices 
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before SMA had been able to acquire an adequate holding. The relatively low liquidity of 
the South African share market provides reason for these concerns. 
At the meeting of the board of the management company in July 1992, one month after 
the launch of the CGF, it was reported that 9 companies, out of SMA’s list of 51, had 
been approved, 7 had been rejected, and 11 had been referred back to the LRS for further 
investigation. The slow rate of approval, arising partly from the limited resources 
available and partly from the need to obtain consensus from the volunteer directors of 
Unity, has been a constant, but inevitable, source of frustration to asset managers. 
2.4 Initial responses 
The first investor in the CGF was Cyril Ramaphosa, then Secretary General of the ANC 
who made out his personal cheque at the initial press conference. This was followed the 
next day by a R1 million investment from the pension fund of the business (rather than 
labour) oriented Times Media Limited. Its managing director, Stephen Mulholland 
identified its launch as a “significant departure in the affairs of a trade union”. A LRS 
spokesman4 was “delighted that Times media has acknowledged the superior potential of 
socially responsible investment”, but hastily pointed out the possibility that the 
company’s industrial relations practices would disqualify it from appearing on the 
unions’ list of approved shares.  
Greenblo5 identified the tensions. Existing participation in provident funds meant that the 
Unions had implicitly accepted the principle of investment in shares and participation in 
the capitalist system, even though this flew in the face of a COSATU economic policy 
document released earlier in 1992. The Unity unions’ involvement in the CGF made it 
more explicit. Greenblo expressed the hope that the CGF approach would break down the 
“adversarial divide between employer and employee”. 
Other criticisms arose from a fear that the social criteria would reduce investment 
performance for the reasons set out in section 4 below. 
                                                     
4
 Reported in the Weekly Mail May 8 to 14 1992. 
5
 Allan Greenblo: Editorial Comment, Finance Week May 7-13, 1992 
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2.5 Subsequent developments 
As it transpired, the CGF was the forerunner of much greater union involvement in the 
capitalist system. Unions that initially resisted the CGF’s apparent compromises6 
subsequently created union investment companies that actively pursued commercial 
objectives. 
Inflows of R100 million were predicted for the CGF in the first year. Given that union 
controlled provident funds had some influence over perhaps R20 billion of assets, this 
did not appear particularly ambitious, but the fund had only R70 million by the end of 
1993. Steady growth, usually below expectations, has been achieved, with the fund 
reaching R900 million by 1998 and currently approaching twice that size.  
A number of factors for the disappointing growth can be identified. The initial opposition 
of some unions, inadequate management resources and numerous changes to personnel 
were perhaps the main factors. More important to the subject of this paper, was the 
question whether socially responsible investment would reduce investment returns.  
2.6 New investment criteria 
In the 1996 report to unitholders, “tougher new criteria for companies seeking inclusion 
in the share portfolio” were introduced. Eight categories, each given an equal weight in 
the final score, were to be used.  
• Create jobs through innovation and expansion.  
The questionnaire used allocates a maximum of 20 points for this category, 5 are 
given for growth in jobs, another 9 for expansion plans, 2 for retrenchment procedures 
and 4 for not creating jobs overseas. 
• Training of workers to enhance skills 
2 out of the 9 points allocated to this score were related to training expenditure as a 
percentage of payroll; the rest were qualitative measures, depending to a significant 
degree on collaboration with the trade union. 
                                                     
6
 The 1992/3 Institute of Race Relations Survey reports that a number of COSATU and NACTU trade unions 
refused to endorse the fund. (page 335) 
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• Economic and social empowerment 
20 out of 30 points here relate to bargaining with unions, 5 to donations to relevant 
social projects, and 5 to partnerships with emerging black businesses. 
• Equity through affirmative action within the workplace 
Half the points here are allocated on whether the company scores better than the LRS 
average for its industry. The rest of the points are qualitative assessments.  
• Good conditions of employment 
6 of the 15 points for this category relate to wages, the rest to benefits. 
• Sound environmental practices must be promoted 
This is more complicated. Companies not involved in an industry which could have a 
potential environmental incident automatically get 9 out of 13 points. Companies in 
other industries can score these 9 if they have suitable policies – losing 1 if they 
experienced accidents and another if the accident was not catered for in their policies. 
Plus or minus 3 points are allocated for the desirability or otherwise of the company’s 
products – and one for not having dealings with oppressive regimes. 
• High health and safety standards must be applied 
Measures of injuries account for 3 out of 11 points; the rest relate to policies. 
• Demonstrate open and effective corporate governance 
The points here are largely allocated in line with King Report (1994) on corporate 
governance. 3 points are given for the company’s response to CGF queries and 
another 4 for disclosure to unions. 
3 DETERMINANTS OF SHARE PRICE MOVEMENTS 
3.1 Overall level of prices 
The next three sections describe the three underlying forces at work in the determination 
of share prices. There is the demand for and supply of shares that arises independently of 
their actual value, and then the factors that drive profitability.  
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3.2 Demand 
Demand for shares will depend firstly on the forces that lead to people saving. This is 
one of the major concerns of economics, but 75 years of intense debate and research has 
produced very little in the way of mathematical relationships. Smith (1990) reviews 
research that shows people tend to save more when: 
• they cannot borrow,  
• their incomes are rising rapidly,  
• their income (current and future in the form of a public pension) is insecure,  
• they have less in the way of accumulated wealth,  
• they need the money for their own businesses and  
• there are some tax advantages in doing so.  
They may, but this is unclear, also save in order to leave money to their children.  
People may also shift their savings between cash deposits, real assets - largely property, 
long term fixed interest stock and equities. These shifts will depend partly on inflationary 
expectations and legislation. 
People also save, through retirement funds of various types or directly, for retirement. 
This aspect at least, we can model, as we can project the amounts people will require for 
their retirement with some accuracy. Some of the impetus for the higher share prices of 
the last decade appears to come from this source.7 
3.3 Supply 
The supply of equities will come from new issues of equity, which in turn will depend on 
matters such as technology, economic growth, labour scarcity, tax and politics (especially 
privatization or nationalization) and the internal politics of family businesses. Changes to 
these factors are largely unpredictable. Sales may also occur for reasons such as death 
duties and retirement expenses, which can be modeled.  
Even if we could model the factors that underlie the demand and supply curves, they 
appear to be greatly influenced by changing perceptions, and it is unlikely that we should 
                                                     
7
 See Poterba, J (2004) The Impact of Population Aging on Financial Markets NBER Working Papers 
10851, National Bureau of Economic Research (http://www.nber.org/papers/w10851.pdf)  
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find any stable relationship to convert them into prices. I like the description of these 
curves as "a mere smudge, to which it is vain to attribute elegant geometrical 
properties"8.  
3.4 Underlying profitability 
The other major influence on share prices will be the underlying profitability of the 
companies that have issued the shares. This in turn will also depend, but in different 
ways on technology, economic growth, international trade, legislation, taxation, the 
relative scarcity of capital, and the quality of management. All these relationships are 
unstable.  
This is however not to say that there is no measure of determining a reasonable long-term 
value for a share. The net asset value (NAV) is not commonly used to price shares, but is 
useful in providing two (albeit approximate) views of a company's worth. Firstly, if a 
competitor were to start up from scratch, it would seem that it would have to invest in 
similar equipment and make similar profits and losses to get to where the company now 
is. If so, it would have the same net asset value. Of course, inflation distorts this figure, 
and there are intangible items that enhance a company's future earning capacity: 
particularly intellectual property such as patents and reputation. On the other hand, 
newcomers to an industry can avoid the mistakes of the incumbent and focus on its more 
profitable markets. The point is that more newcomers will be encouraged into an industry 
as the ratio of price to net asset value increase. This ultimately brings share prices down 
towards NAV.  
Secondly, the NAV also provides an estimate of the break up value of the company, or of 
its value if it were run down. Again, many adjustments would need to be made. This 
second argument is of importance when share prices are too low and asset strippers can 
buy up the shares and make a profit by selling off the assets.  
In the economics literature, Tobin's Q - the ratio of share price to net asset value - has 
been used as a measure of the size of the share bubble9 as well as a measure of the 
                                                     
8
 This is vintage Joan Robinson - a prolific Cambridge economist who died in 1983 – but I have lost the 
precise reference. 
Chapter 6: Relative performance of the CGF 
 
190 
company's success in achieving a competitive advantage - or as a measure of lack of 
competition10.  
An alternative measure of the underlying value of a share is to discount future dividends 
at a suitable interest rate. The total return to an investor is given by the dividends and the 
capital growth. If dividend yields remain constant or fluctuate in a narrow band, the total 
return is entirely dependent on the dividends as the capital growth is equal to the rate of 
dividend growth. Actuarial models built by Wilkie (1995) for other countries, and by 
Thomson (1996) for South Africa, use mean reverting dividend yields to model 
investment returns. 
The discounting of dividend yields becomes a less valuable estimator of a shares value if 
companies do not pay out a consistent proportion of the profits as dividends. It appears 
that one of the Miller Modigliani (1961) propositions - that suggests that investors would 
be happy to see management keep the dividends if the resultant increase in share price is 
greater than the value of the dividend - is relatively widely accepted, and has lead around 
the world to a fall in dividend yields. This has been exacerbated in South Africa since 
secondary tax on companies has penalised companies for paying dividends.  
The difficulties with these methods lead to the most popular measure of a share's value, 
which is the ratio of market price to reported earnings per share. It is normally used as a 
simple rule of thumb to determine value relative to the whole market. A more rigorous 
approach would require the earnings to be discounted, as with dividends. Allowance 
again has to be made for inflation and the need to retain profits to fund growth.  
3.5 Individual share prices 
3.5.1 Fundamentals and perceptions 
The movement of the share prices of individual companies, relative to the average, will 
depend primarily on the underlying profitability of the company relative to others – 
                                                                                                                                                 
9
 In an unpublished paper, Harney, M and E Tower, 2002 Rational Pessimism: Predicting Equity Returns 
using Tobin’s Q and Price/Earnings Ratios http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/Other/Tower/Pessimism.pdf, 
finds that Tobin’s Q provides a good indicator of future investment returns. See also Smithers and Wright 
(2000) which they quote. 
10
 Lindenberg and Ross (1981)  
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rather than on overall supply and demand factors. In the short run perceptions of its 
relative future are important as are temporary pressures of demand and supply. For 
example, it is common to speak of an “overhang” of shares such as followed the 
demutualisation of the largest SA life assurers, which depressed their price for some 
time. The relative underlying profitability will depend on a number of factors. 
3.5.2 Sector 
Profitability will depend in many ways on the industry in which a company competes.  
• It is probable that the demand for the products produced by companies operating in 
the same industry will be correlated, whether changes arise from demographics, 
technology or politics.  
• In the same way, the supply of goods offered by competitors affects all companies 
within a sector. 
• Similarly, companies within a sector are likely to find their costs of production are 
related, whether because of changes in technology or the costs of inputs. 
Sectors can be measured, as most stock exchanges allocate companies to their 
appropriate sectors, but classifications change over time. Data on the rest of the factors 
mentioned below is only obtainable from the company with some difficulty.  
3.5.3 Financial structure 
While companies in the same sector may tend to have a similar financial structure, 
factors other than industry may apply. Growing or family controlled businesses, for 
instance, may use greater debt. Different managements may also take a different view on 
future interest rates – or differently hedge against price movements in their revenues or 
expenses. The most important of the implications of different financial structures are 
different exposures to interest rate, currency and commodity fluctuations.  
3.5.4 Markets 
Even within the same industry, companies develop different niche markets, where they 
may have a more appropriate product, stronger distribution or are better known. Thus, 
companies may be affected differently by demographic and economic changes – 
especially to exchange rates if they operate in different currency areas. 
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3.5.5 Production 
Companies within the same industry may also use different technologies. This may lead, 
for instance, to greater exposure to changes in wage levels or to the development of 
different patents. 
3.5.6 Staff and systems 
In spite of the importance of the financial and material assets of a company, or its market 
strength, it is widely recognised that profits may well depend more on the skills, abilities 
and motivation of the management and staff, and on formal and informal institutional 
arrangements within the company.  
3.6 Perceptions 
It is clear from the above, that each of these headings hides a multitude of other factors, 
and that it is impossible to accurately model the future relative profitability of any 
company. The share price also therefore depends on the perceptions of those stock 
market participants who might consider buying or selling it.  
Perceptions are influenced by the perceptions of others. One readily observable result is 
the herding of investors into observable fashions. Two often mentioned are the 
alternating attractions between large and small companies and between growth and value 
shares.  
Differences in perception are perhaps indistinguishable from differences in the skill of 
investors or their mangers in understanding likely changes in share prices. The returns 
earned by different investors will differ randomly; it may be that more skilled investors 
can expect to earn a higher return. 
3.7 Efficient market hypothesis 
Readers may be struck by the difference between this discussion and a common 
assumption that share markets are efficient: market participants price all assets (and 
liabilities) such that the expected risk adjusted rate of return is equal. There are some 
differences as to how the adjustment for risk is made. Many, such as Malkiel (2005), will 
argue – in his case from that the fact that professional investment managers do not 
outperform the market averages - that there is good evidence of market efficiency in the 
USA over the past twenty years or more. 
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While it may be enormously difficult to outperform the market after fees, few would 
today argue that investment markets are always and everywhere efficient: recent research 
has found numerous pricing anomalies (inexplicable returns arise from such varying 
characteristics as market to book ratios and calendar months). Section 4 of Cantor and 
Sefton (2002) provides an overview of changes in the economic literature over the past 
two decades. In particular, one might expect markets with fewer participants, such as the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, to be less efficient. 
If markets are always efficient, participants will quickly adjust prices to reflect expected 
risk adjusted returns, and investors using social criteria will obtain the same return as 
everyone else. The question of relative investment performance only has meaning if 
markets are not perfectly efficient in adjusting for social criteria. Unsurprisingly 
therefore, Sauer (1997) finds that socially responsible investors will not have to 
“sacrifice investment performance” on the grounds that two socially responsible indices 
have not underperformed indices representing the whole market over a nine year period. 
This may not however always be true. 
4 SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AND SHARE PRICE 
4.1 Screening 
In the light of the above, this section looks at the affects that social criteria might have on 
share prices.  
Alperson (1991) traces socially responsible investment back to the 1920s with funds with 
a church connection prohibiting investments in “sin stocks”, mainly related to companies 
producing liquor and tobacco or involved in gambling. This screening approach has been 
extended to armament manufacturers, serious polluters, companies found offensive for a 
range of causes and the Sharia (Muslim) avoidance of companies charging interest. This 
is the basis for the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s Social Responsibility Index 
introduced in 200411. 
Another approach to screening is based on companies’ corporate governance structure. 
Although the underlying reason for such screening may be economic, the connection 
                                                     
11
 Details can be found at http://www.jse.co.za/sri/background_criteria/background_criteria.doc 
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does not detract from the ethical principles underlying good governance. A positive 
relationship has been found in a number of studies. One of the most extensive can be 
found in Gill (2001), who examines and ranks 495 companies in 25 emerging markets 
and shows strong correlations between corporate governance and share price 
performance. He finds performance in terms of both share price, and of underlying 
profitability measures, is related to his index of corporate governance and social criteria. 
The screening approach will affect the demand for a particular company’s share – and 
may alter the return. Temporary and permanent effects can be noted: 
• If the number of investors applying the screening is increasing, demand for an 
offensive share will decline as may its price – and vice versa. This is clearly a 
temporary phenomenon. 
• If large numbers of investors permanently avoid a particular company, then its 
price may well be permanently depressed – relative to its earnings. If the company 
survives, it will necessarily provide higher returns. Investors that ignore the moral 
stigma attached to such companies may be said to be beneficiaries of moral 
arbitrage. The reverse affect might conceivably apply to a company regarded as a 
moral exemplar. 
The CGF criteria do act as a screening device for shares. At first blush therefore, it would 
appear that the only possible long-term impact of the screening per se would be to reduce 
the performance of its investments. For the screening to increase performance, it would 
have to include factors that positively correlated with improved performance, and for the 
rest of the market to remain in ignorance of these factors. 
4.2 Active shareholding 
An alternative approach, referred to by Leeman (2002) as the overlay approach, is for 
shareholders to actively engage the companies in which they invest in order to influence 
management practices. The most prominent exponent of this approach is the Californian 
public pension system (Calpers), which has been prominent as a vocal shareholder. 
Although its portfolios are indexed, it takes an active interest in companies it feels are 
poorly managed, and Calpers (1995) reports significant improvements in management, 
and dramatic increases in share prices, as a result. 
The CGF also engages the managements of the companies in which it invests. This arises 
initially with the collection of data from management and union officials, which is often 
Chapter 6: Relative performance of the CGF 
 
195 
followed up by negotiations between Unity and the company. Although it has not been 
consistent, Unity also has a program of encouraging union members to attend AGM’s 
with CGF proxies, and of asking questions. The interaction with the company is, unlike 
the Calpers interaction, intended to improve the company’s social performance rather 
than its profits. It may however have other side effects. 
These interactions may achieve improved performance of management and staff, as 
mentioned in 3.5.6 above. The Calpers approach may also provide motivation to 
management to give better returns to shareholders. They may therefore create better 
returns by avoiding the mistakes and losses that can be caused by bad management.  
The CGF approach would be more indirect, and the results may well not always lead to 
better returns. Managers may, for instance, be reluctant to create jobs for a variety of 
reasons not related to profitability. One reason might be that the managers fail to 
distinguish between maximising the rate of return on capital and maximising shareholder 
returns.12 Pressure to create jobs may then lead to profitable new ventures or reductions 
in their required rates of return. Whether the latter will lead to an increase or reduction in 
profit depends however on the company’s cost of capital. 
The impacts of all the CGF’s social criteria are ambivalent in this way. They may well 
promote good management practices that will lead to higher profitability and reduce the 
risk of the company being subject to labour unrest and liability claims. On the other 
hand, they could be taken beyond the optimum level and lead to expenditure that does 
not provide a return to shareholders. 
It is highly unlikely that the same affects will be observable over many years. Even if it 
were possible for good managers to achieve a balance between the social criteria and 
returns, the proportion of good and bad management in the market is bound to change, so 
changing relative performance. 
4.3 Profits and rent 
One can distinguish between legitimate profits earned by shareholders for providing 
capital at some risk to themselves, and monopoly rents extracted from other stakeholders 
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 Chew (1998) reports a panel discussion, where ten senior business people and academics make these 
assertions on pages 165-188. 
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because of a company’s stronger market position. In Asher (1998), it is suggested that the 
latter is morally reprehensible.  
The impact of rents on share price movements would be similar to the points raised in 
section 4.1 above.  
• An increase in rents would see a temporary increase in share prices, and vice 
versa. 
• To the extent that the market permanently saw rents as reprehensible, or risky, 
moral arbitrage could lead to higher profits from monopolist firms. 
4.4 Fiduciary duties 
Given that the CGF is intended as a vehicle for retirement fund investment, the 
management would have to conform to the fiduciary duties expected of fund trustees. A 
conservative view was set out as in the Megarry judgment: 
 "To do the best they can for the beneficiaries ... and ... take advantage of the full 
range of investments authorized, rather than narrowing that range, and ... (trustees are) 
required to consider the need for diversification of the trust investments 
 ... Accordingly, trustees of a pension fund could not refuse for social or political 
reasons to make a particular investment if to make that investment would be more 
beneficial to the beneficiaries of the fund." 13 
Yaron (2001) summarises the objections to this narrow view, and suggests various 
defences of socially desirable investment, even if it does reduce investment returns.  
• The retirement fund rules may permit the use of social criteria. 
• To the extent that the additional profits arise from moral arbitrage, this it would 
seem within the rights of the trustees to refuse such profits if their view is shared 
by the majority of beneficiaries.  
                                                     
13
 Cowan and others v Scargill and others [1984] 2 All ER 750, where the British Coal Board as employer 
prevented the trustees of their pension fund from using non-investment criteria in asset selection. In this case, 
the criteria were relatively eccentric. Apart from not wanting to invest in any company investing outside the 
UK, they also wanted to avoid energy sources competing with coal. Yaron (2001) also points out that the 
union appointed chairman of the trustees personally argued the case so depriving the judge of more nuanced 
legal debate.  
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• A more common view of trust law is that trustees should aim for a reasonable rate 
of return; it is not necessary to aim at the maximization of risk adjusted returns. 
To the extent that social criteria do not reduce returns, and within these constraints if 
they do, there is plenty of room to apply social criteria.  
4.5 Truth, good governance and creativity  
Most of the reasoning above led to the expectation that socially desirable investment is 
likely to under perform, if anything, over the long term. If permanent sources of 
outperformance are to be found, one would have to have to look for entrenched 
behaviour by the managers of those companies that fail the social criteria. One such 
possibility is that the single minded pursuit of shareholder profit so alienates their other 
stakeholders as to reduce their ultimate profitability.  
The issue can be seen as one of justice, the virtue that governs the use of power: in this 
case that of shareholders over other stakeholders. As Lucas (1980) puts it: 
 "Justice is the bond of society... We have been pursuing the wrong political goals - 
productivity, efficiency, equality - and have neglected the cardinal political virtue of 
justice, which, together with liberty, is the condition under which I and every man can 
identify with society, feel at one with it, and accept its rulings as my own."  
It might be put that the human rewards of working for a company that adequately cared 
for all its stakeholders would unleash creativity that overflowed into greater profits for 
shareholders. Cynically, this could be phrased that the fulfilling of social criteria enabled 
shareholders to better motivate staff. 
In either case, the boot is on the other foot. It is not those trustees that adopt social 
criteria that fail in their fiduciary duty, but those who place their funds’ returns at risk.  
5 MEASUREMENT 
5.1 Earlier studies  
From the above, it is clear that there are many influences on share prices, and that the 
affects of social criteria are at best going to be small, and may well be transitory. 
Measuring relative performance may however offer some insight into investment 
markets, company profitability and the importance of corporate governance. From a 
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fiduciary perspective, it was important to have some confidence that performance was 
not significantly affected adversely; from a marketing perspective useful to know if 
performance was positively affected. Two relatively informal studies examined relative 
performance in the mid-nineties.  
Abdulla (1993) studied the relative performance of the 21 shares approved and the 10 
shares rejected by Unity, against various benchmarks over a 5 year period ending 31 
December 1992. He found that the approved share outperformed the rejected shares by 
an average of 8% annually over the period. It would appear that the outperformance was 
statistically significant. 14 
Asher (1994) looked at a similar time period a little more closely by distinguishing 
between shares in different sectors. This was to remove the influence of sector on share 
price - discussed in 3.5.2 above. In 1993, the difference in the annual percentage increase 
in share price between accepted and rejected shares by sector is shown in table 2.  
Again, the results can be 
argued to be statistically 
significant (less than one 
chance in 16 of 
outperforming in all four 
sectors). 
 
5.2 Present study 
This study looks at the relative performance of the data of 54 companies for which 
evaluations on the new (post-1996) social criteria could be found in the Unity 
                                                     
14
 First Bowring Consulting and Actuarial Services, 1991 Survey of Investment Performance of Investment 
Managers, Unpublished reported that the standard deviation of the average returns of 17 asset managers over 
5 years to December 1991 was 2,5% p.a.. Although the periods are not identical, an 8% would be statistically 
significant. 
Table 2: Outperformance of approved shares 
Sector % 
Gold  63 
Industrial  31 
Engineering  26 
Hotels  10 
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Corporation offices. To these were added 7 additional companies that had been rejected15 
although reports were not available. 
The relative performance was calculated as the total return on each share less the average 
return for its sector. Share and sector prices and dividend information was obtained for 
the years 1998 to 2001 inclusive. The relative performance in each year was calculated, 
and then averaged for each share.  
Only 38 companies had been listed for the whole 4 year period. The relative performance 
for the other companies was averaged for the period over which they had been listed. 
There were 45 data points for calendar 1998, 48 for 1999 and 55 from the last two years. 
It is not thought that this distorts the results significantly. 
Table 3: Relative outperformance – 1998 to 2001 
A rated – accepted 6% 
B rated – pending further investigation -1% 
C rated – rejected 2% 
 
The pattern of the earlier investigations is shown in table 3, and is confirmed.  
The differences are impressive, but not significant statistically. There is a probability of 
almost 30% that these differences are the result of random or other unobserved affects. 
5.3 Further analysis 
The correlation matrix for the 54 companies with social criteria data was calculated – and 
shown in appendix 1. The most significant was the positive relationship that between job 
creation and conditions of employment. Interestingly this relationship did not appear to 
be related to sector: financial companies in particular appeared in both extremes. It 
seemed to have no significance for performance. 
                                                     
15
 These have been obtained from the Unity board minutes of 3 March 1997, updated by reports the quarterly 
“CGF Report” (until December 1998) and “Community Investment Update” (subsequently), sent to 
unitholders. 
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5.4 Empowerment 
Empowerment had a positive correlation with all of the other social variables – 
statistically significant in 4 of the 7 cases. This is hardly surprising given that the 
questions in this category are heavily weighted to relationships with the unions, as are 
questions in each of the other categories. 
Only 5 of the 30 points in this section relate to the form of black empowerment popular 
from 1994 to 1998, when individual black people were first given soft finance to take 
significant shareholdings in relatively small companies. Shares in these companies 
experienced something of a bubble, which was not entirely past at the beginning of the 
period of this investigation. The impression of the author, when he attended meetings of 
the Unity board, was that the evaluation of black empowerment companies was initially 
less critical than those of other companies.  
In order to test this possibility, the five approved black empowerment companies 
(defined by their shareholders) were separately examined. Their average relative return 
over the period was very low (-14%) given the ending of the bubble. This was not 
statistically significant (17% chance of error), but sufficiently large to consider excluding 
them from the sample. Doing this increased the outperformance of the A rated companies 
from 6% to 9%. The probability that this outperformance is random reduces to 13%. 
5.5 Regression on all data 
It was assumed that relationships, if they existed, would be more or less linear. A linear 
regression using the relative returns as the dependent variable, and the social scores as 
the independent variables was therefore performed. The procedure used was to see the 
effect of using all the variables, and then progressively eliminating the least significant 
variables until the remaining variables are significant at least at the 10% level. The 
results using all the data proved fruitless: no variable were ever found statistically 
significant even at this level of significance.  
5.6 Regression excluding black empowerment companies 
The analysis was repeated excluding the black empowerment companies. The results did 
achieve a significant result for affirmative action. Appendix 2 shows details of the 
regression.  The points allocated for affirmative action were largely from objective 
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comparisons of the level of black people and women in higher levels of management. 
This is information not widely available, so that outperformance from this source should 
not relate much to perceptions but to real underlying causes. Two possibilities are that 
high scores on this dimension relate to companies with good personnel practice, and that 
the promotion of blacks and women led to greater profitability for the company because 
their skills had previously been unrecognised.  
5.7 Regression excluding other outliers 
The plot of the residuals in appendix 2 shows that the model fails to predict 
outperformance of up to 100% (1 on the vertical axis).16 The reasons are relatively easy 
to explain when one examines the data, which are set out in appendix 4. There are a few 
companies that have very large outperformances – of up to 103%. The reasons for this 
outperformance are not likely to relate to the social criteria. A particular problem with 
methods of linear regression is that extreme outliers of this nature can completely change 
the relationships between variables. 
Two further progressive regressions were therefore performed. The first restricted the 
outperformance to a maximum of 50%, and a minimum of -30%. It produced very similar 
results to that of appendix 2. Corporate governance however came close to statistical 
significance as positively correlated with increasing performance.  
The second approach was to exclude these extreme companies altogether. The results are 
shown in appendix 3. Surprisingly, but not unknown with regressions, affirmative action 
is no longer significant, but corporate governance and job creation become significant.  
Unfortunately, job creation has a negative correlation with performance. Given the large 
number of job losses within the SA economy over the nineties, it suggests that companies 
that have responded most quickly to the technological changes at the root of these 
changes have been more profitable. If so, given the enormous social costs of the losses, it 
is to be fervently hoped that this situation come to a speedy end. 
                                                     
16
 Residuals refer to results - outperformance in this case - that the regression model fails to explain. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The social criteria adopted by the CGF have, if anything, enhanced its investment 
performance over the years. It appears that three of the criteria have been important. 
Affirmative action, which relates mainly to the number of blacks and women in senior 
positions, and good corporate governance were seen to have a positive effect. Job 
creation, under which heading is included general business expansion in SA as opposed 
to internationally, was unfortunately found to have a negative impact.  
The discussion of the process of share price determination in this paper suggests that, 
with the possible exception of corporate governance which could have an ongoing effect 
on company profitability, social criteria are likely to have small and transitory affects on 
investment performance. 
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APPENDIX 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN VARIABLES 
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Average 1,00         
JOB CREATION 0,03 1,00        
TRAINING 0,13 0,21 1,00       
EMPOWERMENT 0,13 0,22 0,38 1,00      
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 0,20 -0,19 -0,07 0,29 1,00     
CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
0,03 0,71 0,44 0,37 0,06 1,00    
ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRACTICE 
-0,12 0,05 0,30 0,27 -0,22 0,25 1,00   
HEALTH & SAFETY -0,08 0,05 -0,17 0,44 0,32 0,15 0,27 1,00  
CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
0,21 0,04 -0,03 0,34 0,20 -0,13 0,09 0,21 1,00 
 
Significant values are shown in bold. 
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APPENDIX 2: REGRESSION EXCLUDING BLACK EMPOWERMENT 
COMPANIES 
SUMMARY OUTPUT   
 
Regression Statistics    
Multiple R 0,286976    
R Square 0,082355    
Adjusted R Square 0,062407    
Standard Error 0,312728    
Observations 48    
     
ANOVA     
  df SS MS F 
Regression 1 0,403747 0,403747 4,128342 
Residual 46 4,498743 0,097799  
Total 47 4,90249   
     
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -0,42576 0,243378 -1,74938 0,086896 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 0,008775 0,004319 2,031832 0,04797 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION  Residual Plot
-1
0
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Re
s
id
u
al
s
 
Chapter 6: Relative performance of the CGF 
 
207 
APPENDIX 3: REGRESSION EXCLUDING BLACK EMPOWERMENT 
COMPANIES AND OUTLIERS 
SUMMARY OUTPUT    
Regression Statistics 
    
Multiple R 0,406955     
R Square 0,165612     
Adjusted R Square 0,118577     
Standard Error 0,161076     
Observations 41     
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 0,20084 0,10042 3,870425 0,029519 
Residual 39 1,011875 0,025946   
Total 41 1,212716    
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 0 N/A N/A N/A  
JOB CREATION -0,00496 0,001837 -2,69749 0,010267  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 0,005214 0,00185 2,819276 0,007525  
JO B CREATIO N  Residual P lot
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APPENDIX 4: BASIC DATA 
COMPANY 
Relativ
e return 
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AVERAG
E
 
STATUS
 
ADvTECH GROUP LTD -3% 68 67 65 45 67 66 67 62 63 A 
AFRICAN MEDIA  -32% 10 43 50 76 31 56 65 77 51 B 
ALACRITY FIN SERVICES -21% 65 67 65 47 63 61 52 65 61 A 
ANGLOPLAT 0%          C 
ANGLOVAAL INDUSTRIES  80% 56 61 63 61 66 67 59 64 62 A 
APLITEC: NET 1 APP TECH  103% 60 65 60 62 64 65 50 66 61 A 
AVIS SOUTH AFRICA -25% 62 60 61 46 58 64 53 65 59 B 
BARLO WORLD  22% 50 78 86 51 72 93 59 78 71 A+ 
BARPLATS 19% 75 53 55 49 67 61 52 58 59 B 
BIDVEST 7% 65 67 65 47 66 61 53 54 60 B 
BoE  -7% 67 64 68 67 66 61 65 67 66 A 
CARSON HOLDINGS -19% 76 65 76 67 74 85 78 65 73 A 
CASHBUILD  92% 70 70 76 60 68 68 70 70 69 A 
CERAMIC INDUSTRIES 20% 59 63 63 50 67 59 47 69 60 B 
CLIENTELE LIFE -1% 65 67 57 47 65 67 65 60 62 A 
DEL MONTE ROYAL 30% 65 67 71 64 61 62 56 63 64 A 
DISCOVERY HOLDINGS  -16% 70 68 67 46 68 65 60 58 63 A 
ENERGY AFRICA 86% 63 75 69 70 72 43 53 65 64 A 
ENVIROSERV HDGS  -35% 50 54 66 56 60 67 64 72 61 A 
FEDSURE -40% 60 60 71 55 67 63 55 63 62 A 
FIRSTRAND  -2% 62 67 67 69 69 61 68 70 67 A 
FRASER ALEXANDER -28%          C 
GENSEC -8% 93 72 43 24 70 75 33 73 60 A 
GREENWICH GROUP  -46% 67 65 55 50 70 60 58 57 60 A 
HIGHVELD -10% 72 72 55 45 64 65 40 65 59 B 
ILLOVO -5% 60 66 74 65 67 65 60 66 65 A 
ISCOR  11% 51 59 57 45 57 60 50 53 54 C 
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L A RETAIL STORES -8% 65 60 67 59 59 60 51 59 60 A 
LIBERTY GROUP -13% 70 72 74 68 75 60 60 68 68 A 
LIBERTY LIFE -18% 59 65 67 50 60 60 51 60 59 B 
MASSMART 27% 58 56 66 78 73 61 59 56 63 A 
MED CLINIC 0%          C 
MERCANTILE LISBON BANK -52% 57 62 58 45 67 68 60 60 60 B 
METRO CASH & CARRY  17% 71 72 59 61 69 60 60 70 65 A 
M-NET 12%          C 
MUTUAL&FEDERAL INS -3% 62 65 55 69 65 62 64 64 63 A 
NANDOS 8%          C 
NEW CLICKS HOLDINGS 21% 50 45 45 52 50 54 55 81 54 B 
NORTHAM PLATINUM  4% 70 61 64 54 60 60 68 65 63 A 
NU-WORLD HOLDINGS -31% 60 78 55 50 78 62 45 24 57 B 
OCEANA FISHING 22% 78 61 83 35 64 75 64 73 67 A 
OLD MUTUAL GROUP  5% 26 74 55 53 41 75 45 63 54 B 
OMNIA HOLDINGS  -17% 50 45 46 40 55 61 60 43 50 B 
POLIFIN 28% 65 65 67 50 60 62 50 65 61 A 
PPC -5% 61 72 70 62 72 96 73 62 71 A+ 
PRISM HOLDINGS  -5% 63 60 66 68 66 61 52 60 62 A 
PRIVEST GROUP  -25% 75 65 67 42 70 65 60 64 64 A 
RAINBOW 42% 56 59 60 52 57 60 55 60 57 B 
RELYANT -48%          C 
RENTSURE HOLDINGS -27% 63 60 72 49 65 69 70 62 64 A 
REUNERT 49%          C 
REX TRUEFORM  -6% 38 60 38 43 57 75 45 38 49 C 
SAAMBOU  -19% 65 65 67 65 67 61 53 63 63 A 
SAGE LIFE  -15% 80 58 62 68 75 64 55 55 65 A 
SANLAM 7% 45 64 62 47 63 67 60 61 59 B 
SANTAM 11% 58 59 65 50 58 60 51 61 58 B 
SEARDEL INV COR 0% 63 56 69 63 63 61 59 57 61 A 
STANDARD BANK GROUP  8% 54 71 74 68 75 70 47 76 67 A 
SUN INTERNATIONAL (SISA)  17% 45 72 60 60 47 50 41 60 54 B 
THE HOUSE OF BUSBY  -1% 70 55 68 70 60 60 60 70 64 A 
WETHERLYS INVESTMENT 21% 76 48 43 57 70 60 52 63 59 B 
  
CHAPTER 7 - MEAN REVERSION IN INVESTMENT 
MARKETS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS AND 
REGULATORS  
 
Forthcoming in the Australian Actuarial Journal  
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper attempts to outline what is known about mean reversion in investment 
markets, and to explore the implications for the regulation of money purchase 
superannuation funds in Australia. Australian superannuation fund members now have, 
in the main, choice of both fund and investment mix. As members of accumulation funds, 
their retirement income depends significantly on how they exercise their investment 
choices.  
While there is a plethora of advice available on investment choice, there is limited 
agreement - even between experts - on many basic facts. There are, however, a few clear 
principles that bear repetition and expansion: diversification, expense management, 
fundamental analysis and - in the light of the mean reversion discussed at length in this 
paper – avoiding panic. These principles are not unknown, and are captured in some 
popular books such Bernstein (2002), but they are not universally accepted and still need 
explanation and defence.  
In section two this paper quickly summarises the debate between efficient market theory 
and behavioural finance. Section three is a more detailed consideration of research into 
mean reversion, the results of which support a time varying equity risk premium and non-
linear reversion to a mean range rather than a point. Together they make the case for 
fundamental analysis, which is discussed in section four as part of a rehearsal of 
investment theory. The section also discusses recent theoretical and market developments 
that take members’ age into account. These developments are found to fall short in their 
consideration of housing, expenses over the life-span and mean reversion. Section five 
considers regulation and recommends some changes.  
In reviewing the literature, an attempt has been made to focus on more influential papers, 
but the field is too broad to have confidence that everything has been covered. Writing 
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ten years ago, Campbell et al (1997) mention the impossibility of covering all the papers 
that had then investigated the efficiency of markets, let alone the other subjects covered 
in this paper.  
2 HOW INVESTMENT MARKETS WORK 
A full discussion of investment market functioning must include the theories of market 
efficiency and behavioural finance, with perhaps a mention of econo-physics and 
evolutionary finance as interesting alternative approaches. Such discussion can, however, 
be made difficult by dogmatic arguments. Arnott (2004), in a Financial Analysts Journal 
editorial, makes the point that: “much of our industry works on dogma. And much of that 
dogma is based on sound economic theory. But theory is only theory: it tells us what 
should happen, not necessarily what does happen.” 
2.1 Market efficiency  
Belief in market efficiency is one piece of dogma that may be a source of poor advice.  
2.1.1 Markets are not perfectly efficient 
It is clear that even the large US share market is not perfectly efficient. This is recognised 
by the wiser proponents of the theory, such as Ball (1995), who merely asserts that it is a 
reasonable a priori assumption that deep and liquid markets with low barriers to entry 
should be efficient. He mentions a number of anomalies that have not been explained. Of 
particular interest are: 
• Shorter term under-reaction to news that rewards momentum strategies. 
• Subsequent price over-reactions and then longer term corrections that reward 
contrarian investment strategies. 
• The weak correlation of observed betas124 - and the stronger correlation of smaller 
capitalization, lower market to book ratios, and higher dividend yields - with 
higher returns on individual shares. 
                                                    
124
 Correlation of individual shares with stock market indices that should in terms of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model explain returns. 
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• Various seasonal patterns of hourly, daily, monthly and quarterly prices. He does 
not mention the even longer four year cycle, which Nickles (2004) shows to 
coincide with US presidential elections since the early fifties.  
2.1.2 The impossibility of perfect efficiency 
Occasional inefficiencies in markets are partly explained in a widely referenced article 
by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who prove the impossibility of completely efficient 
markets. There must be enough inefficiency in market prices to make it worthwhile for 
traders and arbitrageurs to operate. Anomalies in relative value occur if there are 
insufficient numbers of active investors. The profit these investors make keeps them in 
business, but there is no assurance that they will be uniformly successful.  
One implication is that anomalies are not likely to persist for long. They will emerge, 
become subject to exploitation by traders and arbitrageurs and then may disappear only 
to reappear some time later. Another implication is that at least some people must believe 
that it is possible to make trading or arbitrage profits for markets to be efficient. As a 
dogma, the efficiency of markets is self-defeating. The more it is believed, the more 
money will be lost. 
In spite of this, market efficiency is widely taught in university courses and used as a 
useful, if not always challenged, assumption on which to base models for asset prices. 
Welch (2000) asked a sample of over 100 financial and economics professors whether 
they believed in the efficiency of markets or not. Over 90% believed that equity markets 
were efficient and followed random walks in the short run. Fewer than half thought that 
markets showed negative auto-correlation over a three to five year horizon and that the 
value of the equity risk premium changed over time. Most appeared unworried by the 
anomalies mentioned above. 
2.1.3 But one cannot beat the market 
A lack of efficiency means that it is possible to profit if there is an element of luck 
(arising from the absence of traders and arbitrageurs) to supplement good judgment. 
Whether the investment performance of managers persists over time has been intensively 
researched. Carhart’s (1997) findings remain largely unchallenged. There is, at best, 
weak evidence of persistent superior performance arising from funds that seem able to 
quickly capture new evidence in the market, or better interpret current information. There 
is however much stronger evidence of persistent underperformance. Part of the 
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underperformance can be explained by excessive trading; the rest must come from the 
purchase or sale of investments at uneconomic prices. One possibility is that managers 
are trading at an uneconomic price for some personal benefit at the expense of the 
members. Another is that they have failed to consider the fundamental value of the assets 
that they are trading.  
There is also evidence that recognisable groups of individuals perform significantly 
worse than average. Barber and Odean (2000 and 2001), for instance, describe a group of 
individual investors that lose by trading too often: they buy shares that subsequently do 
worse than average and sell shares that do better, and also waste significant amounts on 
brokerage. The problem is more acute for males and the unmarried.  
2.2 Behavioural finance and bounded rationality 
If markets were efficient, they would have to be dominated by rational investors (or 
sellers of assets). Behavioural finance is based on the view that investors are not only 
ignorant about the future but not entirely rational in their processing of relevant 
information, or at least as Simon (1983) puts it, they use bounded rationality.  
2.2.1 Credulity 
Daniel et al (2002) provide a detailed review of behavioural theories of pricing. They 
suggest that investor credulity lies at the root of the anomalies in efficient markets. They 
further explain credulity mainly in terms of “limited attention” and over-optimism, both 
widely attested in the psychological literature and every day experience. (In more recent 
work on over-optimism, however, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) find that it is limited to 
tasks that are perceived as relatively easy. People can become excessively pessimistic 
when faced with more difficult tasks.)  
The limited attention and processing power of investors is used by Daniel et al to explain 
the under-reaction of share prices to news, the persistence of arbitrage opportunities in 
markets with fewer participants and the greater returns from smaller capitalization stocks 
with a limited following of analysts. It can also explain herd behaviour if investors place 
too much weight on information that comes from other market participants, and not 
enough on their other sources of information.  
Over-optimism could explain some of the excesses of price momentum before it reverts, 
and may explain some of the relative failure of growth and high market to book 
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strategies. Companies in these categories may well perform better than others, but 
relative underperformance arises because they do not do as well as expected, perhaps by 
management and analysts. Daniel et al also report on research that suggests that investors 
are more credulous about intangible information than accounting data. It may be that 
these anomalies are also better explained by limited attention than over-optimism. 
Cooper et al (2004) confirm overreaction theories of short-run momentum and long-run 
reversal. They also find that momentum profits depend on the state of the market and that 
up-market momentum reverses in the long-run, which is consistent with over-optimism.  
2.2.2 Under-reaction 
Under-reaction to announcements and subsequent momentum over a period of months 
represents perhaps the most potent evidence of inefficiency in markets: prices do not 
reflect all publicly available information. Ball (1995) argues that the over-reaction is 
smaller than might be expected: markets are almost efficient. Other attempts have been 
made to explain the anomaly. Lewellen (2002), for instance, suggests that it can be 
explained by the correlation structure of markets, but the response by Chen and Hong 
(2002) shows that his arguments are not valid.  
Over-optimism may have a role in this under-reaction. Schwartz and Steil (2002) report 
that investment managers often appear to think that their competitive advantage lies more 
in their alternative interpretations of the same information, rather than quickly absorbing 
new information. Anecdotally, this view arises from the mistaken belief that the market is 
always efficient in processing information. It may lead managers to neglect the 
importance of quickly processing new information. 
2.2.3 Defences of rationality 
In the face of the behavioural critique, there have been a number of attempts to explain 
the anomalies and defend investor rationality, but none appear - at this point - to be 
entirely successful. Brav and Heaton (2002) suggest that rather than see market 
anomalies as irrational, they could be explained in terms of the rational Bayesian 
adaptation of new information into a priori knowledge. Aloysius (2005) uses similar 
arguments to distinguish stochastic from model risks and to suggest that “ambiguity 
aversion” explains the equity risk premium puzzle. Ball (1995) suggests that the 
alternative behavioural theories are too disparate and the patterns too transient to provide 
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an alternative. In one sense he appears to be right: behavioural explanations do find 
patterns in the statistical noise in sequences of prices, but they do not seem sufficiently 
predictable to exploit. 
2.2.4 Relevance of irrationality 
That brings the discussion to the relevance of behavioural finance to investment practice.  
It does not justify communal or government setting of prices. Daniel et al (2002) note 
that the proponents of the efficient market theory make their arguments as a defence 
against government intervention. Daniel et al make the point that this is a brittle and 
unnecessary defence line. If market participants can be irrational, so can government 
officials. Government intervention in the mechanism of price formation is not justified 
by market irrationality.  
The irrationality of some market participants represents both a threat and an opportunity 
to rational investors. Irrational noise interferes with the pricing mechanism, and means 
that rational investors – if forced to liquidate assets at an unfavourable time – will lose 
money. This applies even more strongly to rational investment managers who may lose 
mandates to less rational competitors when prices are out of line with fundamental value. 
To the extent that rational investors and investment managers are able to buy when assets 
are irrationally cheap and sell when they are irrationally dear, there are profits to be 
made. 
One of the major and avoidable risks to uninformed superannuation members is that they 
will credulously accept the recommendation of over-optimistic managers and irrational 
analysts and advisors, and sell cheap and buy dear.  
2.2.5 Other theories 
Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2005) describe the theory of evolutionary finance, which 
considers the evolution of markets and the adaptation and survival of investment 
strategies in a manner analogous to the adaptation and survival of biological species. 
Empirical observation includes the strategies of investors, and not just the pricing 
patterns that make up the stuff of technical research and underlie the theories of efficient 
markets and behavioural finance. Econo-physics, as for instance described in Ball (2004), 
similarly describe the functions of markets rather than prices.  
Chapter 7: Choosing investments 
 
216 
 
Both do offer useful insights into the working of markets and the formation of prices.  
3 MEAN REVERSION 
While the insights of the efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance are 
frequently incorporated into investment advice, the same does not seem to be true of 
what is known about mean reversion.  
This section therefore looks in some detail at the results of academic research into 
whether prices are a random walk or can be expected to revert in some way to some 
mean or fundamental value. Formula 1 states this more rigorously for xt the change in 
price to time t.   
t
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A trend stationary series of price changes would have non-zero values for µ0 and µ1; 
while a covariance stationary series would have non-zero values for some of the j’s. A 
value of  that differs from one means that the series is not stationary at all, but is mean 
reverting. Mean reversion thus means that the expected change in the price depends on 
the current price and can be expected to revert in some way to a longer term mean value. 
It is concluded below that there is significant theoretical and empirical evidence of non-
linear mean reversion from market extremes. The reversion is not likely to be to a point, 
but to some level within a range. Discussion begins with currency markets as they 
provide the necessary background to discuss mean reversion in other markets.  
3.1 Currency markets 
Identical commodities should sell at identical prices in different markets – after allowing 
for costs of transport. Rogoff (1996), in a valuable literature review, outlines a puzzle 
that – in the short run at least - they do not. In that paper, he suggests that while 
economists all believe that purchasing power parity (PPP) should hold in some form or 
other, it had taken some 400 years of research to find persuasive data to demonstrate that 
prices do tend to revert to the expected mean. The pace of reversion, which he set at 15% 
pa, is however sufficiently slow to represent a puzzle – even if “one confines attention to 
relatively homogenous classes of highly traded goods”. 
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There are obvious explanations. In the first place there are frictions: not just transport 
and other trading costs, but tariffs and other barriers to trade. There is also the likelihood 
that traders and arbitrageurs may not be able, or find it worthwhile, to respond to price 
differentials until they become relatively large. The idea can be expressed as a “band of 
inaction” around PPP, with mean reversion applying outside this band.  
There are a variety of models that have been tried to fit this pattern. In one of the more 
elegant Taylor et al (2001), confirmed and adapted by Paya et al (2003), use an 
exponential smooth transition auto-regression (ESTAR) model. A one period simplified 
model of their approach is given by formula 2: 
tt
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2
1
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where µ  represents a productivity adjusted purchasing power parity and t represents an 
error term. The exponential weight is limited to the range [0,1] to prevent it from 
blowing out. Their formula also allowed for a variety of lags over longer periods; the 
resultant fit for a range of European currencies and the US dollar over 22 years to May 
2001 suggests faster mean reversion than reported by Rogoff, especially for the larger 
shocks away from PPP. For a 10% shock, half lives (representing the time taken to move 
half way to a long term equilibrium) vary from 13 to 41 months; for a 40% shock the half 
lives vary from 1 to 17 months. The authors explain the differences in the parameters of 
the formula for different countries by differences in the ease of arbitrage. This, in turn, 
depends on geography and institutional structures (which would be taken to include 
culture).  
Amongst this literature, Taylor (2001) provides a useful analysis of two pitfalls in 
measuring mean reversion. The first is the problem of time averaging. He finds, for 
instance, that measuring currency rates or returns at monthly intervals will overstate the 
half life by some 50% if the true half-life is greater than a month, and by more if it is 
less. The second issue is that of non-linearity, which leads to increasing errors as the 
band of inaction widens. He uses what he calls the simplest, non-linear model where the 
reversion is linear outside the band of inaction. This “threshold autoregression” (TAR) 
requires estimates of the thresholds as well as of the parameters of the reversion.  
There is another independent strand of research into mean reversion and PPP sparked off 
by O'Connell (1998) who argued that the long term linear mean reversion was 
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“overvalued” because of cross-sectional dependence or collinearity. High inflation had 
simultaneously affected most of the countries in the samples and thus created spurious 
relationships. This strand ignores what would appear to be the superiority of the non-
linear tests, but the non-linear researchers, in turn, appear to ignore these other influences 
that should be considered in the modelling process. 
After referring to the non-linear developments, Taylor and Taylor (2004) say that “the 
idea of long-run PPP now enjoys perhaps its strongest support in more than thirty years, a 
distinct reversion in economic thought.” It certainly appears that recent research has 
resolved the puzzle of PPP. Small deviations from PPP present little in the way of 
profitable arbitrage opportunities, and can remain for some time. Large deviations from 
the productivity weighted PPP do, however, produce a speedy and measurable mean 
reversion. 
3.2 Interest rates 
Unlike PPP for currencies, there is no natural theoretical level to which interest rates can 
be expected to revert. There are however good theoretical reasons to expect the real rate 
of interest to be within a band of some -2% to perhaps 10%. Below rates of -2%, there 
will be opportunities for arbitrage as is it possible to hold cash if there is no inflation, or 
non-perishable goods if there is. If real interest rates were 10% in a developed economy 
(where the balance sheets of the banks exceed GDP and there are numerous other loans 
and rental on property to pay), total real interest and rent payments could account for 
20% of GDP. If half the people in a country are lenders and renters and the other half 
rentiers (who receive interest and rent), the borrowers will be paying an average of 40% 
of their gross incomes in interest and rent. While perhaps not impossible, it is difficult to 
envisage such a situation being sustainable. 
In the vast literature on interest rate modelling (most of which covers nominal interest 
rates), two strands can be examined briefly. One, such as Mankiw and Miron (1986) 
finds that there is insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis of a random walk. On the 
other hand, many interest rate models, such as Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersol and 
Ross (1985) assumed linear reversion to a mean. These models did not initially fit 
observed data well, but have been developed to fit more closely.  
Some subsequent work appears to have shown that the relationship is not linear. Jones 
(2003) shows that attempts to measure the parameters precisely are largely dependent on 
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the hypothesis being tested. He provides an interesting illustration of how results can 
differ widely depending on alternative Bayesian prior distributions. The problem arises 
from the paucity of data at extremes. One can believe that each extreme event is likely to 
be unique in its causes and the way in which markets return to normality. If so, it 
provides no evidence of future mean reversion.  
Kapetanios et al (2003) apply an ESTAR model to interest rates in the major OECD 
economies with success. Nominal interest rates too, therefore, appear to be mean 
reverting as they approach extreme values. There is less research on the real interest rate 
as determined by deducting inflationary expectations from nominal rates, but Lai (2004) 
finds evidence of mean reversion in the US. 
3.2.1 Term structure 
Seo (2003) finds a non-linear mean reversion in the term structure of interest rates using 
a TAR approach. He ascribes these plausibly to transaction costs, which prevent 
investors from realizing arbitrage opportunities. His adjustment coefficients which 
describe the mean reversion are regime-dependent125, which makes the model more 
complex. 
Chan and Cheung (2005) produce a TAR model of Australian long and short term 
interest rates with three regimes based on thresholds of the difference between the two 
rates. The model may well be over-parameterized, but has mean reverting properties.  
3.2.2 Credit risks 
Jarrow and Turnbull (2000) bring together default and market risks to model credit risks. 
They refer to the need, arising from banking regulation, to capture the risks of default, 
downgrade and spread. The first two are clearly related and are clearly cyclical. Collin-
Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) confirm that firms adjust their leverage over time to find 
an optimal level with the result that credit spreads are mean reverting. Prigent et al 
(2001) find evidence of non-linear mean reversion of the indices, as does Bhanot (2005), 
who confirms that survival bias does not change this result. 
                                                    
125
 The parameters of the model switch between different regimes (or states of the world) in a random fashion. 
Regime shifting models often fit the data well because of their fatter tails and ability to reflect clumps of 
increased volatility. 
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Some idea of the consensus view can be obtained by considering pro-cyclicality. This is 
the problem that backward looking, risk-based regulatory capital will rise after defaults 
and spreads increase, and then be too high for the improvement to come. Allen and 
Saunders (2004) survey the literature and say that they see a consensus on the basic idea 
of addressing pro-cyclicality, but little agreement on model and policy specifics. 
3.3 Inflation 
As with real interest rates, there is no obvious long term level for inflation and 
inflationary expectations, except perhaps the targets set from time to time by central 
banks. Given that explicit inflation targeting is relatively recent, there is not enough data 
to confidently test this possibility. There are reasons for believing that the inflation rate 
cannot fall much below zero – real interest rates would rise too high, and the 
redistribution between different groups of people become untenable. Inflation rates can 
however explode, as has been experienced too frequently.  
As with the other time series investigated, there are many independent strands of 
research on inflation. Much of the earlier economic work does not consider mean 
reversion at all, and where it does, only considers linear characterizations, which from 
the earlier discussion, are unlikely to be satisfactory. The few reported attempts that have 
tried non-linear models have been more successful. Baillie et al (1996) analyse monthly 
inflation for 10 different countries, and find strong evidence of long memory with mean 
reverting behaviour for all countries except Japan. Arghyrou et al (2004) try a variety of 
linear and non-linear models on UK inflation rates over the last third of the previous 
century. That they have attempted a number of models suggests that there is data 
snooping (so finding spurious relationships), and the large number of parameters that 
they use suggests some over-parameterization. In spite of this, their rejection the null 
hypothesis of a random walk for inflation appears plausible. 
3.4 Equity markets 
This brings us to the interesting question of whether there is a band of inaction for equity 
markets. As with PPP, there are a number of ways of modelling the “true” value of a 
share, with prices deviating from this value to the extent that the assumptions in the 
particular model do not hold.  
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One can make the assumption that all markets are competitive and free of trading or 
arbitrage opportunities. If the markets for every company’s products and its assets and 
liabilities were perfectly efficient, the mean value of a share would be the book value of 
the net tangible and intangible assets (adjusted appropriately for inflation). If the price 
were higher, an arbitrageur could raise capital for a new company of the same sort, buy 
the same assets and then sell the shares for a premium. If the price were lower, then the 
companies would not invest in replacement assets and would pay their entire cash flows 
back to their shareholders until the productive capacity in the market was sufficiently 
reduced.  
One can relax the assumption that the underlying markets are efficient, and consider the 
position if only the investment markets are efficient, and can produce an unbiased 
estimate of companies’ earnings. Under these circumstances, every company would 
generate earnings at a risk premium to the risk free interest rate of suitable duration. The 
duration would depend on the period for which the earnings were predictable. If one 
makes the additional assumptions required for the capital asset pricing model126, then the 
margin required by investors over the risk free rate can be determined. If one can also 
ignore the impact of depreciation and the possible need for investment to maintain the 
earning power of the assets, a fairly accurate estimate of the value of the company can be 
obtained by discounting the earnings at a risk-adjusted rate.  
If alternatively, we assume that retained earnings are used to increase dividends in real 
terms at some predictable rate, the fair value of shares can be determined by the dividend 
yield. One obvious problem is that optimal dividend policy changes with the tax regime, 
which provides a major obstacle to the assumption that the long term payout ratio has 
been constant.  
3.4.1 Empirical relationships 
There is clear evidence of mean reversion in price to earnings ratios and market to book 
ratios (Tobin’s q) as described, for instance, in Harney and Tower (2003). They used a 
value for the market to book ratio that adjusted for inflation. Cavaglia and Moroz (2002) 
find that industry share prices tend to converge to long term dividend yield, interest rates 
                                                    
126
 These include a stable correlation structure for all shares and sufficient market participants who can invest 
or borrow at the risk free rate.  
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and earnings levels. Cutler et al (1991) find significant reversions to the dividend yield in 
Australia, Canada, the UK and some US periods, but not in the other countries they 
model. Thomson (1992) finds significant mean reversion of dividend yields in South 
Africa. 
There is also evidence that share prices in different countries and sectors revert to their 
average relative to the global market. Balvers et al (2000) find reversion from 18 
countries to a portfolio representing the average value for the 18 countries when testing 
annual data. Stotz (2004) finds evidence of mean reversion in 50 large European shares 
using a combination of profits and book values as explanatory variables.  
Futures contracts are relatively easily priced using the spot price of the underlying asset 
and assumptions about interest rates and dividends, or storage costs. Even in this market, 
however, there are costs to arbitrage, and Monoyios and Sarno (2002) find an ESTAR 
mean reversion to the theoretical price that produces a superior fit to a linear mean 
reversion to underlying stock prices. 
There is research, such as Narayan and Smyth (2005), that rejects mean reversion, but 
this might be accused of being naïve in that the authors only look for reversion to an 
absolute value, and test on daily data which may well hide longer term reversion. 
The conclusion is that there appears to be mean reversion from the extreme of equity 
market values based on earnings yield, dividend yields and market to book ratios.  
3.4.2 Bubbles 
The corollary of mean reversion in the extremes is that prices occasionally reach 
extremes. Such extremes would be irrational bubbles if the expected return on risky 
assets fell below the risk free rate, although they would only ensure the presence of 
arbitrage profits if there were a way of ensuring that no money is lost.  
Bubbles can be explained by herd behaviour as for instance in Hirshleifer (2001) and 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Herd behaviour may arise from irrational psychological 
biases that involve placing excessive reliance on the opinions of others, or from rational 
incentives not to take a contrarian view. Kim and Nofsinger (2005) provide evidence of 
the latter applying to institutional investors. The theory of rational bubbles is famously 
illustrated by Keynes, who described investment as a beauty contest where the prize goes 
to the person who best guesses the preference of the majority.  
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Allen and Gale (2000) look for other explanations and suggest that the bubbles in Japan 
and in Scandinavian countries during the eighties and nineties arose from excessively 
generous credit that exposed the banks to moral hazard by investment opportunists. If 
this were true it would be the banks rather than the investors who were irrational, unless 
the value of government support exceeded their credit losses, in which case government 
officials supplied the irrationality. On the other hand, the rupture of other bubbles may 
reflect deeper causes as suggested by Kindleberger (1988) for the crash of 1929. 
There are other reasons why share prices may be at a level unjustifiable in terms of their 
intrinsic value. Some arise because some investors will not sell shares that they know to 
be over-priced. Owners who are involved in the management, or who have family and 
other ties to a company, may chose not to sell over-priced shares, while other investors 
will not sell for tax reasons. Passive investors may also be limited, by prior decision, to 
buy and hold shares in their index. Woolley and Bird (2003) criticise passive investors 
for buying shares that were clearly overpriced during the 2000 tech bubble. They cite 
evidence that share prices rise if they are included in a share index favoured by passive 
investors as evidence of market inefficiency. They do not raise the problem that this 
effect is aggravated by share price indices that are based on capitalization rather than 
tradability, although this problem has been addressed in the last few years.  
Restraints on short selling can also explain bubbles. Short selling is particularly risky, as 
a “bear squeeze” can require a purchase at inflated prices when it comes to delivery. 
Perhaps the most colourful of these in recent years was the manipulation of the silver 
price in the late eighties. The Bunker Hunt brothers were the most famous participants in 
a consortium that drove the silver price up 650% in one year as short sellers attempted to 
cover themselves. The gold price bubble of the same years may well have been an 
irrational parallel. Williams (1995) describes aspects of the legal case against the Hunt 
brothers and their collaborators; Abolafia and Kilduff (1988) discuss the regulatory 
manipulation that broke the bear squeeze by limiting the number of contracts that an 
individual could hold.  
Gilchrist et al (2005) develop a model of bubbles, assuming restraints on short sales and 
the incentive of companies to issue more shares when prices are high, and to invest the 
money in expanding their operations. They investigate the 2000 tech bubble, and find 
that companies behaved as might be expected from their model. They did not find 
excessive and wasteful investments took place because companies restricted their share 
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offerings in order to maintain the price. Woolley and Bird (2003), however, suggest that 
European communication companies did make wasteful investments; a large part was 
overpaying governments for licences. 
While bubbles can be inflated by over-optimism, panics are also not impossible if there 
are times when rational investors are unable to buy or where portfolio insurance or 
regulatory capital requirements require sales even though markets are already depressed. 
The extent of the 1987 share market crash can be explained by programmed selling. 
Barker (1999) mentions other incidents of the forced sale of equities, and purchases of 
fixed interest stocks, as a result of capital requirements. 
Bubbles and panics can therefore occur in investment markets.  
3.4.3 Comparative performance 
If markets do mean revert, such relationships should be exploitable. Malkiel (2004) looks 
at the success of technical and fundamental models to predict returns. He uses dividend 
yields, price earnings ratios and a model based on interest rates and Tobin’s q, and finds 
evidence of out-performance.  
These results are not disproved by findings, such as by Becker et al (1999), that mutual 
fund managers on the whole are unable to benefit from market timing. The average 
investor must do as well as the market, and these findings merely show that the mutual 
fund managers in the study are no different from the average investor. 
The performance test for mean reversion would be to see whether those investors (and 
raisers of capital) that attempt to read market levels do better than those that do not. The 
performance of asset allocation hedge funds could provide such a test. Capocci and 
Hubner (2004) confirm that earlier analyses appear to have overstated the success of 
hedge funds, but they do find that one quarter of US hedge funds managers appear to be 
successful in finding arbitrage opportunities. Amongst these are funds with a market 
timing strategy. Do et al (2005), in contrast, find no evidence of over-performance in 
Australian hedge fund managers. In summary therefore, the formal evidence that there 
are opportunities for identifiable groups of investors to exploit market timing is weak. 
There is however strong evidence that companies raise more money when the market is 
high - as found by Gilchrist et al (2005). This produces something of a puzzle in that they 
appear to have more knowledge about the level of the market than institutional investors. 
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The fact that institutional investors face incentives to herd does not mean that they do not 
have an incentive to attempt to outperform by small – and measurable - margins.  
Outside of the academic research, there is perhaps no puzzle: everyone knows that 
fundamental investors such as Warren Buffett outperform the market. The problem is 
that their services are not generally available to all at a fixed price127 or they are not easy 
to identify. There has apparently been no academic attempt to measure whether Buffett’s 
success has been due to chance or not, which perhaps creates a puzzle in itself. 
The question therefore appears to remain open until someone finds a way of identifying 
successful managers.  
3.4.4 Property 
Most of the research in this area has been on US listed property trusts, which would be 
expected to display some equity type characteristics. Stevenson (2002) is the most cited 
article, and finds that statistics from some markets reject the hypothesis of stationarity. 
He concludes that mean reversion is slow. He does not however refer to the paper of 
Okunev and Wilson (1997) that finds significant results for an exponential reversion.  
3.5 Possible consequences 
In the survey mentioned in section 2.1.2 above, Welch (2000) documented the relatively 
low level of belief amongst academics in a varying equity risk premium. This contrasts 
somewhat with the view of Campbell et al (1997, 286): “It used to be thought that 
expected asset returns were approximately constant and that movements in prices could 
be attributed to news about future cash payments to investors. Today the importance of 
time-variation in expected returns is widely recognized, and this has broad implications 
for both academics and professionals…” As their text book is regarded as something of a 
classic by some, the slowness in the spread of this view about fluctuating risk premiums 
is disconcerting, but does illustrate the difficulty of developing an informed consensus of 
views. 
                                                    
127
 Berkshire Hathaway, for instance, is a closed fund and the share price partly depends on the demand for 
Mr Buffett’s skills. 
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It appears that market extremes are relatively short-lived. If investors do not panic by 
buying at extremely high or selling at extremely low prices, the impact may be relatively 
small. If there are no fundamental grounds why the extremes should not reverse, then 
they may be able to benefit from the extremes by buying inexpensively or selling 
overpriced assets. For the reasons mentioned in 3.4.2, it is normally unwise to participate 
in short selling. 
4 THEORY OF INVESTMENT 
This section recapitulates, in the light of these facts about investment markets, the basic 
principles of investment. Fundamental analysis and diversification are both widely 
accepted, although not as frequently practised.  
4.1 Fundamental analysis 
Fundamental analysis attempts to determine the underlying value of an asset by reference 
to company specific accounting and economic data, and consideration of the future. It 
can be contrasted with technical analysis that considers only previous price movements, 
and perhaps turnover, and is purely historical.  
Perhaps the most important result of the research on market efficiency, behavioural 
finance and mean reversion is that fundamental analysis can be shown to identify 
opportunities for extra profits during those times when the market is inefficient, or 
subject to behavioural biases.  
This appears to be confirmed by Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) whose model includes a 
variety of firm specific accounting data (such as accounts receivable, margins, labour 
force productivity etc). Their results do not prove that fundamental analysis will always 
pay for itself in superior returns; such proof is not possible although the arguments of 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) mentioned in 2.1.2 suggest that it ought to be close. Given 
its relatively low cost for relatively large fund managers, however, there would be a 
strong argument for all superannuation funds that can access such managers to adopt it.  
Technical analysis may well identify specific shares or bonds or sectors of the investment 
markets that are anomalously priced, but it is always wise to consider whether there may 
not be good reasons for the anomalies, when viewed prospectively. 
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4.2 Diversification and utility theory 
Analysis of prospective investment returns should give not only the expected value, but 
the range of possibilities, which leads to considering how to make the trade off between 
some measure of risk and return.  
The rational approach to this trade-off is to develop some curve of utility of various 
levels of wealth and weight these by the probabilities of occurrence. This involves a host 
of brave assumptions on both the utility of levels of wealth and the probabilities of future 
returns as is pointed out, for instance, by Georgescu-Roegen (1954). The irrationality that 
underlies much of behavioural finance lies in the fact that people do not have consistent 
utility functions and are often unreasonable in determining future probabilities. (From a 
totally different perspective, Allen and McGoun (2000) suggest that investors derive a 
variety of pleasures from participating in what can be a social as well as an intellectual 
experience. They refer to the “Motley Fool Investment Guide”, but an examination of the 
daily press would tend to confirm their observations.)  
Thomson (2003), however, defends subjective utility theory as a normative method of 
guiding investment decisions. Whatever other gains there are from investing, there 
appears to be no better rational approach to choosing between investments with different 
expected risk and return. 
Whatever rational method is used to determine the asset allocation, if it considers risk at 
all, it is likely that it will result in the diversification of the portfolio. If returns on 
different assets are not perfectly correlated, a diversified portfolio can produce 
considerable reductions in risk for relatively little loss of return provided returns on the 
different assets do not differ markedly.  
4.3 Life cycle applications 
Recent years have seen a number of applications of utility theory to personal investment 
decisions. Campbell et al (2003), Chen et al (2006) and Purcal and Chan (2006) are 
examples. They take into account not only personal utility and some of the characteristics 
of the investment markets mentioned above, but also allow for consumption over the 
financial lifecycle and diversification benefits and risks that arise from wage income. 
McCarthy (2004) surveys much of the literature and refers to Cocco (2005) and others 
who incorporate housing in the portfolio choice. 
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In spite of their complexity, these models are recognised by their authors as relatively 
crude approximations to reality. They do, however, confirm various intuitions and throw 
light on some otherwise unanswerable questions. Mean reversion in returns over the 
medium period means a greater allocation should be made to riskier assets, as does the 
greater implicit investment in human capital that young people have as a result of their 
greater future wages. A varying equity risk premium means a varying allocation to risky 
assets.  
Four particular criticisms of these models can be made. They frequently use too high an 
equity risk premium and under-emphasise its uncertainty; their characterisation of the 
utility function appears unrealistic and they ignore the insights offered by the growth 
optimal portfolio (explained below); they do not appear to consider the particular 
situation of retired superannuation fund members, and they confuse mean reversion and 
autocorrelation.  
4.4 The size of the equity risk premium 
There are considerable differences in opinion as to the size of the equity risk premium. 
Mehra and Prescott (2003) report on two decades of debate on their earlier observation 
that the premium appeared too high to be explained solely by risk aversion. Not the least 
is the problems is that of measurement as McCarthy (2004) points out. The historical 
returns must be estimated between two points in time so that even small changes in 
choice of period lead to considerable differences in estimates. In Welch (2000) academic 
economists estimated the arithmetic average long term risk premium as 7% on average. 
This reduced to 5.5% when the 1998 survey was repeated in 2000 – as reported in Welch 
(2001). One of the reasons may have been that Welch’s original paper reported that the 
respondents believed that the consensus view within the economics profession was as 
high as 8%, and that this had “anchored” their views at a higher level. On the more 
pessimistic side, Wilkie (1995) suggests that, in average conditions, the risk premium 
may be in the range from 3% to 4% per annum. His calculations make allowance for the 
re-rating of shares, which has been responsible for much of the out-performance of recent 
years. This lower estimate is supported by others such as Dimson et al (2004). 
The difference between these two estimates of the expected risk premium is significant, 
as can be seen by table 1. While the underlying model is crude its indicates the variability 
of investment returns and the overlap illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between 
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different assumptions. Under plausible assumptions, a difference in return of 2% per 
annum, over a working career of 40 years, increases the expected outcome by 50%. The 
chance of a negative return would be reduced by about 75%. 
Table 1: Accumulation phase - lump sum 
Percentiles 2% return 4% return 
1% 22 27 
5% 25 34 
25% 39 54 
50% 57 77 
75% 84 127 
95% 156 243 
99% 207 306 
 Mean 68 100 
Shown is the accumulated value of 1 per annum after 40 years, assuming a 
lognormal return with standard deviation of 15% - 250 simulations. 
 
Regardless of the shape of the utility function, it is clear that the allocation to equities 
will depend very much on the investor’s view of future equity returns. That the experts 
differ so dramatically on the mean, but that the variability is not quite as disputed, would 
tend to support Aloysius (2005) that ambiguity aversion tends to discourage equity 
investment. For retirement planning purposes, it would seem appropriate to use a lower 
rather than higher estimate of the equity risk premium. 
Over-optimism in these models is aggravated by a failure to take expenses into account. 
A typical Australian superannuation fund will charge its members administrative 
expenses of at least 0.5% per annum for equity investment. Tax may reduce the return by 
another 0.5%. On the other hand, the individual’s personal cost of borrowing will be at 
least 1.5% over the risk free rate. Even if the superannuation fund is able to gear up more 
cheaply, the net risk premium to be used to estimate the optimum level of gearing within 
the fund should probably not be more than 1.5% - if the equity risk premium is 3% or 
lower. 
4.5 The growth optimal portfolio 
Luenberger (1997) describes the growth or log optimal strategy, which determines the 
proportion of capital to be invested in each asset by using subjective probabilities of the 
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returns and a logarithmic utility function. He makes a persuasive argument for the use of 
the logarithmic rather than another utility function for this purpose. The utility function 
used in most of the papers that have contributed to the debate on the equity risk premium 
have used a constant relative risk aversion of the form: 
)1(
)1()(
)1(
γ
γ
−
−
=
−WWU  (3) 
where W represents wealth and  the coefficient of risk aversion, which is taken to be in 
the range (1,10]. A coefficient of risk aversion close to 1 approaches logarithmic utility. 
Cocco (2005) uses 5 as being plausible, but this is not intuitive as it implies that every 
20% increase in wealth is worth less than half of the previous 20%. It is suggested that 
this apparent risk aversion is more likely to reflect rational discontinuities caused by the 
possibility of forced lifestyle changes in the short run as suggested in Asher (1999). 
Shrikhande (1997) demonstrates that a kink in the utility function of this type can serve 
to explain the equity risk premium puzzle in the same way as a higher co-efficient of risk 
aversion.  
Younger fund members must necessarily expect their consumption patterns to change in 
the long run – for lifecycle if not wealth induced reasons. If investment returns do not 
meet expectations, they are likely to be able to work for slightly longer to make up the 
shortfall. In such circumstances, any kinks in the utility to be applied to investments 
ought to disappear. Very risk averse utility is therefore not an appropriate normative 
basis for investment decision making over the long term. 
Luenberger briefly derives the growth optimal portfolio of assets that maximises the 
logarithmic utility over a single period – given the expected distribution of investment 
returns from different assets (or - more practically - asset classes). It can be shown that, 
in the long run, this portfolio dominates all other strategies in the sense that the expected 
median return is always higher. It is more likely to be optimal the longer the time period 
for investment. For the youngest members of superannuation funds, with a long term 
time horizon, it would appear that the growth optimal portfolio is the one that they 
should choose. 
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4.6 Older superannuation fund members 
Superannuation members face increasingly reduced investment opportunity sets as they 
age. A reducing life expectancy is often punctuated by two particularly important life 
decisions.  
The first is the purchase of a house. This decision may not have been made for 
investment reasons (ownership gives benefits not obtainable from renting – some tax 
related), but the presence of the house and significant debt in the family’s portfolio is 
likely to require a different optimal allocation of assets. On a relatively conservative 
view of the equity risk premium and investment expenses, the best advice may be to 
repay the home loan as quickly as possible. To the extent that contributions to 
superannuation are compulsory, a growth optimal portfolio that takes into account 
correlations with interest rate movements will be more appropriate. This is consistent 
with the model of Cocco (2005), who does however not allow for the greater utility that 
may arise from owning rather than renting. 
The second major decision relates to retirement. McCarthy (2004) makes the point that 
the models do not adequately take retirement fund, social security and tax considerations 
into account. Of interest in this section are retirement fund members who will want to 
rely on their retirement benefits from the fund. Such members have two main decision 
phases: the first no longer to invest in human capital (future career development), the 
second to finally leave the workforce. Once out of the workforce and drawing down 
superannuation savings, members’ investment choices should be much more 
conservative.  
Table 2, using a volatility one third of that used in table 1, shows the distribution of the 
residual value of an annuity forty years after it is first drawn. Post retirement benefits at 
older ages are obviously much more sensitive to volatility and to differences in return. 
An investment policy even more conservative than that which would produce the 
standard deviation of 5% used in the chart appears to be indicated. The growth optimal 
portfolio would appear inappropriate because of the kinks discussed above.  
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Table 2: Decumulation phase - residue  
Percentiles 2% return 4% return 
1% 2 23 
5% 6 38 
25% 15 58 
50% 23 76 
75% 37 91 
95% 55 158 
99% 78 204 
 Mean 27 81 
Shown is the residue after an annuity of 1 is drawn from an original 
amount of 40 units for 40 years, assuming a lognormal return with 
standard deviation of 5% - 250 simulations. 
 
This significant change to a more conservative investment portfolio in retirement 
suggests that the current practice of revising asset allocations in retirement (the lifestyle 
portfolios that reduce exposure to investment risks as people age) may well be 
appropriate. These are described in Bodie and Treussard (2006), who suggest that they 
may still recommend too high a proportionate investment in risky assets for those with 
high coefficients of risk aversion (or kinks in their utility functions). 
If there are kinks in people’s utility curve that derive from lumpy lifestyle decisions, then 
it is not correct to use a universal utility curve for all people. It is important to understand 
each family’s circumstances as the level of risk aversion will depend on how close they 
are to having to make significant changes for financial reasons. 
4.7 Exploiting mean reversion and time varying risk premiums 
Mean reversion of prices in the extremes is not the same as negative autocorrelation, 
which looks at changes in the previous period, rather than the level of the market as 
evident from formula 1. There is also no stable cut-off between short term momentum 
and long term correction both of which are observed. Ahmed et al (2002) for instance, 
show that a momentum strategy – based on the winning style of the previous year - 
would have been profitable in the US in the 15 years from 1982.  
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The models described above take different approaches to mean reversion. Campbell et al 
(2003) allow for auto-correlations and reversion to the dividend yield, Purcal and Chan 
(2006) allow only for autocorrelation, while Chen et al (2006) make no allowance at all. 
It would seem appropriate to use a more comprehensive model that considers all the 
factors that have been found to govern mean reversion.  
4.8 Expenses and taxes 
The need to keep control of expenses and tax does not always seem to receive the 
emphasis it deserves. The last section of Chapter 4 above calculates the total impact of 
expenses that are frequently held to be unnecessary but which can be explained by the 
ordinary member’s need for some financial advice. 
The costs of trading to individuals are mentioned in 2.1.3 above. The costs to institutions 
are discussed in Schwartz and Steil (2002). They report on an international survey which 
shows that soft commissions128 are widely prevalent and reduce the effectiveness and 
increase the cost of trading. Glass and Wagner (1998) identify four elements to the cost 
of trading, which must be considered as a whole as savings of one element is likely to 
increase costs in another: 
• Broker commissions, which are a little higher for soft dollar trades and 
significantly higher for more difficult trades, and the bid offer spread. 
• The market impact, measured by the difference in the price from when the order 
is placed to when the trade is completed.  
• Timing losses that arise from the time the portfolio manager chooses to trade to 
the time the order is placed. 
• Opportunity costs arise when an order is not completed, which can be measured 
by the product of the change in price and the stocks not traded. 
Only brokerage is always a cost; the others may turn out profitable at times. As a 
measure of the impact of these costs, Glass and Wagner’s exhibit 2 is worth repeating (in 
table 3 below), as it shows that it is possible to significantly reduce the cost of trading. 
The table also makes their point that the costs must be considered as a whole, as savings 
of one element is likely to increase costs in another: directed trades (where investment 
                                                    
128
 These describe payments in kind and those otherwise not disclosed. 
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managers are required to use a particular broker) may be cheaper but seem to take longer 
to implement. 
Table 3:  Costs of trading  
 Directed trades Non-directed trades 
Commissions -12 basis points -15 basis points 
Market impact -13 basis points -24 basis points 
Delay costs -87 basis points -44 basis points 
Total execution costs -112 basis points -83 basis points 
Exhibit 2 from Glass and Wagner (Plexusgroup) 
 
It is noticeable, and a significant omission, that brokerage costs are not invariably 
reported in superannuation fund accounts. It also appears that most managers do not 
measure total trading costs. 
Dammon et al (2001) discuss how appropriate management of capital gains tax 
particularly can affect optimal asset allocations and returns. While the rate of tax is 
relatively low in Australia, capital gains tax on a portfolio that turns over once each year 
can be as high as 0.75% per annum of the value of the portfolio. 
5 REGULATORY RESPONSE 
While much has been said about the role of government, this section accepts the limits of 
Adam Smith: “ ... the sovereign has only these duties to attend to; three duties of great 
importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understanding:  
• first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other 
independent societies; 
• secondly the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from 
the injustice and oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of 
establishing an exact administration of justice;  
• and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain 
public institutions which it can never be in for the interest of any individual, or 
small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never 
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repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may 
frequently do much more than repay it to a great society."(Smith, 1930 edition, 
180)  
In this context, the role of regulators would seem to be to help protect superannuation 
members from exploitation and to create the conditions for efficient investment markets 
that would not arise spontaneously. 
This section mentions some recommendations from behavioural finance, outlines the 
Australian regulatory structure and then makes a few modest recommendations. 
5.1 Suggestions from behavioural finance 
Three sets of suggestions emerge from the behavioural finance literature; each of which 
could be taken up by the regulators and required of trustees as suggested later in this 
section.  
5.1.1 Disclosure 
Daniel et al (2002) are not advocates of government direction of the market, but have 
some suggestions on: 
 “minimally coercive and relatively low cost measures to help investors make better 
choices and make the market more efficient. These involve regulation of disclosure by 
firms and by information intermediaries, financial reporting regulations, investment 
education, and perhaps some efforts to standardise … advertising.  
“More controversially, a case can be made for regulations to protect foolish investors by 
restricting their freedom of action or the freedom of those that may prey upon them. 
Limits on how securities are marketed and laws against market manipulation through 
rumour spreading may fall into this category.  
“There is little cost to requiring companies to provide a standard warning, analogous to 
cigarette warning labels, to workers of the risks of plunging retirement money in their 
own company’s stock. Regulating the way in which retirement investment options are 
presented to individuals (i.e. the status quo choice, and how choices are categorized) may 
have low cost yet may greatly affect lifetime outcomes.” 
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In the light of the observed persistent under-performance of some funds, Blake and 
Timmerman (2004) conclude that past performance information should be made 
available to members so that they are able to avoid these under-performing funds.  
5.1.2 Option menus 
Mitchell and Utkus (2004) take up the question of choices noting that many portfolios 
tend to be undiversified, that people tend to end with the default investment option 
particularly if a large number of alternative choices are made, and that they tend to 
interpret the choices offered as including an element of recommendation. For example, if 
more equity options are offered, people will put a larger proportion of their assets into 
equity.  
They suggest that the default option should automatically guide investors into optimal 
investment behaviour. This suggests some type of lifestyle investment pattern as 
discussed in 4.6 above. Such a pattern would need to be invested in optimal portfolios 
that progressively sell risky assets and buy indexed-linked bonds as people age, noting 
the comments that older people are likely to be much more risk averse.  
In order to prevent a plethora of options confusing and misleading average investors, 
they suggest that alternative options should be limited and placed on an alternative 
investment menu.  
5.1.3 Self-monitoring 
Behavioural research confirms the human penchant to forget or reinterpret past errors. 
Biais et al (2005) report on experiments that show that self-monitoring of performance 
provides something of an antidote to overconfidence. One might be more emphatic: if 
there is any science or management in investment, monitoring the success and failure of 
decisions is essential.  
5.2 Australian regulations 
Official responsibility for the regulation of Australian superannuation funds is shared by 
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), which is responsible for 
market conduct of the industry, and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA), which is responsible for the regulation of the trustees.  
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ASIC’s policy statements govern the content of disclosure; Policy Statement 168 requires 
disclosure to facilitate the comparison on fees and historical performance.  
APRA’s Superannuation Circular II.D.1 “Managing Investments and Investment Choice” 
requires trustees to develop diversified investment strategies that place neither the fund 
nor the member exercising the choice at excessive risk. It also discusses the 
implementation of the strategies and, of particular interest to this paper, the reporting of 
investment performance. 
There are also a number of industry, professional and educational bodies with their own 
principles of investment and standards for the provision of advice. They should also be 
seen as part of the regulatory system, and the recommendations below apply also to them. 
5.3 Recommendations 
The following ideas for the development of these regulations may be considered. 
5.3.1 Disclosure 
The recommendations from behavioural finance recorded in sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 and 
should be incorporated as part of good practice.  
In addition, it would not be out of place to require superannuation funds to report on the 
exact assets held by their various options. Australia is almost unique in not requiring 
mutual funds to report on their asset holdings129. 
5.3.2 Monitoring performance 
In monitoring investment performance, trustees ought to consider the success of each 
element of the investment decision: asset allocation, stock selection and dealing. Such 
monitoring should include performance attribution of the form used by Daniel et al 
(1997) that measures the relative contribution of asset allocation and stock selection. It 
would be even more useful if investment managers were to document the reasons for 
their particular decisions. This would help to prevent the hindsight bias described in the 
behavioural literature. 
                                                    
129
 Personal communication from Bloomberg management. 
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The success of stock selection can be further analysed by the approach set out in Day et 
al (1994), which measures the profitability, over recent quarters, of particular decisions 
to buy and sell. It provides an important short term measure of investment ability and 
efficiency, especially relevant in view of the tendency reported in 2.2.2 for managers to 
underestimate the possibility of inefficiencies in information flow. The mis-pricing that 
may arise is likely to be relatively short, so the wisdom of a particular transaction should 
soon be apparent. It would, in some respects, be surprising if an investment manager saw 
opportunities more than a few weeks before the market price responded. 
Given that excessive dealing and high dealing costs have been identified as a significant 
contribution to under-performance, it is also important to monitor the dealing costs 
identified by Glass and Wagner (1998) and listed in 4.8 above. 
Such reporting should also include the impact of tax on net investment returns.  
In the interests of transparency, the results of these analyses ought to be made available 
to members and potential members – perhaps after a suitable delay to protect the 
intellectual capital of the investment managers. Given the limited interest and ability of 
members to absorb large quantities of data, such performance reports should be 
summarized before they are distributed, with fuller reports available on request or on 
websites.  
This more thorough reporting can be contrasted with the performance reports currently 
given to members. These are normally given for a variety of periods often from 3 months 
to 5 years which make little or no allowance for different styles. The shorter periods are 
entirely useless and inappropriately focus attention on a set of random numbers. The 
longer terms are of greater value but often do not make appropriate allowance for tax. 
APRA’s investment circular will hopefully encourage trustees to develop a more 
thorough approach to performance measurement. It should perhaps be made more 
specific. 
5.3.3 Poor performers 
The publication of past performance league tables is appropriate, as suggested by Blake 
and Timmerman (2004), so that investors can avoid under-performing funds. While the 
worst funds are often included in a table, editorial invariably focuses on winners rather 
than losers. The reason is presumably that losers are also advertisers. The losers may not 
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be driven out by competition if they operate through a marketing channel that does not 
require comparisons to be made.  
It would appear that it should fall to the regulator (APRA in this instance) to identify 
poor performers and ensure that the shortfall is not due to dishonesty or gross 
incompetence.  
It may also be appropriate for the regulator (ASIC in this case) to actively discourage the 
use of the more risky interest bearing assets that are particularly active in property 
financing. They are particularly inappropriate for superannuation funds given that they 
commonly offer limited diversification and the returns are skewed downwards: a 
maximum interest rate and a possible 100% loss. Advertisements ought, at very least, to 
disclose a measure of the risk being taken. (Something along the lines of: “The 
underlying properties have to fall in value by 5% to affect the value of your investment, 
and by 10% to reduce it to zero”.) 
5.3.4 Risk appetite 
Superannuation fund members are normally given the choice between a range of risk and 
reward tradeoffs. More recent developments are for products to be related to age.  
The existing products also do not appear to take the investment theory set out above into 
account: 
• They do not appear to offer a growth optimal portfolio for younger investors. This 
might well incorporate some implicit gearing to the extent permitted by law. 
• The difference between homeowners and non-homeowners does not appear to be 
recognised. 
• Most of the portfolios have predetermined asset allocations, giving the investment 
managers limited opportunity to respond to extreme market events. 
It is not clear that these issues should be resolved by regulatory intervention. It would 
appear to be mainly an issue of ongoing research and education, of which this paper is an 
element. 
5.3.5 Benchmark portfolio to discourage panic 
One of the functions of prudential regulators is to avoid banking crises. Preventing 
extremes in investment markets is generally seen as beyond their capabilities. There may 
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however be some parallels between the role of government in banking crises and in 
investment market extremes. People at least need to be reassured.  
The damage done by a bank run is obvious. Superannuation fund members - who 
“panicked” and bought foreign technology shares at the peak of the last bubble may have 
lost half their lifesavings. They may not however make news.  
As discussed by Abolafia and Kilduff (1988), regulators do have a direct interest in the 
effect of price bubbles on lenders that have contributed to the bubble. They will also 
respond at various stages of a panic. Are earlier interventions possible? To ask the 
regulator to warn of excesses is unrealistic. The benefits are putative, the risk to 
reputation far too high.  
It is possible, however, that there would be some merit in developing a model growth 
optimal portfolio that reflected the consensus of economists, asset consultants and 
investment managers. The portfolio could be published by the regulator or an industry 
body and be justified as a "public work" in Adam Smith's terms. The consensus could be 
based on a survey that did not lead to the identification of the individual participants, so 
preserving any competitive advantage. The published results would be of the anticipated 
returns and correlation matrices of the major asset classes and of the resultant model 
growth optimal portfolio130. It would include a measure of dispersion in both the 
expected returns and model portfolio. Such a publication would have a number of 
advantages: 
• It would be resolutely prospective, so providing a constant reminder that 
historical returns are not estimates of the future. It ought also to encourage more 
fundamental analysis as it is necessary to estimate future returns.  
• It would also provide a constant reminder for the desirability of diversification 
even where expected returns differ significantly.  
• Behavioural research suggests that it would encourage people’s views and actions 
towards conformity. This is the desired response for uninformed investors. Even 
in the case of the academics reported in Welch (2001), it led to more reasonable 
                                                    
130
 There should be constraints on short sales and borrowing as neither are legally permitted. Luenberger 
shows that the mathematical result for the growth optimal portfolio can normally be shifted away from the 
most risky assets with a minimal loss of expected return, but this a technical detail. 
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estimates of the future. It may aggravate the pressures of informed professional 
investors, but might also provide an environment where shorter term deviations 
from the herd would be easier to explain.  
• Because it would have to be published with the necessary health warnings, it 
would remind older investors of their need to reduce risk.  
6 CONCLUSION 
Extracting a consensus view of the current state of investment theory is made difficult by 
dogmatically held views and a vast output of often unrelated research.  
While markets may be more efficient than we could expect, it is clear that there are 
momentum and bubble effects that are better explained by the bounded rationality of 
investors. These anomalies in efficient market theory are well explained by behavioural 
finance, but exploiting the resulting noise requires fundamental analysis of the merits of 
each investment. Fundamental analysis can yield profits from both asset allocation and 
stock selection during those times when markets are inefficient. The benefits of active 
asset allocation when markets are mispriced do not appear to be emphasised sufficiently. 
In protecting uninformed superannuation investors with investment choice, regulators 
need to ensure that they are given information in a way that encourages sensible 
behaviours. A particular gap in the current framework would appear to be a thorough 
monitoring of performance. Poor performers particularly ought to be identified. It is also 
suggested that the development and publication of a consensus portfolio would 
encourage all the desirable elements of a sensible investment strategy: fundamental 
analysis, adequate diversification and a greater sense of comfort with the choices made.  
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CHAPTER 8 - SMOOTHING INVESTMENT RETURNS 
 
First published as Chapter 8: “Smoothing Investment Returns” in Retirement Funds in 
Scary Markets (2007), ed H Bateman, Edward Elgar. 
1 THE NEED FOR SMOOTHING 
Other things being equal, we expect people to want a predictable and smooth income 
stream in retirement. This would enable them to fund regular consumption and to budget 
for less regular expenses.  
In spite of this both private and public superannuation schemes have been changed, over 
the past twenty years particularly, from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution 
(DC). Investment risk is thereby transferred from the sponsor (employer or state) to the 
members. The benefits paid are therefore not necessarily predictable or smooth. The 
issue has been discussed, inter alia, by Knox (1993), Khorasanee (1995), Andrew (1995) 
and Blake (2000).  
This chapter addresses the question of how DC funds can provide smoother investment 
returns. In the next part, we look at the difference between long and short term 
investment risks and the problems faced by DB funds in coping with changes to the 
social and economic environment. This inflexibility, and their opaqueness, can be seen as 
causes of their current unpopularity. The rest of the chapter then describes the smoothing 
algorithms. 
2 THE MANAGEMENT OF RISK  
2.1 Longer term risks  
The transfer of risk from sponsors to fund members can be seen to have a long term and a 
short term component.  
This is perhaps best illustrated in the context of mortality risk, which is also transferred 
from DB scheme sponsors to DC members. It applies to the costs of the death benefits 
payable to members’ dependants, and to the risks of longevity. The relatively short term 
risks of fluctuations in experience can be absorbed by insurance contracts and life 
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annuities. These can be purchased from life insurance companies or self insured by the 
fund. Longer term fluctuations require changes to premium rates. The distinction 
between the long and short term risks effectively depends on the financial capability of 
sponsors and insurance companies to provide guarantees. They can do so for short term 
risks, but not for the long term. 
The issue of financial capability is also relevant to long and short term investment risks. 
The risks are however much larger. Estimates of the long term net real rate of return vary 
from about one per cent to five per cent annually. The lower return is that available from 
indexed linked stocks – after inflation, taxes and expenses. The upper end of the range 
arises from the estimates of Dimson et al (2004) of the likely equity premium. The equity 
premium arises from a number of sources: the inherent risk and the costs of investing 
probably the most important. Dimson’s estimate of 3.5 percent for the equity premium is 
lower than that reported by Welch (2000) in a survey of economists, but probably more 
realistic. With typical contributions and expenses, the difference between one and five 
per cent would translate into a DC pension of between 35 and 130 per cent of average 
income when spread over a 60 year span. This compares with a variability of perhaps 10 
per cent each way in the value of a life annuity as a result of unexpected changes to 
mortality over the life of a typical pensioner. 
If long term investment returns are lower than expected, members of DC funds will have 
to contribute more during their working lives, accept lower pensions or work for longer. 
The latter strategy can be very effective: each year of additional contributions will 
increase a pension by some 10 per cent. The major role for investment smoothing comes 
in providing members with more time to adjust their plans for retirement in line with 
variations in long term investment returns. 
2.2 Cross subsidies and inequities in DB funds 
While DB funds have provided apparently predictable pensions for many of their 
members, the traditional DB design does not provide a model for smoothing. Even if the 
sponsoring employer is able to guarantee accrued benefits, future accruals must always 
be open to renegotiation because it is impossible to guarantee investment returns for 
ever. The long term variability in investment returns will produce differences to 
contribution rates of the same order as differences in DC benefit levels. There is however 
no objective mechanism to make the adjustments to prevent inequities arising.  
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In employer sponsored scheme there would be no inequity if the salary packages of new 
employees reflected the ex ante fair value of the promised benefits, and the employer 
absorbed the profits and losses arising from deviations in investment returns from those 
expected. Neither condition is usually met. The first condition would require salary 
packages to be adjusted for the value of the pension benefits accruing. It is however 
practically impossible to distinguish between groups of members, such as different 
generations of recruits. This creates cross subsidies between the groups, the value of 
which is seldom if ever determined.  
The failure to calculate the value of the cross subsidies between different groups of 
employees also means that little attempt is usually made to determine whether the 
employer is bearing a fair share of the costs. This opaqueness and imprecision in the 
allocation of costs opens the way for strong opportunistic parties to benefit at the 
expense of others either by manipulating changes to benefit levels or by frustrating 
equitable changes. The beneficiaries are likely to be shareholders, but could also be 
senior management or union officials. This uninsurable moral hazard is explored in more 
detail in Asher (2000). 
These issues are writ large in a state sponsored scheme. Even if the relationship between 
contributions and benefits is determined initially in such a way as to be fair, economic 
and demographic changes will soon create unintended, and frequently implicit, cross 
subsidies between different groups of contributors. Making changes is politically fraught 
as the acrimony of current debate on the issue bears witness.  
If the rules of DB funds were never changed, they would give rolling guarantees that 
extended for the lifetime of every cohort of new members: an infinite guarantee. This is 
clearly unreasonable. It would appear that the only way of setting the rules to ensure that 
no interested group will wrest an unfair advantage for itself is to make the cross-
subsidies and investment guarantees explicit. This would convert DB funds into complex 
DC arrangements with employer guarantees of accrued benefits, and regularly reviewed 
future accrual rates.  The future accruals would be a form of guaranteed deferred 
annuities.   
Modern finance and accounting, with their increased focus on market values, have begun 
to identify the cross subsidies that arise in DB funds, and the unacceptable risk that 
guarantees bring to the finances of the sponsor. It is perhaps not surprising that growing 
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numbers are being converted into DC funds, which have four clear advantages over 
traditional DB designs. 
• Members’ entitlements are clearly set out and not subject to management 
discretion or political maneuvering. 
• The relationship between contributions and benefits is clearly fair, and free of 
significant but implicit cross subsidies. 
• The risks to the sponsor are not inherent in the benefit design, and any guarantees 
can be explicitly managed.  
• Members are free to participate (if there is investment choice) in the equity 
premium, so possibly reducing contributions or increasing benefits.  
2.3 Managing risks in retirement 
In the long run, the equity premium means that investments in equities produce lower 
pension costs. The price is significant short term volatility: falls of 30% and more within 
a year have been commonly experienced.  
Once retired, it is likely to be difficult for fund members to re-enter the employment 
market to make up for investment losses. Members therefore need protection against such 
significant falls in income after retirement. This protection should probably begin before 
the retirement date, as plans for retirement presumably take some time to implement. 
Superannuation funds therefore need investment instruments that offer protection against 
investment fluctuations over this relatively long, but finite, period. 
The strategy employed by most DC funds and their members is to use a combination of 
investments in order to give an optimum mix of security, inflation protection and 
participation in the equity premium.  
To the extent that the equity premium arises from the correlation of share prices with the 
universe of consumption, it may be possible to develop other assets that share this risk 
without the short term volatility. One possibility would be to develop investments that 
provide a cash flow that could match pensions, and was linked to a wage index. This is 
the approach taken by the new Swedish notional DC national scheme. Asher (1994) 
suggests a method for utilising housing finance.  
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In the absence of these instruments, the next part of this chapter describes how volatile 
investment returns can be smoothed to produce a more acceptable income flow, and 
provides a family of algorithms for this to be done fairly and efficiently.  
3 CURRENT METHODS OF SMOOTHING 
3.1 Lifestyle switching to guaranteed assets 
For the reasons discussed above, many DC arrangements, even if they are largely 
invested in equities before retirement, arrange for members’ investments to be switched 
to fixed, or inflation protected, annuities at retirement.  
A common variation on this approach, called “lifestyle investing”, is described by Booth 
and Yakoubov (2000). The switch to more stable investments is phased in over a few 
years, rather than made at a single date. As they find however, the success of such a 
strategy depends on the availability of suitable long term indexed linked instruments, and 
foregoes some of the equity premium. It does however reduce the volatility of the final 
benefits.  
Cairns et al (2003) describe a further theoretical development that they call “stochastic 
lifestyling”, which dynamically matches retirement income to the member’s final salary. 
Given that final salary can be distorted by recent promotions, or a reduction in working 
hours related to ill health or impending retirement, it is not clear however that this is an 
appropriate benchmark. 
3.2 Delaying action 
One approach to smoothing investment returns is to delay the decision to distribute 
investment returns until the end of some time period. This is not as alarming as it first 
appears. Unit trusts will normally delay transacting until the end of a day. Many unit 
linked DC funds will allocate units at the end of a month, while non-linked funds will 
apply the same crediting rate for a year at a time. In almost every case, however, they 
will reserve the right to calculate unit prices, or change the crediting rate, at some 
intermediate time if market conditions change and some participants may otherwise be 
disadvantaged. This could happen for instance if market values dropped dramatically. In 
this instance, failing to recalculate unit prices will mean that departing members are 
given more than a fair share of the assets – to the detriment of remaining members. The 
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inequity may be aggravated, and the solvency of the fund perhaps threatened, if some 
members are able to elect to leave in order to take advantage of the artificially high unit 
price. This risk of some members making elections that harm others is called anti-
selection in the actuarial literature.  
Delaying action should however be seen more as an administrative convenience than a 
method to address market fluctuations. 
3.3 Smoothed bonuses 
Many DB and DC funds historically operated through policies with life insurance 
companies. The companies declared smooth bonuses on these policies to distribute 
investment and other profits. DC funds often declare their own smoothed bonus or 
crediting rates. 
One actuarial method of determining the bonus is to begin with a calculation of a 
smoothed value of assets. Head et al (2000) provides a description of their development 
and justification in the context of DB funds. One common approach is for the value of 
shares to be determined by discounting future dividends at the actuarial valuation rate. 
An alternative is to assume that share prices will (immediately) return to a level that 
reflects some long term average dividend yield. Other approaches to smoothing involve 
some averaging of the market value of assets.  
To the extent that these actuarial values for the assets differ from their market values 
they are, arguably, unrealistic. Actuaries who use the method respond that their smooth 
actuarial value represents a more realistic estimate of the long term value of assets than 
the market price. Market prices may well be overly influenced by the needs or views of 
those who happen to be transacting at that time.  
Even if this were true, three major problems arise. The first is the possibility of anti-
selection. Incoming policyholders or members benefit if the difference between market 
and actuarial value is positive; maturing policyholders and exiting members gain when it 
is negative. They thus have the incentive to make decisions that disadvantage other 
members. 
The second is that when market values are below actuarial values, the fund is exposed to 
the risk that a combination of further falls in market values and an outflow of funds may 
lead to an unacceptable drop in the benefits available to the remaining members, or even 
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to insolvency if the fund is entirely exhausted. This problem may be further aggravated 
by anti-selection. Fund trustees and company managers are therefore understandably 
reluctant to allow a shortfall of assets to become significant. This reduces their ability to 
cushion falls in benefit payments – which is the original reason for smoothing. 
The third problem is more subtle. As a result of the reluctance to pay benefits in excess 
of the market value of the underlying assets, most smoothing involves limiting the 
increase in the crediting rate when market values rise rapidly. This creates a tendency for 
smoothing reserves to build up with no obvious methodology of release. In the absence 
of protection for policyholders or members, the resulting surplus is open to expropriation 
by stronger and opportunistic parties. Asher (1991) discusses one such incident, where an 
“orphan estate”, built up from the contributions of previous generations of policyholders, 
was expropriated by a new shareholder. 
Clay et al (2001) discuss UK with-profit policies and make various recommendations as 
to disclosure and the protection of vulnerable parties. They believe however that 
smoothing necessarily requires discretion on the part of the fund’s governing body, in 
order to ensure equity and solvency. The discussion of their paper reflected widespread 
doubt as to whether the three problems discussed above can be resolved without using an 
objective algorithm for smoothing.  
3.4 Alternative algorithms  
Thomson (1997) suggests an algorithm that optimises measures of smoothness and 
solvency in order to produce both an investment policy and a crediting rate for a DC 
fund. The results appear to avoid negative bonuses (which are not easily understood by 
members), but produce more volatile bonus rates than would be common practice.  
Khorasanee and Ng (2000) propose an arrangement where the contributions made by or 
on behalf of active members are explicitly reallocated to retiring members in order to 
allow for smoother returns. As pointed out in the discussion by Sze, this approach does 
not appear to be fair, particularly if investment returns are poor and the fund is declining. 
Blake (2003) investigates the benefits of a smoothing algorithm that truncates higher and 
lower returns so that bonuses lie within a limited range. He does not however provide a 
justification for the method.  
All three methods are vulnerable to anti-selection. 
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4 A NEW ALGORITHM 
This chapter suggests algorithms that smooth using a set of forward contracts of different 
durations.  
4.1 A series of forward contracts 
We can take an investment policy issued by a life insurance company as an example. The 
benefits of a member of a DC fund are identical from an investment perspective. 
The maturity payout of a unit linked policy depends on the market price of the units 
attached. The payout would be smoothed if the maturing policyholder were to enter into 
series of forward or future131 contracts, each for some of the units attached to the policy, 
in each of the months prior to maturity. For purposes of illustration, assume the 
smoothing will take place over 60 months. 
The remaining policyholders in the life fund would be the obvious counterparties to 
forward contracts. When the payouts on policies maturing, or likely to claim, in the next 
five years is small relative to the size of the fund, then the fund as a whole could be the 
counterparty. Alternatively, policyholders wishing to increase their exposure to volatile 
investment markets could be specifically allocated as counterparties.  
Younger policyholders may be liquidity constrained - unable to borrow - and may want 
greater exposure to higher yielding equities. Such greater exposure seems appropriate as 
found, for instance, by Cairns et al (2003). An important caveat is that such findings 
depend critically on assumptions as to borrowing rates and the size of the long term 
equity premium. Long forward positions gear up exposure to equity markets, and a 
significant fall in market values would reduce surrender values considerably. If one 
assumes that equity values will recover however – as is normally the case – young 
policyholders in the accumulation phase would be compensated by being able to 
accumulate new units at a low price. It would be necessary however to make this patently 
clear to them in advance in order to avoid unhappiness at unexpectedly low shorter term 
returns. 
                                                    
131
 A future contract is listed, a forward is not. They are otherwise substantially the same. 
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The allocation of the long position would depend on the surrender values of the policies 
being sufficiently large to serve as margins. Given the illiquid nature of the forwards, the 
margin required would be significantly higher than that required on futures contracts 
regularly marked to market. Determining the size of the margins required is a problem 
not addressed in this paper. The objective nature of the algorithm nevertheless allows for 
it to be addressed explicitly, unlike the implicit algorithms of discretionary smoothing. 
The payouts on policies maturing (or likely to claim) in the next five years may become 
large relative to the size of the fund for a particularly aged workforce. In such a case, it 
may be necessary to enter into future contracts in a suitable future’s market, reduce the 
fund’s equity exposure or reduce the smoothing. 
Contract design may be dominated by tax considerations, which may also lead to 
participation in the forward contracts by the insurance company’s shareholders.  
4.2 Pricing forwards and futures 
Determining forward prices is relatively simple. Entering into a contract to buy an asset 
at a particular price at a future date is equivalent to borrowing money to buy the asset 
now, and repaying the loan at that date. Similarly, the counterparty could sell the asset 
now and put the money on deposit. The forward price of the asset should therefore be the 
current market price plus interest for the period.  
The rate of interest to use will depend on market conditions, the bargaining power of the 
participants, tax, expenses and credit risks. The terms on similar listed future contracts 
will provide a first estimate for the interest rates to use. Because the market in long-term 
future contracts (over a year or two) is relatively thin, short term rates will have to be 
used to give an indication of the important considerations. The starting point in 
determining a fair rate would normally be the rate of return on riskless government stock 
– the standard assumption of financial economics. Those who take the short position in 
future contracts are able to participate in the market at this rate, so should be given a 
higher rate for participating in these illiquid forward contracts. They are also taking some 
counterparty risk, suggesting that a further some margin should be added.  
Policyholders taking the long positions would probably be subject to borrowing rates 
significantly higher than the risk free rate – even though their position would be secured 
by the surrender values of their policies.  
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This would suggest that the pre tax interest rates should perhaps be somewhat higher 
than those for good quality corporate debt. The rate on home loans might be considered 
as a retail analogy for a secured loan, and thus function as a ceiling.  
4.3 Smoothed maturity value 
The smoothed payout at maturity of those units committed to forward contracts would be 
determined by the following formula –  
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Where:  
maturity takes place at t = 0 
n is the smoothing term   
U
-t is the number of units committed to forward contracts at time -t 
P
-t is the market price of the units at time -t, which includes reinvested dividends. 
i
-t is the spot rate of interest of term t at time -t 
Insurers, or the policyholders, could choose an appropriate value for the smoothing term 
n, and formula for U
-t. 
An obvious formula would be: 
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Where: 
TUk is the total number of units allocated to the policy at time k. 
For policies with no premiums during the smoothing term, this would provide for an 
equal number of units to be committed to future contracts in each of the n periods. Where 
premiums are still being paid during the smoothing term, this formula would produce an 
increasing the number of units as the policies near maturity. If a more equal weighting 
over the period was wanted in such cases, an appropriate adjustment to formula (2) 
Chapter 8: Smoothing 
 
260 
 
would need to be made for the units that were expected to be bought by the unpaid 
premiums. 
4.4 Anti-selection 
The approach described here allows for the determination of fair, market consistent, 
surrender values without the anti-selection risk that some policyholders will be able to 
trade their units on terms disadvantageous to others. This is because the forward prices 
can be worked backwards to determine their current market value for purposes of 
surrender. The surrender value at time k before maturity will be: 
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Where:  
SVk is the surrender value at time k. 
Time 0 would still be the planned maturity date, 0 < k < n 
Another type of anti-selection problem arises if new policyholders wish to take out a 
policy with a term of less than n, the smoothing term. A similar problem exists if an 
existing policyholder wishes to pay an additional premium in the last n years of the 
policy’s term. These are analogous to a reverse surrender, and equation (3) would then 
form the basis for the number of units to allocate to the policy. The additional premium 
would be equivalent to the surrender value. There would be any number of ways of 
determining U
-t, the number of units that would be committed to forward contracts at the 
time the additional premium was paid. One approach would be for no immediate 
allocation, that is U
-t = 0 for all values of t less than k. An alternative would be for a 
proportionate allocation; that is U
-t = TU-k /n for all values of t less than k. TU-k has to be 
determined as it is the number of new units to allocate in respect of the additional 
premium. 
4.5 Effects on investment returns 
It can be seen that the smoothed return is equivalent to that obtained by “lifestyle” 
disinvesting from equities, and buying zero coupon fixed interest assets as maturity 
approaches. As discussed above, this forgoes the equity premium as retirement 
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approaches. The difference is that this algorithm provides for gearing in the initial years 
of the policy that allows for the recapture of the equity premium that will be foregone 
later. It is unlikely that the two will exactly counterbalance each other, but they should be 
of broadly the same value ex ante. 
The proposed algorithm has other advantages over the lifestyle approach because most of 
the transactions should be internal (between generations of policyholders). This reduces 
the administration and its costs, saves the costs of brokerage on dealing, and saves the 
difference between the interest rates on borrowing and investments.  
5 CREATING ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
This model can also be used to create new investment instruments. 
5.1 Inflation linked assets 
Inflation linked instruments of appropriate term can be created by the formula: 
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Where: 
CPIt is the consumer price index at time t 
r
-t is the spot real rate for term t at time -t 
This means that the internal lifestyle investments obtain an inflation linked return, and 
that the policyholders acting as counterparties borrow at an inflation linked rate. The 
former is not a new instrument; the latter is. This removes the risk to both parties of 
unexpected changes to the rate of inflation.  
5.2 Other linkages 
There is no reason to stop there. Inflation could be replaced by a wage index, GDP per 
capita, or any other suitable index that allowed pensioners to participate in a country’s 
overall prosperity. In each case, the rate of interest would need to be suitably adjusted to 
take into account perceptions of the relative risk and expected growth of the index.  
Chapter 8: Smoothing 
 
262 
 
The expected rate of interest used would be higher because of the systemic risk involved. 
Younger policyholders might be prepared to pay the higher rates because they would be 
hedging their exposure to the volatility of the growth in wages or GDP per capita. 
5.3 Dividend links 
Another method would be to use an index of dividend growth and the dividend yield. 
This yields the formula: 
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Where:  
dy
-t is the dividend yield on a share index, and  
D indext is measures the rate of growth in dividends on those shares. 
This method gives a rate of return of somewhat more than the dividend yield plus the rate 
of growth of the dividend index. This method is suggested, not so much for its smoothing 
benefits, but because it can be reconciled with the traditional actuarial approach to 
dividend smoothing discussed earlier. The units used in this chapter first need to be 
redefined so that that the dividends are no longer reinvested in the units. This allows us 
to formulate a new price related to the dividend index: 
ttt indexDdyP −=*1  
Equation (5) can then be reformulated as follows: 
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The middle term can then be developed: 
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The conclusion to be drawn from this development is that the actuarial value is an 
approximation to an average of forward contracts. The inequality (6) is greater if the 
dividend yields vary significantly. The traditional approach effectively removes the 
benefits of dollar cost averaging, but is otherwise not necessarily unfair. 
6 AN ILLUSTRATION  
The graphs below examine the effects of applying this algorithm in South African over 
the past 3 decades.  
6.1 Smoothing achieved 
Given relatively high and volatile rates of inflation, nominal spot rates were 
inappropriate so equation (4) in section 5.1 was used. Real rates of interest were not 
available over the period, so dividend yields were used instead. A value of n = 60 months 
was used.  
The results shown in figure 1 overleaf are encouraging. It shows payouts at six monthly 
intervals of an investment of 1 per month for ten years. The large payouts in the eighties 
especially reflect two decades of inflation in excess of 15% p.a. Maturing smoothed 
policyholders would have received much smoother returns than linked policyholders. 
They would have been protected from much of the share market slump of the seventies, 
and the sharper stock market cracks of 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1998. They would not 
however have benefited from all the higher prices of the late seventies and mid eighties. 
The results do not appear to be particularly sensitive to adjustments in the smoothing 
term, real yields or formula.  
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This smoothing was to be expected. If we were using a single premium policy and the 
forward contracts were spread equally over 60 months, the monthly variance in payout 
(ignoring the effect of interest rate changes) would be reduced to 1/60 or about 13% of 
that of an unsmoothed return.  
Figure 1: Smoothing (d/y + inflation) - 10 year monthly JSE investment  
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6.2 A problem with actuarial values 
The actuarial values based on formula (6) seemed a reasonable approximation to this 
smoothing algorithm. Figure 2 shows the real values of the JSE All Share index, and the 
actuarial value of the assets if the assets are valued by treating the real dividend index as 
perpetuity at 4%. The actuarial value may be made more or less consistent with forward 
pricing. Smooth it is not because the dividend index is far from smooth. It may be 
smoother in more diversified markets, and there may be ways of ad hoc adjustment, but it 
does not appear suitable for smoothing in South Africa.  
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Figure 2: Smoothing using d/y + growth 
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7 OTHER ISSUES 
7.1 Guarantees 
Traditional with profit policies offer an underlying and increasing guarantee as well as 
smoothing investment returns. The discussion of Clay et al again raised long standing 
debates as to the value to policyholders of these guarantees, and the common failure to 
explicitly cost them. This algorithm will significantly reduce the cost of investment 
guarantees. The exact reduction in costs must be left to further research, but the 
reduction in variance makes it clear that it will be substantial. Of course, the smoothing is 
relatively short term – five years in the illustration. Guaranteeing longer term rates is not 
really possible.  
7.2 Application to retirement funds 
This algorithm can obviously be applied to DC retirement funds, life office annuities and 
pensions. The method of determining a surrender value would apply to withdrawals and 
early retirements. The method can be applied to the smoothing of lump sum payments 
and (with greater administrative complexity) to the smoothing of pension payments. 
Monthly smoothing of pensions would perhaps find little favour, but an annual 
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smoothing (where amounts were disinvested annually and spread over the year) could 
well provide an acceptably smooth income. 
There seems no point in applying it to DB funds, however, as the employer would 
effectively be on both sides of the forward contracts. 
7.3 Investment choice 
The method can be applied to policies or funds that offer investment choice. The choice 
of fund will be the prerogative of the policyholders holding the long position in the 
forwards, as the maturing policyholders have locked in their returns for the period. The 
relative risk of the investments chosen might then effect their margin requirements and 
perhaps limit their ability to change their investment elections. Keeping track of such 
elections would add another, but not insuperable, layer of complexity to the 
administration of the funds. 
8 CONCLUSION 
Smoothing is recognised as a useful element in managing the risks of investing for 
retirement. The main mechanisms used in the past have been DB pension funds and 
smoothed bonus policies. They both suffer from being unclear as to the effects of their 
operation, and open to abuse.  
Smoothing with the forward algorithms suggested here provides an objective and fair 
manner of smoothing that efficiently mimics lifestyle investment strategies. The 
contracts can be marked to market so they are not vulnerable to anti-selection, and do not 
lock members into long term contracts. It also allows for the creation of a number of 
alternative linkages that can be used to smooth income in retirement.  
When developing alternative smoothing algorithms, both theoreticians and practitioners 
could use the formula developed here to check on fairness and resistance to anti-
selection. 
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CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION: METAPHYSICS AND 
MOTIVATION 
 
This conclusion attempts to outline how the vision given in the introduction, and spelt 
out in the body of the thesis, can be extended and applied by further research and 
action.  
The earlier chapters have shown how the institutional structure of the retirement fund 
industry (the legislation, the organizations, the benefits offered) can be reformed to 
remove injustice and better serve the beneficiaries. This final chapter considers how 
those who might contribute to reforms could develop the motivation and the wisdom to 
do so.  
This chapter suggests first that that motivation can come from the discovery of 
vocation. The idea of vocation, or a calling, can be seen as archaic, and based on a 
different metaphysic to that now dominant in actuarial and economic research and 
practice, but it provides a way in which energy and courage can be developed and 
focussed on social reform and other desirable outcomes. While the idea of vocation 
can be discussed without reference to religion, I find such discourse unsatisfying and 
inadequate. I therefore include in this section of the chapter some of my own Christian 
experiences and views. For those who do not share the views, I hope the discussion 
will help to clarify differences, even if it fails to persuade. 
The next section of the chapter turns to the question of wisdom, another term that 
might be described as archaic, but which includes both the knowledge and personal 
skills to effect change and the ability to commit to action in the face of uncertainty.  
The final section describes, in more detail, possibilities and imperatives for research, 
practice and regulation.  
1 VOCATION 
Hall and Chandler (2005) examine vocation as a means of ensuring "psychological 
success" in a career. They report on other research that correlates objective career 
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success with people's subjective interpretation of their careers, and suggest that it is 
simplistic to assume that the subjective follows the objective by some type of ex post 
rationalization. People who set personal goals do achieve some of them and feel better 
as a consequence. Those who respond to a calling do, as a consequence, create the 
objective outcome of their own careers. Hall and Chandler find that the basis for 
vocation can be religious or secular but the idea clearly has religious roots. 
Chamberlain (2004) describes how sociology has traced the "Protestant work ethic" to 
a religious understanding of vocation, and how Catholic thought has arrived at a 
similar view of vocation as having an application to secular as well as religious careers 
during the past century.  
Hall and Chandler also provide some discussion of how people develop a sense of 
vocation. They mention evidence of unique and applicable gifts; a strong sense of 
involvement or passion; how the vocation is difficult to find and articulate; and how it 
provides a sense of purpose. So much can be agreed by secular and religious positions, 
but animating the concept seems to me to require that people be invited to participate 
in a particular position, or at least be given enough detail to understand the emotional 
as well as the intellectual attractions. Hall and Chandler certainly give an example in 
their paper. It may, therefore, be helpful to share my sense of vocation in the hope that 
it may provide assistance to others in defining their own.  
My involvement in the retirement industry was sparked by a sense of outrage at the 
unjust treatment of withdrawing members from defined benefit funds, and later flamed 
by the injustice of the means test and its consequences for lower income people. These 
two structures – or more accurately the indifference of those who derive a healthy 
living from these same arrangements and have the power to change things - still have 
the power to get my adrenalin flowing.  
My tendency to anger was however rightly admonished by a friend quoting James132: 
“So then my beloved brethren, let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to 
wrath; for the wrath of man does not produce the righteousness of God.” 
While I have often been slow to hear, the bibliographies of the foregoing chapters 
                                                    
132
 1:19 in the New King James version. 
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indicate that I have been diligent in seeking out the voices - from different disciplines 
and viewpoints - of those who have written on the subject. I have also heard from a 
wide variety of participants in the retirement industry, not necessarily from diligence, 
but from responses to two compulsions. For the first my personal propensities, family, 
school and career choice spoke as one: professional duty. My father's example was 
reinforced by the school's motto “Orando et laborando” (by prayer and by work), and 
the Francis Bacon quote that at one stage appeared on Institute of Actuaries 
publications: 
“I hold every man a debtor to his profession; from the which as men of course do seek 
to receive countenance and profit, so ought they of duty to endeavour themselves by 
way of amends to be a help and ornament thereunto." 
This should not suggest that I have not gained sustenance and pleasure from family, 
school or profession. The latter is particularly relevant here, as participation has been 
repaid by many warm friendships and congenial interactions. What contribution I have 
made in this area would have been inconceivable had I not felt I belonged inside the 
profession. 
The other compulsion came from the Old Testament prophets and the South African 
Churches, who both insist that we should listen to the poor. Interactions here were as 
often intense as congenial, but often more rewarding for it. In particular, I was exposed 
to two emotionally and intellectually seminal influences in the middle of 1975. The 
first was the ten day conference of the Anglican Students Federation, the only student 
organization of the period that had not split into white and black components. I was 
often left in tears at the intense pain that was expressed; and more were shed as I 
worked through the second major influence, the SPROCAS (Study Project on 
Christianity in an Apartheid Society) reports133. These were a careful analysis of racial 
oppression in South Africa and the possibilities for reform. They were written by some 
150 largely white and Christian intellectuals. Perhaps because they were also largely 
English speakers with no influence on government, the main conclusion seemed to be 
that blacks would have to win their own liberation. The thinking of the black Anglican 
students, and the SPROCAS participants, was informed by the dialectic of black 
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 Published by the Christian Institute and the South African Council of Churches 
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consciousness enunciated by Steve Biko: 
“The thesis is in fact a strong white racism and therefore, the antithesis to this must, 
ipso facto, be a strong solidarity amongst the blacks on whom this white racism seeks 
to prey. Out of these two situations we can therefore hope to reach some kind of 
balance - a true humanity where power politics will have no place.”134 
James, SPROCAS and black consciousness converged: one should not presume to 
speak for God or the poor unless specifically called. My calling seemed: become an 
actuary, “mind your own business”135, and wait to be called.  
In the process, I also made myself available to serve and to undertake some research. 
For the former, I became an occasional advisor on retirement issues to the Black trade 
unions, one consequence of which is described in chapter 6 of this thesis. The research 
began with Asher (1987), which was more an opinion piece on withdrawal benefits 
than a research paper, but it bears a similar title to this thesis and began my 
involvement with retirement fund policy: in particular six years as member of the 
Pension Fund Committee of the Actuarial Society of South Africa followed by as 
many years on the Ministerial Advisory Committee on Pension Funds. Amidst the 
more pressing issues of the times, my membership of these committees allowed me to 
suggest a link of the withdrawal benefit issue to the more pressing question of surplus 
refunds. This may have provided the seed that led to the 2001 reforms which, inter 
alia, imposed minimum withdrawal benefits on all retirement funds. I do not know 
how important my role was in this sequence, but it does provide satisfaction to know 
that I participated actively. I mention it here because it illustrates the long gestation 
period required for policy reform, and provides a reason to set ambitious long term 
goals. 
In addition to cultivating patience, there is other personal work that may well be 
necessary in finding and responding to a calling. Luke's beatitudes (6:20-22) all speak 
to me.  
                                                    
134
 Steve Biko (1971) Black consciousness and the quest for a true humanity 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/specialprojects/black-consciousness/biko/writings-humanity.htm 
135
 As Paul has it in 1 Thessalonians 4:11 
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"Blessed are you who are poor, for yours is the kingdom of God.  
Blessed are you who hunger now, for you will be satisfied.  
Blessed are you who weep now, for you will laugh.  
Blessed are you when men hate you, when they exclude you and insult you and reject 
your name as evil, because of the Son of Man.” 
While they have a literal meaning as words of comfort, I have always understood them 
to set standards of virtue. In order: humility, which includes separating from personal 
and class interests to listen to others; a hunger for justice; a compassion that weeps at 
evil; courage in the face of opposition.  
2 PRACTICAL WISDOM 
My sense of calling led to 14 years as Director of Actuarial Studies at the University 
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. One of the reasons was to give myself time to 
learn from the academic literature in the fields related to actuarial work. I found it on 
the one hand surprisingly rich, but on the other disappointingly narrow. The 
narrowness arises, to my mind, partly from a reluctance to risk controversy even on a 
technical level, and more especially when linked to practical and moral issues.  
The introduction to this thesis quoted Michael Polanyi on the necessity of a 
“committed and passionate” rather than disinterested approach to finding truth. It 
seems to me that such commitment is more likely to search widely for assistance and 
be concerned about applications. It should however be identified and disclosed. My 
personal commitment is to the Truth that provides meaning and beauty to our private 
and working lives: intellect and emotion; social, economic and political. My belief is 
that because they arise from God, the different aspects of our lives co-inhere in each 
other. This co-inherence136 means that separating our knowledge into artificial 
compartments can produce a distorted reductionistic understanding.  
I find much economic research and discussion to be reductionistic. As is illustrated in 
the introduction and chapter 8, the research is frequently narrow and dogmatic. One 
school of economists has difficulty with explanations of behaviour that are not based 
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 A term that derives from early Christian writers, but I first found it in Williams (1939). 
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on material self-interest, let alone social and ethical considerations. It seems to me that 
this materialist economics intersects almost entirely with assertions that true science is 
value free. Rothbard (1976) deals with this question in his discussion of the views of 
Ludwig von Mises, one of the more influential proponents of value free economics. He 
acknowledges the validity of Von Mises's point that one must accept the distinction 
between how things are and how they ought to be, and that experts in the one are not 
necessarily experts in the other, but then shows that von Mises's attempt to support 
both laissez faire and value free economics simultaneously is not consistent. Free 
markets ought to be supported because they embody the value of liberty and appear 
more likely to be more efficient and reward industry. These are clearly value 
judgements, as are other views that inequality and failure to provide for everyone's 
needs, which frequently arise from the operation of a free market, are problems.  
Similarly Gouldner (1961), in discussing sociologist Max Weber's influential espousal 
of the value free, suggests that “the myth of a value free sociology was Weber's way of 
attempting to adjudicate the tensions ... between science and religion...” Gouldner 
echoes a suggestion in Polanyi (1962) when he says of the value free notion: “it invites 
men to ignore the vulnerability of reason to bias, leaves it at the mercy of 
irrationality.” The irrationality arises because neither self-interest nor moral 
indignation, which often provide emotional drivers for debate, are recognised for what 
they are.  
Conflicts between science, ethics and religion can represent a problem, but seem to me 
to derive from the relationships of the people concerned rather than the intellectual 
inconsistencies that emerge from time to time. The solution lies in the rules of 
engagement rather than insisting on a cessation of debate. “No politics, sex or 
religion" may be an alternative if participants in a discussion cannot stick to rules of 
courtesy, but if we want the truth, we have to be prepared to try to understand and 
interact with reasonable people with whom we disagree.  
In applying the distinction between the objective and subjective to actuarial work, 
Thomson (2004) distinguishes between science, which includes the pursuit of 
knowledge, and wisdom. He suggests that wise criteria are “essentially subjective”, 
although he is making the case for utility theory to be seen as normative and limits the 
subjective to the shape of the utility function. It appears to me that, in the absence of a 
coherent alternative, utility theory more than provides enough criteria to decide 
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whether a particular investment choice is wise or not. Similarly, it is suggested that 
justice is a universal standard that requires those exercising decisions of power to 
consider a definable range of criteria. People may trade the criteria off against each 
other, but they must all be considered. If they fail to consider all the criteria, the 
decision is procedurally unjust. And academic research is foolish if it identifies 
knowledge and techniques but fails to situate them in a framework that can lead to 
wise decisions.  
What then is wisdom? Sternberg (2002) has edited what seems to be the most cited of 
modern books on wisdom, where a number of the authors lament the decline of the 
concept. Chandler (1990), for instance, referring to well-known philosophers for 
support, "argues that our modern conception of the knowing process is a much 
fragmented and highly restricted version of a once more elaborate conceptual scheme 
... of the notion of wisdom and the existence of wise persons." There is however a 
clear recognition within the book that wisdom integrates the cognitive, the affective 
and the moral, and makes skilled practical judgements in the face of uncertainty. 
Wisdom is the object of learning.  
I think Chandler is overly pessimistic. In my experience, wisdom is widely valued 
outside the social sciences. Many of my teachers clearly sought and valued wisdom, 
and "sound actuarial judgement" is frequently used by members of the profession. 
With both teachers and actuarial colleagues, there has been a significant intersection 
with my experience of other Christians, and of sharing together in a search for 
wisdom. While there is an apparent inconsistency between the biblical injunction that 
"the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (repeated throughout the "wisdom 
books": Job, Psalms, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes)137 and the secular method of exposure 
to alternate views and debate, both include instruction and interaction with a teacher. 
While not a Socratic dialogue, the raging debates of the book of Job and the volatile 
intensity of the Psalms do force active consideration of different points of view. Thus 
it seems to me that controversy is necessary to create the ability to consider alternative 
positions and to wrestle with them until there is some reconciliation or integration. As 
such it is necessary for the development of wisdom.  
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 See especially Proverbs chapters 8 and 9. 
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This would also mean that different intellectual and professional disciplines do, or at 
least should, hold together. Pension fund design must surely be informed by sociology 
and gerontology as well as the health and management sciences. Modern disciplines 
however seem to define themselves quite narrowly. Thomson (2004), for instance, also 
seems to find it necessary to explicitly justify the inclusion of normal actuarial work in 
a scientific thesis. This is perhaps partly a consequence of the relatively recent 
introduction of actuarial studies into the university curriculum. I also interpret it as a 
defence against reductionistic arguments that research is only legitimate if it conforms 
to a narrow interpretation of the scientific method.  
As with justice, I would argue that the value of research is similarly to be considered 
in terms of a range of criteria. These include the scientific criteria of logical 
consistency, objectivity and independence and the need to test theory against other 
theories and against data. The criteria should also include respect for the interests and 
opinions of others who may be affected; relevance to real world problems and decision 
making; aesthetics: in which I would include elegance, enthusiasm and clarity; as well 
as the ability to communicate and persuade.  
To those who would argue that these are not the traditional academic objectives, my 
response would be that their tradition is too short and too narrow. Universities by their 
name proclaim their founders' objective of the pursuit of universal truth and, by their 
contemporary nature, are primarily concerned with the professional development of 
their students, and not the narrow perspectives within which some researchers appear 
to confine themselves. Specialization does not mean tunnel-vision. 
Most importantly theory and practice ought to co-inhere: “good theory is good practice 
aware of itself” as I was once told. In my experience, Church and duty demanded more 
than listening. It could be of no value unless there was praxis - practical consequences. 
The next section from James has it: “be doers of the word and not hearers only, 
deceiving yourselves.”  
Wisdom can of course be found in some of the published economic and actuarial 
research. My problem could alternatively be framed as a disappointment that so many 
of the researchers appear so poorly read. Wisdom requires a balance of the materialist 
economists and the World Bank literature with Herbert Simon and the institutional 
economists, the International Labour Organization and wise writers such as Thompson 
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(1998) and Barr (2001) in the modern pensions literature. Some would also benefit 
from reading Adam Smith - both “Wealth of Nations” (1776) and his earlier book on 
ethics (1759). 
Finally, in considering practical consequences, I would suggest that we need a theory 
of sin and forgiveness. This is necessary to connect what is with what ought to be and 
what can be. One of the words translated sin is an archery term that means falling 
short. It refers to failure in relationships, thinking and working: intellect and emotion; 
social, economic and political. Some failure is inevitable, but no progress is possible 
unless we are agreed that there was indeed failure, and that we have the capacity to 
change ourselves and our world. The Christian concept of grace is that we can be 
forgiven if we repent of our sins. And while our prime responsibility is to look to our 
own actions, a concept of sin also permits of a prophetic vocation to hold the powerful 
accountable for the justice of their actions. For those not persuaded of the Christian 
position, Braithwaite (2002), writes of the importance of both shame and restoration in 
a range of non-Christian cultures.  
3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
A few suggestions for researchers, practitioners and regulators are sketched out at the 
end of each of the chapters. With the whole picture now sketched, I can perhaps be 
bolder. 
For researchers, the main thrust is that there are enormous possibilities for connecting 
economic research into how people are behaving with actuarial knowledge of what the 
financial services industry does and how it might be changed. Research should 
however break with the ideas that people are perfectly rational, or that we will find 
predictable irrational patterns in their behaviour. Behaviour is always likely to be more 
complex. While it is worthwhile finding out what people are doing to protect their 
financial security, it is as important to determine what they should be doing. As 
discussed in the introduction, contributions to a pension fund are usually made in 
ignorance of the real needs of orphans, the disabled and the elderly. We need to know 
what makes for the best protection from disruption and poverty. This is an ongoing 
quest as the conditions will change over time. Research has not only to look at the 
present but attempt to tease out future possibilities and develop strategies. As spelt out 
at the end of Chapter 2 above, such research needs to be based on panel studies. 
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Practitioners in the pension and life insurance industry are given a range of 
suggestions in chapters 5 and 8 on how benefits could be better designed to meet the 
real needs of members. The most common response I have to suggestions of this sort is 
that there is no demand for the ideas. Most often I believe that this response arises 
because people are overloaded, and have little time to respond to yet another new 
demand.  
Sometimes the response is informed by the assumption that the purpose of business is 
to make a profit, and that this is most easily achieved by meeting the obvious demands 
of the market in the most efficient way. This is reductionistic. Drucker (1977) is I 
believe closer to the truth and more creative: “the main purpose of business is 
innovation”. The function of management is to know: what is our business? The 
business is to meet particular needs of customers and potential customers. The needs 
are met by creating new products and services, and the profit is made by showing 
customers that their needs are better met. This is an aspect of business that can be 
particularly exciting, creative and remunerative. I hope particularly that some 
practitioners will be inspired by this thesis to develop products more appropriate to 
real needs. 
As I understand the duty of regulators, theirs particularly is the duty to prevent 
injustice: the abuse of power. By regulators, I mean those in compliance roles within 
companies, especially statutorily appointed actuaries and auditors, and including 
outside directors, as well as everyone employed by industry and consumer bodies, and 
government. As to injustice, I have perhaps been too critical in this thesis but have at 
least spread the criticism widely. Injustice is to be found in civil servants who 
manipulate pension and tax rules for their own benefit, and not just in Africa. It is to 
be found in the profession and industry groups that lobby for concessions and 
compulsion that distorts markets and social structures. Executive management 
manipulate their income to many times their market value. The most apparently proper 
of trustees and their professional advisors can milk those they are supposed to serve in 
a fiduciary capacity. Financial advisors charge too much or give poor advice. 
Academics would prefer to play with mathematical models rather than address 
egregious wrongs in the industries they research. This much however is consistent 
with my understanding of the doctrine of sin, which does not rule out either 
forgiveness or hope. 
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Conscious that I may be too negative, I am comforted that established wisdom allows 
for some critical and negative feelings. As Adam Smith (1759) has it on the topic of 
indignation: “Resentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for 
defence only. It is the safeguard of justice and the security of innocence”. 
Regulators within companies particularly need courage to take what can be an 
unpopular line, but I should record warnings that it is important not to embark on an 
adversarial course without adequate personal support. Jos et al (1989), for instance, 
describe the significant costs paid by those who whistle blow. I do believe that Luke's 
beatitudes provide the model: listen, weep and hunger before risking oneself, and then 
private rebuke before open opposition: “the wrath of man does not produce the 
righteousness of God.”  
Also consistent with the nature of sin is the propensity to become more concerned with 
injustices perpetrated by someone else. Against this, Eliot Spitzer provides a role 
model. He138 does not claim to be doing anything more than his job, yet has made a 
significant impact on US financial services, clearing out conflicts of interest that had 
become entrenched in what appeared to be the most reputable of banks and insurers. 
While I do not have research to confirm this, it appears likely that the integrity of any 
system depends as much on thousands of smaller decisions to eschew or confront 
injustice - as on the occasional attorney-general with the insight, the courage and the 
political motivation, to take on an industry. And I am grateful to have worked with 
many people who have quietly, and not so quietly, made some of these courageous 
decisions and so protected us all. 
Researchers, practitioners and regulators also have an educational role. Three 
particular areas covered in the thesis stand out for me. The first is to explain the need 
for insurance; the second to reinforce good investment theory - the value of 
fundamental analysis; and the third for the centrality in matters of governance of the 
principle that conflicts of interest must be avoided.  
Finally, I ask myself whether these financial issues really justify this rather heavy 
conclusion, and whether the financial sector is that important in a world of devastating 
                                                    
138
 In Eliot Spitzer (2005) Business ethics, regulation and the "ownership society" 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements/Business_Ethics.pdf 
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poverty, vicious war and global warming. Perhaps not, but it is the area to which I 
have felt called to offer my gifts. Those of us who labour in this sector can perhaps 
take some encouragement from the end of the first chapter of James:  
“Pure and undefiled religion before God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and 
widows in their trouble, and to keep oneself unspotted from the world.” 
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